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Expatriation—the loss or relinquishment of citizenship—has a long and
divisive history as a fundamental concept of American citizenship. It has been
the subject of contentious and robust debate from the very beginning of the
country. This Article posits that the concept of expatriation today has little jurisprudential salience, despite its increasing rhetorical valence in the context of
terrorism, because the historical development of the concept has obscured its
meaning. Expatriation originally had a precise meaning: an individual right declared by the country in 1868 to be “indispensable” to the inalienable rights
identified in the Declaration of Independence. That meaning has largely been
lost due to what this Article identifies as the precession of the subject of expatriation’s root verb “expatriate.” This Article attempts to reverse this precession
and unencumber expatriation from the language of rights. In so doing, it seeks to
restore the original concept grounded in allegiance. Without that restoration,
the possibility of the state acting to expatriate an individual involuntarily continues to be a viable, if difficult, path, as demonstrated by recent and repeated
legislative proposals. If expatriation is restored as a singular, coherent, historical concept, however, that possibility no longer exists. And without that restored
concept of expatriation, grounded in allegiance, citizens’ rights may be imperiled by a formal, as opposed to functional, understanding of citizenship.

I. INTRODUCTION
Unfamiliar to most, expatriation—the loss or relinquishment of citizenship—has a long and divisive history as a fundamental concept of American
citizenship. In the 1779 Virginia Code, Thomas Jefferson declared expatriation to be a “natural right which all men have.”1 During the early years of
the United States, a legislator referred to it as “the foundation of our Revolution.”2 One commentator has called it “one of the three great international
issues” of the day during the period leading up to and following the War of
1812,3 and the Act of July 27, 1868 declared it to be “a natural and inherent
right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”4 On March 31, 1958, the Supreme Court
1
I-MIEN TSIANG, THE QUESTION OF EXPATRIATION IN AMERICA PRIOR TO 1907, at 26
(1942).
2
7 ANNALS OF CONG. 354 (1797).
3
Nancy L. Green, Expatriation, Expatriates, and Expats: The American Transformation of
a Concept, 114 AM. HIST. REV. 307, 312 (2009).
4
An Act Concerning the Rights of American Citizens in Foreign States, ch. 249, 15 Stat.
223 (1868).
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issued three closely divided opinions about it that one Justice called at the
time “the most important constitutional pronouncements of this century.”5
And most recently, legislation has been introduced in the last five Congresses that would utilize it as a tool to combat terrorism.6
The nature of expatriation has been the subject of contentious and robust debate from the very beginning of the country. In current political, popular, and scholarly dialogue, expatriation potentially includes under its
umbrella everything from the founding era debates about allegiance owed to
England7 to a Civil War statute punishing desertion by deprivation of the
“rights of citizenship”8 to a tweet by then-President-elect Trump suggesting
that one of the consequences of flag burning should be “loss of citizenship.”9 It includes the first law on expatriation, the Expatriation Act of
1868,10 as well as the legislative proposals that have been introduced since
September 11th to remove the U.S. citizenship of suspected terrorists and
those who aid them.11 And that array of meaning is a problem.
This Article posits that the concept of expatriation today has little jurisprudential salience, despite its increasing rhetorical valence in the context of
terrorism, because the historical development of the concept has obscured its
meaning. Expatriation originally had a precise meaning: an individual right
declared by the country in 1868 to be “indispensable” to the inalienable
rights identified in the Declaration of Independence.12 That meaning has
largely been lost due to what this Article identifies as the precession of the
subject of expatriation’s root verb “expatriate.”13 The only viable subject of
5
PATRICK WEIL, THE SOVEREIGN CITIZEN: DENATURALIZATION AND THE ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 147 (2013).
6
Expatriate Terrorist Act, S. 361, H.R. 1021, 115th Cong. (2017); Expatriate Terrorist
Act, S. 247, H.R. 503, 114th Cong. (2015); Enemy Expatriation Act, H.R. 545, 114th Cong.
(2015); Enemy Expatriation Act, H.R. 4186, 114th Cong. (2015); Expatriate Terrorists Act, S.
2779, H.R. 5450, 113th Cong. (2014); Enemy Expatriation Act, S. 1698, H.R. 3166, 112th
Cong. (2011); H.R. Res. 1288, 111th Cong. (2010) (urging the “issuance of a certificate of
loss of nationality for Anwar al-Awlaki”); Terrorist Expatriation Act, S. 3327, H.R. 5237,
111th Cong. (2010).
7
See infra text accompanying notes 42–99.
8
See infra text accompanying notes 754–56.
9
See Steve Vladeck, A Short Course on the Constitutional Law of Expatriation, JUST
SECURITY (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/35006/short-constitutional-law-expatriation/ [https://perma.cc/FW6M-7XEL] (quoting tweet); Charlie Savage, Trump Calls for
Revoking Flag Burners’ Citizenship. Court Rulings Forbid It., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/us/politics/trump-flag-burners-citizenship-first-amendment.html [https://nyti.ms/2jEp4y8] (also quoting tweet).
10
15 Stat. 223.
11
See WEIL, supra note 5. See the Bush Administration’s draft legislative proposal known
as the “Patriot Act II” that was never formally submitted after it was leaked. Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 § 501 (Jan. 9, 2003), http://www-tc.pbs.org/now/politics/patriot2-hi.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2QE-KCGX]. See generally Nora Graham, Patriot Act II and
Denationalization: An Unconstitutional Attempt to Revive Stripping Americans of Their Citizenship, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 593 (2005).
12
15 Stat. 223.
13
“Precession” is the comparatively slow rotation of the axis of another rotating body,
such as the circular motion of the point of a spinning top. It is most commonly used to describe

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\55-2\HLL205.txt

366

unknown

Seq: 4

Harvard Journal on Legislation

18-MAY-18

10:50

[Vol. 55

the verb “expatriate” was initially as clear as, and identical to, its object: the
individual citizen. The debate involved only the authority of a state to prevent or limit an individual from expatriating herself.14 But, as a consequence
of the historical precession described in Part I, the state became a viable
actor as well, an additional subject of the verb “expatriate.” The Supreme
Court’s reaction to this precession only furthered it without restoring expatriation as a singular, historical concept.15 And, consequently, the concept of
expatriation today includes elements of both the individual and the state acting as subject.16
The current statute governing expatriation—section 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)17—embodies the distortion of the concept caused by its historical evolution, as do the repeated legislative
proposals to amend section 349. The INA provides that a citizen who voluntarily engages in any of its enumerated acts “with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality” “shall lose his nationality.”18 The specific
intent requirement, a constitutional requirement originating in the Supreme
Court’s foundational decisions in Afroyim v. Rusk19 and Vance v. Terrazas,20
ensures that the government is not violating the Fourteenth Amendment and
expatriating the individual; instead, the individual is intentionally expatriating herself. But the acts in the statute predate the Supreme Court’s rulings
and represent the era of expatriation in which the state did act as the subject
and expatriate individuals. As a result, if an individual does perform one of
the acts, the government can still “revoke” her citizenship against her will
under section 349, what some have called “involuntary expatriation,”21 if it
can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she specifically intended
to relinquish her citizenship in performing the act, even if she asserts that
she did not so intend.22
Further complicating the issue is that, despite the paramount importance of the citizen’s intent under the current Afroyim-Terrazas framework,
an individual citizen can expatriate herself only by performing one of section
the motion of the Earth’s axis of rotation. I use this term to describe the phenomenon by which
the actor in the context of expatriation has slowly rotated from individual to state and back
around to individual. The term is apt because expatriation has always derived its meaning from
the dynamic mix of the national and international definitions of “citizen,” “citizenship,” and
“allegiance,” which themselves have been in constant flux throughout U.S. history. Thus the
subject of the verb “expatriate” is a second axis by which to understand expatriation, the
rotation of which has generated significant changes over the course of U.S. history that have
largely gone unnoticed.
14
See infra text accompanying notes 100–42.
15
See infra text accompanying notes 278–378.
16
See infra text accompanying notes 436–70.
17
8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (2012).
18
Id.
19
387 U.S. 253 (1967).
20
444 U.S. 252 (1980).
21
BEN HERZOG, REVOKING CITIZENSHIP: EXPATRIATION IN AMERICA FROM THE COLONIAL
ERA TO THE WAR ON TERROR 24–25 (2015).
22
Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 260–63.
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349’s enumerated acts with the requisite intent. She cannot, for example,
renounce her citizenship within the United States, even in a sworn statement
before a court, except when the United States is “in a state of war.”23 Nor
could a citizen do as Adam Gadahn did and rip up his passport in a public
video, but instead of calling it a “symbolic” gesture, claim it to be his formal act of expatriation.24 Despite the individual’s clear intent to renounce his
citizenship and expatriate himself, he could apply for a new passport the
following day, and the State Department could not deny the request on citizenship grounds.25
The pending and past legislative proposals to add terrorism-related provisions to section 349 demonstrate the inherent tension and confusion in the
modern concept of expatriation. In 2010, shortly after Faisal Shahzad, a dual
Pakistani-American citizen, attempted to detonate a car bomb in the middle
of Times Square, Senators Joe Lieberman (D-Conn.) and Scott Brown (RMass.) introduced legislation called the Terrorist Expatriation Act.26 Senator
Lieberman said that “[t]hose who join such groups [as al Qaeda and the
Taliban] join our enemy and should be deprived of the rights and privileges
of U.S. citizenship and the ability to use their American passports as tools of
terror.”27 Senator Brown advocated the slightly different position that
“[i]ndividuals who pick up arms . . . have effectively denounced their citizenship, and this legislation simply memorializes that effort.”28
When Senator Ted Cruz (R-Tex.) first introduced the Expatriate Terrorists Act in 2014,29 shortly after the United States commenced airstrikes
against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS),30 he stood on the Senate
floor to argue for its passage by unanimous consent, stating that the bill
23
8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6). Even then, the individual’s renunciation would be sufficient only
if the Attorney General approves the renunciation as “not contrary to the interests of the
United States” and it is undertaken according to the procedures described by the Attorney
General. Id.
24
See American-Born Al Qaeda Spokesman Lashes Out at U.S. in New Tape, FOXNEWS
.COM, Jan. 6, 2008, http://www.foxnews.com/story/2008/01/06/american-born-al-qaedaspokesman-lashes-out-at-us-in-new-tape.html [https://perma.cc/6G9K-LCGQ] (describing a
video released by al-Qaeda that “featured the California-born Adam Gadahn tearing up his
U.S. passport as part of a ‘symbolic’ protest against Washington”).
25
See U.S. Dep’t of State, Renunciation of U.S. Nationality Abroad, https://travel.state
.gov/content/travel/en/legal-considerations/us-citizenship-laws-policies/renunciation-of-citizenship.html [https://perma.cc/D5LW-KFUK] (“Renunciations abroad that do not meet the
conditions described above have no legal effect.”).
26
Terrorist Expatriation Act, S. 3327, 111th Cong. (2010).
27
Jean Spencer, Lieberman, Brown Unveil Bill to Strip Citizenship, WALL ST. J. (May 6,
2010), https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/05/06/lieberman-brown-unveil-bill-to-strip-citizenship/ [https://perma.cc/JFU6-66D4] (emphasis added).
28
Charlie Savage & Carl Hulse, Bill Targets Citizenship of Terrorists’ Allies, N.Y. TIMES
(May 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/world/07rights.html [https://perma.cc/
E8TY-E63V] (emphasis added).
29
Expatriate Terrorists Act, S. 2779, 113th Cong. (2014).
30
See Remarks on the Situation in Iraq, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 602 (Aug. 7,
2014), (President Obama explaining that he had authorized airstrikes in Iraq against ISIS). The
President referred to the group as “ISIL,” the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and the
group is also known as the Islamic State, the name it gave itself on June 29, 2014. See KEN-
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would “make fighting for ISIS, taking up arms against the United States, an
affirmative renunciation of American citizenship,” which is a “privilege . . .
not a right.”31 According to Cruz, “[p]eople who are serving foreign powers—or in this case, foreign terrorists—are clearly in violation of the oath
which they swore when they became citizens.”32 The political dialogue demonstrates the confusion between what entity is taking an action—the state or
the terrorist—and what the action—expatriation—really is. Under the proposed additions to section 349, which are based on both criminal and noncriminal acts,33 would the United States be “depriving” individuals of their
citizenship because they were in “violation” of their oath? Or have these
terrorists “affirmative[ly] ren[ounced]” and “effectively denounced” their
citizenship, actions that would simply be “memorialize[d]” by the statute’s
revocation of citizenship?
These legislative proposals, among other things, have led to a spate of
scholarly commentary on expatriation.34 But this discussion has been hampered by the confusion and conflation inherent in the term “expatriation”
itself. Section 349, and the various legislative proposals, are not the cause of
the problem. They are a symptom.
This Article starts from the beginning—the creation of the individual
right of expatriation at the founding of our country—and attempts to restore
expatriation as a singular, coherent concept. As it demonstrates, the foundation of that concept, obscured by the precession of the subject and ultimately
extinguished by the Supreme Court, is allegiance. Part II traces the history of
expatriation in the United States from the founding of the country to the
current section 349, demonstrating the precession of the subject of “expatriate” from the individual, to the state, and then back around to the individual,
a rotation that occurred amidst dizzying developments in the United States
KATZMAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R43612, IRAQ CRISIS AND U.S. POLICY 8
(2014).
31
160 CONG. REC. S5726 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 2014) (emphasis added).
32
Id. (emphasis added).
33
The proposals would each add several “expatriating acts” to section 349, including
becoming a member of, providing training or material assistance to, or joining the hostile
forces of a foreign terrorist organization. Expatriate Terrorist Act, S. 361, H.R. 1021, § 1,
115th Cong. (2017); Enemy Expatriation Act, S.1698, H.R. 3166, § 2, 112th Cong. (2011).
34
See, e.g., HERZOG, supra note 21; WEIL, supra note 5; Leslie Esbrook, Citizenship Unmoored: Expatriation as a Counter-Terrorism Tool, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1273 (2016); Annam
Farooq, Expunging Statelessness from Terrorist Expatriation Statutes, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV.
933 (2016); Nora Graham, Patriot Act II and Denationalization: An Unconstitutional Attempt
to Revive Stripping Americans of Their Citizenship, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 593 (2005); Charles
Hooker, The Past as Prologue: Schneiderman v. United States and Contemporary Questions
of Citizenship and Denationalization, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 305 (2005); Peter J. Spiro,
Expatriating Terrorists, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2177 (2014); Shelby D. Wood, No Going
Home: An Analysis of U.S. and U.K. Expatriation Laws as Applied to the Current Crisis in
Iraq and Syria, 25 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 229 (2015); David Cole, No, You Can’t
Strip Americans of their Citizenship, Senator Cruz: The Folly of the Expatriate Terrorists Act,
JUST SECURITY (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.justsecurity.org/15147/no-cant-strip-americanscitizenship-senator-cruz-folly-expatriate-terrorists-act/ [https://perma.cc/LSV2-CYDE];
Vladeck, supra note 9.
NETH

R

R
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and internationally with respect to citizenship, travel, immigration, and residence abroad. Part III attempts to reverse this precession and unencumber
expatriation from the language of rights in order to restore expatriation to the
original concept grounded in allegiance. Part IV explains why such restoration is vital. Without it, the possibility of the state acting as subject continues
to be a viable, if difficult, path, as demonstrated by the pending legislative
proposals. And without a restored concept of expatriation grounded in allegiance, citizens’ rights may be imperiled by a formal, as opposed to functional, understanding of citizenship.
II. THE HISTORY

OF

EXPATRIATION AND
SUBJECT

THE

PRECESSION

OF THE

This Part recounts the fascinating history of the law of expatriation in
the United States. As it demonstrates, the birth and historical development of
the concept of expatriation in the United States is a precession of the subject
of its root verb “expatriate”—from citizen, to government, and around to
citizen again. This entire precession is now imbedded in the concept itself,
obscuring the meaning of expatriation in scholarly and political discourse
and preventing a dialogue about its place in our modern, global society.
At the time of the founding of the United States, the individual right of
expatriation was inseparable from emigration and naturalization.35 From the
founding of the country to the Expatriation Act of 1868, during an era in
which allegiance to more than one country was an absurdity,36 the creation
and advancement of an individual right of expatriation in the United States
was propelled by the desire that individuals emigrating from their native
country and naturalizing as U.S. citizens had the ability, and indeed the
right, to transfer their allegiance from their native country to the United
States.37 With respect to the act of expatriation, the subject of the underlying
verb “expatriate,” from the founding of the country until the 20th century,
was the individual.
As the United States developed and faced new international challenges
and pressures, the precession of the subject to the state began with the first
35
See, e.g., Edwin M. Borchard, Decadence of the American Doctrine of Voluntary Expatriation, 25 AM. J. INT’L L. 312, 314 (1931) (“Freedom of emigration and freedom of expatriation, its incident and corollary, are thus indelibly associated. The abandonment of the one
involves an abandonment of the other.”).
36
See 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 356, 361 (1859) (“No government would allow one of its subjects
to divide his allegiance between it and another sovereign; for they all know that no man can
serve two masters. . . . The allegiance demanded of a naturalized resident must have been
always understood as exclusive.”); 3 JOHN B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 518
(1906) (recognizing that the “doctrine of double allegiance” had been criticized as “unphilosophical”); Peter Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J.
1411, 1417–42 (1997); see also United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 720 (1898)
(Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (“[D]ouble allegiance in the sense of double nationality has no place
in our law.”).
37
See HERZOG, supra note 21, at 27–30; TSIANG, supra note 1, at 25–28.

R
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administrative implementation of the individual right of expatriation in the
late 20th century and the codification of existing law in the Expatriation Act
of 1907.38 In implementing international treaties and the 1907 Act, the executive branch developed a common law of expatriation, complete with presumptions and evidentiary requirements. The Nationality Act of 1940 then
attempted to codify this common law,39 but, in so doing, it also altered the
fundamental nature of expatriation, reifying in statute the precession of the
subject to the state.
In the latter half of the 20th century, in a series of closely divided decisions arising under the Nationality Act of 1940 and its descendants, the Supreme Court again altered the nature of expatriation. After some initial
disagreement, the Court ultimately forced the precession of the subject back
to the individual, ruling that the Constitution prohibited the government
from acting as the subject of “expatriate.” But, in so doing, the Court did
not restore expatriation to its historical conception, an endeavor for which
Chief Justice Warren had advocated in his dissent in the first round of decisions on the Nationality Act of 1940.40 Instead, the Court accepted the expansion of the concept and limited its applicability. As a constitutional
matter, it forced the subject of “expatriate” back around to the individual,
but it did nothing to recognize or resolve the ambiguities created by the past
precession of the subject to the state.
A. The Individual Right to Expatriation and the Formation of a Nation
At its inception, at least its modern inception, expatriation was an individual right. This individual right of expatriation, “though of Roman extraction, seems to have had its birth in the United States.”41 Under the British
common law, the concept did not exist. However, as the political theories
out of which the Declaration of Independence and Constitution were born
took hold, the concept of expatriation played a significant role in establishing a new country and defining its relation to its citizens and to citizens of
other countries.
1. The Origins of the Concept of Expatriation
The common law, infused by its feudal origins,42 incorporated the doctrine of perpetual allegiance, for which the formal legal maxim was Nemo
patriam, in qua natus est, exuere, nec legantiae debitum ejurare possit, or
“No man may abjure his native country nor the allegiance which he owes to
38
An Act In Reference to the Expatriation of Citizens and Their Protection Abroad, ch.
2534, 34 Stat. 1228 (1907).
39
The Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137.
40
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 62 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
41
GEORGE HAY, TREATISE ON EXPATRIATION 2 (1812).
42
Id. at 34.
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his sovereign.”43 Under British law at the time of the Declaration of Independence, the bond of allegiance between a sovereign and its subject was an
immutable, permanent bond established by the law of nature.44 As Blackstone explained, it was “a principle of universal law, that the natural-born
subject of one prince cannot by an act of his own—no, not by swearing
allegiance to another—put off or discharge his natural allegiance to the former.”45 Nor could a foreign sovereign “dissolve the bond of allegiance between the subject and the crown,” by naturalizing or gaining the allegiance
of a British subject.46
In objecting to the practices of King George III, the American colonists
initially framed their arguments within the prevailing common law doctrine
of perpetual allegiance and presented their arguments as Englishmen.47 The
Declaration of Independence, drawing on the precedent of the English
Revolution of 1688, abandoned that position and declared that the colonists
were “[a]bsolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown and that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is and ought to
be totally dissolved.”48 In discarding the doctrine of perpetual allegiance, the
colonists adopted a Lockean, contractual view of the relation between subject and sovereign.49 The authority of the British crown was derived by
“compact,” and because the King had violated that compact by his actions,
the colonies asserted he had “dissol[ved],”50 “abdicated,”51 and “forfeit[ed]” 52 the crown’s authority.53

43

TSIANG, supra note 1, at 11 (quoting SIR EDWARD COKE I, A COMMENTARY UPON LIT129A, 19th ed. 1832). I-Mien Tsiang, in her comprehensive investigation of the
first century of expatriation, traces the concept of perpetual allegiance as far back as the mid14th century, during which the House of Lords debated the status of children born abroad to
English subjects but assumed that the parents’ status could not be altered. Id.
44
Id. at 13–15.
45
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
46
Rex v. Aeneas MacDonald, 18 How. St. Tr. 858 (1747); TSIANG, supra note 1, at 16.
47
TSIANG, supra note 1, at 18.
48
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776); see also HAY, supra note
41, at 4.
49
See Denver Brunsman, Subjects v. Citizens: Impressment and Identity in the AngloAmerican Atlantic, 30 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 557, 559 (2010). As Herzog describes it, the “new
political ideas” of the American Revolution included the idea that “allegiance to and membership in a political community were matters of individual choice” as opposed the British tradition in which “[a]llegiances were conceived of as natural vertical ties between individual
subjects and the king, like parent to child, and these ties could not be dissolved even with the
subject’s consent.” HERZOG, supra note 21, at 29–30; see also HAY, supra note 41, at 29–30
(discussing Locke’s rejection of perpetual allegiance from birth and his acceptance of “allegiance voluntarily contracted,” though Locke thought that once an individual had consented to
be a subject of a state that bond was “unalterabl[e] and “indissolubl[e]”).
50
TSIANG, supra note 1, at 19 (quoting N.J. CONST. of 1776).
51
Id. at 19 n.45.
52
Id.
53
See HAY, supra note 41, at 81–83 (“The first page of the Declaration of Independence,
asserts, not in terms, but substantially, the principle of expatriation.”). In furtherance of the
new contractual theory of citizenship and in rejection of perpetual allegiance, the new sovereign states formalized new compacts: requiring oaths of allegiance from, for example, officers
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The severing of British sovereignty and formation of the United States
as a separate sovereign, or groups of sovereigns, under the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution did not settle the question of expatriation.
The question of expatriation was of fundamental importance during the early
days of the United States, and the debate largely fell along the familiar divide between the Federalists and Republicans, exemplified by the distinctly
different views of Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton.54 In helping
fashion the first laws of Virginia to comply with the new American ideals of
equality and social compact, Jefferson, while abolishing concepts like primogeniture and entail and drafting protections for religious freedom, also
recognized as part of the Virginia Code a “natural right” of expatriation.55
The 1814 pamphlet “A Treatise on Expatriation,” contends that the concept
of expatriation “was probably first introduced” in this Virginia law.56
Under Jefferson’s natural rights view that animated the Virginia provision and similar provisions in other states, the right of expatriation was “inherent in every man by the laws of nature, and incapable of being rightfully
taken from him even by the united will of every other person in the nation.”57 Although the Virginia law established a formal procedure for expatriation, wherein an individual could “declare her intent to expatriate orally
in court or by written deed,”58 Jefferson did not believe such formal procedures were necessary: “[T]he individual may do it by any effectual and
unequivocal act or declaration.”59
The Federalists, by contrast, continued to espouse a vestige of the doctrine of perpetual allegiance, in which the sovereign retained authority over
the relinquishment of citizenship. For example, arguing against laws passed
by New York to punish Loyalists, Alexander Hamilton contended that citizens could not “at pleasure renounce their allegiance to the state of which
they are members” and “devote themselves to a foreign jurisdiction,” because allowing such a right would be “contrary to law and subversive of

or all white males and, collectively, requiring all persons holding commissions or offices under
Congress to take an oath of allegiance. See TSIANG, supra note 1, at 20–21.
54
See Rising Lake Morrow, The Early American Attitude Toward the Doctrine of Expatriation, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 552, 552–55 (1932). Expatriation also became a debate in Great
Britain during this time period. Although the common law doctrine of perpetual allegiance still
controlled, there was some suggestion in earlier cases that the inhabitants of a British territory
that had been conquered by a foreign power were no longer subjects to the crown. The question arose then whether, by the Peace Treaty of 1783 and the Jay Treaty of 1794, the British
crown had consented to the expatriation of British subjects who had chosen to remain in the
conquered territory and become citizens of one of the United States. Eventually, this view
prevailed, though some still argued for the position that a subject remained a subject permanently. See TSIANG, supra note 1, at 21–24.
55
DOUGLAS BRADBURN, THE CITIZENSHIP REVOLUTION: POLITICS AND THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN UNION, 1774-1804, at 105 (2009); see also TSIANG, supra note 1, at 26.
56
HAY, supra note 41, at 3.
57
BRADBURN, supra note 55, at 106.
58
TSIANG, supra note 1, at 26.
59
BRADBURN, supra note 55, at 106.
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government.”60 The New York law proposed to cancel the citizenship of
Loyalists, but Hamilton argued that “[t]he idea, indeed, of citizens transforming themselves into aliens by taking part against the State to which they
belong, is altogether of new invention, unknown and unadmissible in law,
and contrary to the nature of the social compact.”61 In this contention, as in
many others, Hamilton was directly opposed to Jefferson,62 who asserted that
Loyalists became aliens by adhering to the British cause during the
Revolution.63
2. Early Controversies
Jefferson and Hamilton’s competing views were largely theoretical until
judicial and political disputes brought the issue of expatriation into sharp
focus at the turn of the 19th century. In April 1793, Gideon Henfield, an
American citizen, joined the mostly American crew of the French privateer
Citoyen Genêt, setting out from Charleston to “strike a blow in the great
new war of the French Revolution.”64 As he had been promised, he was
given command of the first prize the Citoyen Genêt seized,65 the British vessel William, and he then sailed the William to Philadelphia to dispose of it.66
He and a fellow American sailor were arrested upon arrival for disobeying
President Washington’s declaration of neutrality, and the resulting case became a defining moment of American politics, demonstrating the fundamental disagreements within the country about, among other things, the French
Revolution, the nature of the American nation, and American citizenship.67
Although Henfield initially argued that he had been unaware of the Neutrality Proclamation, which was issued three days after he departed Charleston,68
he soon switched strategies. Supported by the controversial French ambassador Citizen Genêt,69 Henfield argued that he could not be charged with trea-

60

Id.
TSIANG, supra note 1, at 28.
62
See, e.g., LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA, Election of 1800, on HAMILTON (ORIGINAL BROADWAY CAST RECORDING) (Atlantic Records 2015) (Alexander Hamilton singing, “I have never
agreed with Jefferson once. . . . We have fought on like seventy-five diff’rent fronts.”).
63
BRADBURN, supra note 55, at 106.
64
Id. at 101; see also Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1110–11 (CC.D. Pa. 1793) (No.
6360).
65
Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1116.
66
WILLIAM CASTRO, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF THE FIGHTING SAIL 85 (2006). Henfield’s actions created quite a stir in the capital and prompted the
British minister to file a protest with Thomas Jefferson, then Secretary of State. Id.
67
BRADBURN, supra note 55, at 102–03.
68
CASTRO, supra note 66, at 91; see also Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1116 (“[O]n his
examination before the magistrate, he protested himself an American, that as such he would
die, and therefore could not be supposed likely to intend anything to her prejudice. He declared
if he had known it to be contrary to the president’s proclamation, or even the wishes of the
president, for whom he had the greatest respect, he would not have entered on board.”).
69
BRADBURN, supra note 55, at 110–12; Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1116.
61
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son because he had exercised his “natural right of expatriation” and become
a French citizen.70
The prosecution, which was assisted by Alexander Hamilton,71 rejected
an individual’s absolute right to expatriate himself. They argued that an individual citizen who defied the President and attacked a foreign country could
not be absolved by claiming expatriation; an individual citizen “could not
escape the duties of citizenship without the consent of the nation as a
whole.”72 Henfield relied on his natural right of expatriation. Despite the
instructions of presiding Justice James Wilson, which heavily favored the
prosecution,73 the jury acquitted Henfield and set off ripples throughout the
country.74 While the Washington Administration took steps to ensure other
American citizens did not join the French against the British, including publishing Justice Wilson’s instructions to the jury, the Republican opposition
toasted Henfield and the “patriotic jury of Philadelphia” that recognized the
natural right of expatriation.75
The next important expatriation case that arose, known as Talbot’s
Case,76 also involved American citizens who had seized a foreign vessel, this
time a Dutch ship, and escorted it to Charleston where they claimed it as a
prize.77 When arrested, native Virginian Edward Ballard claimed he had expatriated himself pursuant to the procedures prescribed by Virginia law.78
Native Virginian William Talbot claimed he had expatriated himself by
swearing allegiance to France in Guadalupe, and he had a commission from
the French authorities and papers showing his naturalization as a French citizen.79 The case ultimately reached the Supreme Court after the circuit court
found the two guilty.80 The Virginians’ lead counsel, Alexander J. Dallas,
70

CASTRO, supra note 66, at 91–92.
CASTRO, supra note 66, at 95; Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1115 n.3 (noting that a
draft indictment had “marginal corrections, apparently by Mr. Hamilton”).
72
BRADBURN, supra note 55, at 113.
73
Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1120 (“It is the joint and unanimous opinion of the court,
that the United States, being in a state of neutrality relative to the present war, the acts of
hostility committed by Gideon Henfield are an offence against this country, and punishable by
its laws. . . . Much has been said on this occasion, by the defendant’s counsel, in support of the
natural right of emigration; but little of it is truly applicable to the present question. Emigration
is, undoubtedly, one of the natural rights of man. Yet it does not follow from thence that every
act inconsistent with the duty is inconsistent with the state of a citizen. Nothing is more inconsistent with the duty of a citizen than treason; but it is because he still continues a citizen that
he is liable to punishment.”); see also CASTRO, supra note 66, at 96; BRADBURN, supra note
55, at 113–14.
74
BRADBURN, supra note 55, at 113–16.
75
Id. at 114–15.
76
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795).
77
BRADBURN, supra note 55, at 116; HERZOG, supra note 21, at 30; Green, supra note 3,
at 311; TSIANG, supra note 1, at 30–31.
78
BRADBURN, supra note 55, at 116.
79
Id.
80
The circuit court recognized an individual’s right to expatriate generally, but found the
two guilty because an expatriated former citizen “has no right, in his new character, to injure
the country of his first and native allegiance, by open violation of her treaties with friendly
powers.” Jansen v. The Vrow Christina Magdalena, 13 F. Cas. 356 (1794) (No. 7216)
71

R
R
R

R
R
R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\55-2\HLL205.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 13

18-MAY-18

Expatriation Restored

10:50

375

based his argument on the right of expatriation, which he contended derived
from the difference between citizenship, the principle of the Revolution, and
allegiance, which was equivalent to “servitude.”81 Opposing Dutch counsel,
echoing the circuit court, did not deny the right to expatriation but argued
that it could only be accomplished “under the regulations prescribed by
law,” and Congress had not prescribed any such regulations.82 Under its
view, the Constitution vests Congress with the exclusive power over naturalization, which included “[t]he power of regulation of emigration,” and,
thus, the Virginia laws “under which Ballard pretends to have renounced his
allegiance, can have no effect on the political rights of the Union.”83 As a
result, Ballard and Talbot could not have expatriated themselves pursuant to
procedures established by law.84
In the Court’s lead opinion, Justice Patterson first reasoned that even if
a Virginia citizen could expatriate himself under Virginia law, such expatriation could not divest him of his federal citizenship and its attendant obligations.85 He also agreed with the Dutch and the circuit court that the
Virginians could not have expatriated themselves because Congress had not
provided for such expatriation, opining that such a law was “much
wanted.”86
Justice Iredell was the only other Justice to address the right to expatriation directly. His opinion eloquently argued for the principle of a right to
expatriation,87 but he also believed the state could limit that right in light of
the citizen’s obligations to the state:
As every man is entitled to claim rights in society, which it is the
duty of the society to protect, he in his turn is under a solemn
obligation to discharge all those duties faithfully which he owes as
a citizen to the society of which he is a member.88
If the right to expatriation were an inalienable right “upon which no act of
legislation c[ould] lawfully be exercised,” then “it must be left to every
man’s will and pleasure, to go off, when, and in what manner, he pleases.”89
Iredell rejected that notion because it would elevate citizens’ “mere private
inclination” over “principles of patriotism and public good,” the qualities
that “ought to predominate” in government.90 Iredell’s view, then, was of a
qualified right of expatriation, “a reasonable and moral right which every
81

BRADBURN, supra note 55, at 117.
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 150 (1795).
83
Id. at 150–51.
84
BRADBURN, supra note 55, at 119.
85
Talbot’s Case, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 152–53.
86
Id. at 153–54.
87
Justice Iredell wrote that a man “should not be confined against his will to a particular
spot because he happened to draw his first breath upon it.” Id. at 162.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 163.
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man ought to be allowed to exercise, with no other limitation than such as
the public safety or interest requires, to which all private rights ought and
must forever give way.”91
The third critical judicial case on expatriation of this era was that of
Isaac Williams,92 a U.S. citizen who accepted a position on a French frigate
in 1797, took an oath of allegiance to France, and renounced his allegiance
to all other countries, “particularly to America.”93 Williams had served in
the French navy for five years, moved his family to French territory, and
intended to reside there permanently, but, on a short visit to Connecticut to
visit family and friends, he was arrested and indicted for committing acts of
war against Great Britain.94 Williams argued that he had expatriated himself
and that to hold differently would be contrary to the naturalization laws of
the United States, which allowed citizens of foreign nations to become
American citizens.95
Chief Justice Ellsworth, sitting on the circuit court, rejected that argument, stating that the “common law of this country remains the same as it
was before the Revolution,” and that “all the members of a civil community
are bound to each other by compact,” such that “members cannot dissolve
this compact without the consent or default of the community.”96 He noted
that even “the most visionary writers on this subject do not contend for the
principle in the unlimited extent, that a citizen may at any and at all times,
renounce his own, and join himself to a foreign country.”97 Ellsworth’s statements in Williams set off a national debate, and “the question of expatriation
was openly argued, and, for the first time, became a definite issue between
the two political parties.”98 For example, a Virginia paper opposed to the
Federalist administration argued that “[t]he natural right [of expatriation]
formerly secured to the citizens of this State by law” had been “abrogated”
not by the Constitution or federal law “but by the judgment of a Federal
Court.”99
3. Impressment, the War of 1812 and the Continuing Debate
The debate over the right to expatriation continued during the start of
the 19th century, but came to the fore of public consciousness in a different
context: the British impressment into service of British-born American citi91
Id.; see also TSIANG, supra note 1, at 31; BRADBURN, supra note 55, at 120. Because
Iredell did not believe that even Talbot’s foreign naturalization had completely severed his
obligations to his native country, he ultimately ruled against him. Talbot’s Case, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) at 165.
92
Williams’ Case, 29 F. Cas. 1330 (C.C.D. Conn. 1799) (No. 17,708).
93
Id. at 1330.
94
TSIANG, supra note 1, at 32; BRADBURN, supra note 55, at 121.
95
Williams’ Case, 29 F. Cas. at 1330.
96
Id. at 1331.
97
Id.
98
TSIANG, supra note 1, at 34.
99
Id. at 35.
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zens.100 As this practice of impressment and the disagreement over an citizen’s right to expatriate herself culminated in the War of 1812,101 the
question of expatriation became “one of the three great international issues
of the time.”102 In the United States, competing pamphlets argued the different positions on expatriation, with those supporting it as an absolute right
also supporting the war against Great Britain for its practice of impressment.103 Other pamphlets supported the common law concept of perpetual
allegiance and generally opposed the war.104 One of the most prominent
pamphlets, George Hay’s Treatise on Expatriation, argued strenuously
against perpetual allegiance, calling it “bad in theory,” “odious and detestable in practice,” and “in the highest degree oppressive and cruel.”105
The impressment controversy and the public debates prompted renewed
action and debate in Congress as well. When the debate over the right of
expatriation returned in force to Congress in 1817,106 at least one representa100
The “laxity of American naturalization procedure was often considered in England as
an instrument to encourage and harbor British deserters.” Id. at 46. The naturalization law in
the United States required only a renunciation of native allegiance and a probationary period of
residence, which was shortened from fourteen years to five years in 1802. Id. In the face of the
continued impressment of U.S. citizens into military service in their native country, particularly Britain, Congress passed a law in 1796 aimed at protecting American seamen by providing them citizenship protections. Brunsman, supra note 49, at 574 (2010). The citizenship
documents and protections provided by Congress ultimately proved ineffectual at preventing
impressment into the service of Britain, however. Id.; see Spiro, supra note 36, at 1421–23. In
1807, the King proclaimed that “we do hereby warn all such mariners, seafaring men, and
others, or natural-born subjects, that no such letters of naturalization, or certificates of citizenship, do, or can, in any manner, divest our natural-born subjects of the allegiance, or in any
degree alter the duty which they owe to us, their lawful Sovereign.” TSIANG, supra note 1, at
46 (quoting royal proclamation of Nov. 11, 1807).
101
Spiro, supra note 36, at 1422–23; 1 FREDERICK VAN DYNE, CITIZENSHIP OF THE
UNITED STATES 271 (1903) (“One of the chief causes of the War of 1812 between the United
States and Great Britain was the rigor with which the latter government applied the doctrine of
inalienable allegiance. British cruisers took from American vessels on the high seas naturalized American citizens of British origins, and impressed them for service in the royal navy, on
the grounds that they were British subjects by birth, and that no forms gone through in
America could d[i]vest them of their British nationality.”).
102
Green, supra note 3, at 312.
103
Id.; TSIANG, supra note 1, at 52–53. Even though Federalists were generally against the
war, see Brunsman, supra note 49, at 583–85, and not as supportive of the individual right of
expatriation, several prominent Federalists objected to the practice of impressment and the
underlying justification of perpetual allegiance, see TSIANG, supra note 1, at 46–47.
104
TSIANG, supra note 1, at 53–55.
105
HAY, supra note 41, at 87–88.
106
The first discussion of expatriation occurred during consideration of the 1795 Act establishing a uniform rule of naturalization, the second federal law governing naturalization,
which, for the first time, required that an individual naturalizing as a U.S. citizen “renounce
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty
whatever, and particularly, by name, the prince, potentate, state or sovereignty whereof such
alien may, at the time, be a citizen or subject.” An Act to Establish a Uniform Rule of Naturalization and to Repeal the Act Heretofore Passed on That Subject, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 414, 414
(1795). One legislator proposed an amendment to “impede a return to citizenship of those who
should expatriate themselves,” and a debate occurred over several days about the doctrine of
perpetual allegiance and the respective roles and authorities of the federal and state governments in the context of citizenship and expatriation. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 1005, 1027–30
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tive contended that the federal government lacked the authority under the
Constitution to provide for expatriation, a position espoused by several
others as well and largely based on their view that the federal government
could not dissolve state citizenship.107 The proposal at issue would have permitted any citizen to declare in writing her intention to relinquish her citi(1794); see also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 272 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing this debate). In 1797, expatriation was again the subject of debate in the Legislature as the
House of Representatives considered an express expatriation provision, which, as part of a bill
prohibiting U.S. citizens from entering into foreign military service, would have allowed a
U.S. citizen to “by deed in writing” before witnesses and a court “declare that he absolutely
and entirely renounces all allegiance and fidelity to the United States, and to every of them,
and shall forthwith depart of the territorial limits thereof.” 7 ANNALS OF CONG. 349 (1797). A
citizen who undertook those procedures would “be considered expatriated, and forever thereafter deemed an alien, in like manner and to all intents as if he had never been a citizen” from
the time of his departure from the country. Id. The provision divided the House along familiar
lines, with Southern legislators from Virginia and South Carolina supporting it as codifying the
inherent right of expatriation upon which the Revolution had been founded, see id. at 354
(“Mr. Giles [Va.] thought there could not be a doubt in the minds of Americans on the subject
of expatriation. Indeed, he said, this was the foundation of our Revolution.”), and northern
legislators advocating for the removal of the provision because they believed the government
retained some control over a citizen’s ability to expatriate himself and thus throw off the obligations of citizenship, see id. at 352 (“There was a mutual obligation, Mr. S[mith] said, between a Government and all its citizens. The Government owed protection to its citizens, and
citizens owed obedience to their Government. These duties were mutual and co-extensive; and
they might as well say that Government could abandon its citizens when it pleased as that
citizens could desert their Government when they pleased.”).
107
See TSIANG, supra note 1, at 57; Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 273–75 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In 1810, Congress debated and passed a constitutional amendment pursuant to which, as ultimately passed, any U.S. citizens who acquired any title of nobility from another country would
“cease to be a citizen of the United States.” 20 ANNALS OF CONG. 530, 549, 572–73, 635, 671
(1810); HERZOG, supra note 21, at 38 (showing development and revisions of the proposed
amendment). The amendment ultimately fell two states short of ratification, see Gideon M.
Hart, The “Original” Thirteenth Amendment: The Misunderstood Titles of Nobility Amendment, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 311, 315 & n.15 (2010), but, had it passed, it “would have had the
potential to denationalize many Americans and even to change the course of history,”
HERZOG, supra note 21, at 38. Although there is little historical record to explain the impetus
for or debate over this “obscure” amendment, id.; see also Hart, supra note 107, at 324, at
least one congressman argued that the fact of its passage by Congress meant that Congress did
not think it could take citizenship away from individuals by statute. See Afroyim, 387 U.S. at
259 (quoting Congressman Anderson of Kentucky: “The cases to which their powers before
this amendment confessedly did not extend, are very strong, and induce a belief that Congress
could not in any case declare the acts which should cause ‘a person to cease to be a citizen.’”).
That argument, like the debate over the 1818 expatriation bill, may have been grounded in “the
dominant Jeffersonian view . . . that citizenship was within the jurisdiction of the states; a
statute would thus have been a federal usurpation of state power.” Id. at 278 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting John P. Roche, The Expatriation Cases: “Breathes There the Man, With
Soul So Dead . . .?, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 325, 335) [hereinafter Roche, The Expatriation
Cases]. Other rationales that would explain the need for a constitutional amendment, as opposed to a statute, have been proposed as well. See id. (suggesting that a constitutional amendment was necessary because the proposed amendment was intended to enforce the
Emoluments Clause); Hart, supra note 107, at 321 & n.49 (citing the loophole of “constitutional magnitude” that a foreign noble could disclaim his title of nobility temporarily in order
to become a U.S. citizen or office holder and then reclaim it and a legislator’s statements that
Congress “had no power respecting this matter” without the amendment); id. at 346 (noting
the amendment would provide “a constitutional protection against treachery, which did not
depend upon a Congress that could be secretly corrupted”).
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zenship in open court and to depart the country, at which point “such person
shall . . . thenceforth be considered no citizen.”108 The proposal ultimately
failed, but the debate on expatriation demonstrates that the opinions in Congress reflected the wide variance in opinion among the first generations of
American citizens.109 Expatriation touched on fundamental questions about
individual rights, state and federal authority, the nature of the polity, and
obligations of citizenship,110 and the views were as diverse as they were
strongly held.
4. Further Judicial Consideration of the Individual Right of
Expatriation
During the early 19th century, expatriation controversies continued to
reach the judiciary, including several cases in the Supreme Court. But these
disputes typically involved the inverse of the issue debated in public discourse and by Congress. While the pamphlet arguments, congressional debates, and the impressment issue typically focused on the right of new
Americans to expatriate themselves from their native land by virtue of transferring allegiance to the United States, the cases that reached the judiciary
typically involved the relinquishment of citizenship by American citizens.
The lower and state court decisions displayed the same diversity of opinion
as the congressional and public debates, with some courts adhering to the
doctrine of perpetual allegiance,111 some supporting a qualified right of expatriation that required the consent of the sovereign,112 and a few adopting the
Jeffersonian position of an unqualified right of expatriation.113
After acknowledging the debate over the right to expatriation but declining to address it directly several times,114 the Supreme Court ultimately
issued two decisions in 1830 directly addressing expatriation. In Inglis v.
Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor,115 the Court faced the question of whether
John Inglis, who had been born in New York on an unknown date during the
Revolutionary War, could inherit land under New York law, a question that
turned on whether Inglis was a citizen or an alien.116 Although it was not
clear whether Inglis had been born in New York prior to the signing of the
Declaration of Independence, after the signing but before the British took
108

TSIANG, supra note 1, at 57.
See MORROW, supra note 54, at 564 (“There was no unanimity on the question [of
expatriation]. The state court decisions contradicted each other, the Supreme Court in general
opposed the right, and statesman could be quoted on all sides.”).
110
TSIANG, supra note 1, at 56–61.
111
See, e.g., Ainslie v. Martin, 9 Mass. (8 Tyng) 454 (1813).
112
See TSIANG, supra note 1, at 64–65.
113
Id. at 64–66.
114
See In re the Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283 (1822); M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s
Lessee, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 209 (1808); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64 (1804).
115
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830).
116
Id. at 120–22.
109
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possession of New York, or after the British had taken possession of New
York, the Court held that Inglis was an alien under each of these scenarios
because his father had chosen to adhere to his native British allegiance while
Inglis was a child and Inglis had “never attempted to throw off” that allegiance “by any act disaffirming the choice made for him by his father.”117
The Court recognized the “right of election . . . in all revolutions like
ours,”118 and applied “the doctrine of allegiance . . . which rests on the
ground of a mutual compact between the government and the citizen or subject, which it is said cannot be dissolved by either party without the concurrence of the other.”119 Citing a New York law banishing British loyalists who
fled to British territory during the war, the Court determined that, even if
Inglis were a New York citizen by birth and New York law, both the state
and he had consented to his election of British allegiance.120
The second case, Shanks v. Dupont,121 involved a native South Carolina
woman who married a British officer in 1781 and departed the United States
with her husband in 1782.122 Justice Story, writing for the majority, held that
the temporary occupation of South Carolina by the British did not affect her
American citizenship and that her marriage to the British officer “produce[d] no dissolution of the native allegiance of the wife.”123 He stated the
“general doctrine” as “no persons can, by any act of their own, without the
consent of the government, put off their allegiance and become aliens.”124
But he ultimately held that she had expatriated herself by electing to be a
British subject after the war because the United States had consented to such
election in the Peace Treaty of 1783.125
5. Official Recognition of the Right to Expatriation
The Supreme Court’s and lower courts’ decisions did not settle the issue
of expatriation, and, in the years after the War of 1812, the United States
continued to confront the issue, most often in the context of foreign nations
attempting to impress U.S. citizens into military service. Opinions were
mixed at the beginning of this period over whether the United States should
interpose herself between a foreign state and a U.S. citizen who had emigrated from that country or who was otherwise considered a subject of the
foreign nation.126 And a further question arose whether the United States

117

Id. at 124–26.
Id. at 122.
119
Id. at 124–25.
120
Id. at 125–26. “It cannot, I presume, be denied, but that allegiance may be dissolved by
the mutual consent of the government and its citizens or subjects.” Id. at 125.
121
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242 (1830).
122
Id.
123
Id. at 246.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 249–50.
126
TSIANG, supra note 1, at 72–77.
118
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should act differently with respect to naturalized U.S. citizens and naturalborn U.S. citizens, with some advocating that the former should be provided
less, or no, protection abroad when they were subject to the jurisdiction of
their former sovereign.127
Ultimately, under President Buchanan, who had long advocated a robust right of expatriation and protection for naturalized U.S. citizens abroad
as a Senator and as Secretary of State,128 the United States adopted a position
of interceding on behalf of naturalized and natural-born U.S. citizens whom
foreign governments attempted to impress or prosecute on the basis of their
military obligations.129 An opinion by Attorney General Black in the
Buchanan Administration memorialized the prevailing executive branch
position.130
Confronted with the case of naturalized U.S. citizen Christian Ernst,
who had been arrested on a temporary return visit to his native Hanover and
impressed into military service, Black concluded that it was the “natural
right of every free person . . . [to] throw[ ] off his natural allegiance and
substitut[e] another allegiance in its place,” a principle upon which the
United States “was populated” and to which it “owe[d] . . . its existence as
a nation.”131 Black’s opinion defined the exercise of the right of expatriation
as “not only emigration out of one’s native country, but naturalization in the
country adopted as a future residence,”132 and his argument largely rested on
the fact that U.S. laws, as well as the laws of numerous European nations,
permitted the naturalization of foreign subjects.133 He ardently defended the
notion that U.S. law permitted no distinction between naturalized citizens
and native-born citizens, excepting those inscribed in the Constitution, and
he concluded by expressly rejecting the consensual view of expatriation, the
view that had been adopted by the Supreme Court almost 30 years prior in
Shanks.134 Black concluded that even if Ernst had not followed the emigration laws of Hanover, “the Hanoverian government cannot justify the arrest
of Mr. Ernst . . . unless it can also be proved that the original right of expatri-

127

Id. at 75–79.
Spiro, supra note 36, at 1427; TSIANG, supra note 1, at 72–75.
129
TSIANG, supra note 1, at 75–79.
130
Right of Expatriation, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 356 (1866).
131
Id. at 359.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 361–62.
134
Id. at 363 (“Hanover probably has some municipal regulation of her own by which the
right of expatriation is denied to those of her people who fail to comply with certain conditions. Assuming that such a regulation existed in 1851, and assuming also that it was violated
by Mr. Ernst when he came away, the question will then arise whether the unlawfulness of his
emigration makes his act of naturalization void as against the king of Hanover. I answer no,
certainly not. He is an American citizen by our law; if he violated the law of Hanover, which
forbade him to transfer his allegiance to us, then the laws of the two countries are in conflict,
and the law of nations steps in to decide the question upon principles and rules of its own. By
the public law of the world we have the undoubted right to naturalize a foreigner, whether his
natural sovereign consented to his emigration or not.”).
128
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ation depends on the consent of the natural sovereign. This last proposition I
am sure no man can establish.”135
Although not intended to be public, Attorney General Black’s opinion
found its way into print and into the public consciousness.136 President
Buchanan directed Secretary of State Cass to act on the basis of it, and he
restated Black’s conclusions in his annual message to Congress in 1860:
“Our Government is bound to protect the rights of our naturalized citizens
everywhere to the same extent as though they had drawn their first breath in
this country.”137
After the Civil War, the issue of protecting naturalized citizens abroad
returned to the public consciousness, most notably in the cause of two Irishborn, naturalized American citizens, both Civil War veterans, who were
prosecuted for and convicted of treason in Great Britain under procedures
that applied only to citizens, despite their contention that they had expatriated themselves.138 Relying on the doctrine of perpetual allegiance, the British courts rejected the Irish-Americans’ defense that they had exercised their
right of expatriation and were no longer British subjects due to their American naturalization.139 The two were ultimately convicted, and their case resulted in “[n]ational outrage”140 and became a “cause celebre” in the
United States141 for the individual right of expatriation and protection of naturalized U.S. citizens abroad. The case, and others like it, led Congress to
consider numerous resolutions in support of that cause.142

135

Id.
TSIANG, supra note 1, at 80.
137
James Buchanan, President, Fourth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1860), in 7 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 3157, 3172 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1897).
138
Green, supra note 3, at 315. The two Irish-Americans, Warren and Costello, landed in
Dublin during the Fenian agitation, part of an expedition providing men and arms. TSIANG,
supra note 1, at 85; see also Green, supra note 3, at 315; Spiro, supra note 36, at 1427–28.
139
The British Court reasoned: “[A]ccording to the law of this country, he who is born
under the allegiance to the British Crown, cannot, by any act of his own, or by any act of any
foreign country or government, be absolved from that allegiance. . . . You may have acquired
all the privilege of American citizens. . . . But while you may enjoy those privileges in
America, yet, when you come to this country, where your allegiance binds you by bonds from
which you cannot be freed—here, in this country—you must be amenable to the laws which
here prevail.” R v. Warren [1867] pamphlet rep. (Cty. Dublin Comm’n) (Ir.) 130, reprinted in
H. EXEC. DOC. NO. 40-157, at 290–91 (1868).
140
Spiro, supra note 36, at 1427.
141
Green, supra note 3, at 315.
142
TSIANG, supra note 1, at 86. For example, the House in November 1867 investigated
whether the U.S. minister to Great Britain should be “charged with neglect of duty toward
American citizens in England and Ireland by failing to secure their rights as such citizens,”
and considered a resolution demanding that the Secretary of State “communicate to this House
all correspondence to and from the Department for the two years last past on the arrest, imprisonment, trial, or conviction of any American citizen, or any person claiming to be such, in
Great Britain and Ireland.” CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 786 (1867).
136
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The end result of the political outcry over the Irish-Americans’ fate,143
and the culmination of almost a century of thought about an individual’s
right of expatriation, was the Expatriation Act of 1868.144 At the end of 1866,
President Johnson informed Congress that it “seem[ed] to be a favorable
time for an assertion by Congress of the principle so long maintained by the
executive department that naturalization by one state fully exempts the native-born subject of any other state from the performance of military service
under any foreign government.”145 Congress ultimately went further: (1) declaring that “the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all
people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness”; (2) establishing that the government would disavow
any foreign state’s claim to allegiance from its native-born citizen who had
become a naturalized U.S. citizen; and (3) affirming that naturalized U.S.
citizens were entitled to the same protections abroad as native-born citizens.146 The Act required the President to demand the release of any U.S.
citizen imprisoned abroad in violation of the rights of U.S. citizenship.147
Ultimately enshrined by the Expatriation Act of 1868, the view of expatriation as an individual right initially prevailed within the executive branch
and in popular opinion, perhaps in large part due to the necessity of establishing and growing a new nation composed largely of immigrants. Concerns
about dual allegiances and a desire to protect U.S. citizens from impressment
or obligations to their native states led to a less stringent naturalization process and the recognition of a citizen’s right of expatriation. But, as this section shows, the question of expatriation during the formation of the United
States was far from settled. Some, starting with Thomas Jefferson, viewed it
as an absolute individual right, inherent in natural law. Others, including the
Supreme Court in Inglis and Shanks, maintained that the sovereign retained
control over the circumstances in which an individual could exercise her
right of expatriation, a vestige of perpetual allegiance. The questions that
remained at the time of the codification of the Expatriation Act of 1868 thus
involved the authority of the sovereign to prohibit, limit, or define an individual’s exercise of her right of expatriation; they had nothing to do with the
143
As stated by one Representative, after recounting the numerous cases of Irish-born
American citizens who had been prosecuted as British subjects, “God save Ireland, shouted
these brave American citizens from beneath the gallows, surrounded by a scowling mob of
anti-Irish and anti-American Englishmen, and here from beneath this dome in these Hall of
legislation, whose decrees shall yet govern the world, we reecho that cry.” CONG. GLOBE, 40th
Cong., 1st Sess. 788 (1867).
144
An Act Concerning the Rights of American Citizens in Foreign States, ch. 249, 15 Stat.
223 (1868); see Spiro, supra note 36, at 1427–28 (noting that Congress “moved quickly” after
the outrage over the prosecution of the Irish-Americans “to enact legislation categorically
affirming expatriation”).
145
Andrew Johnson, President, Second Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1866), in 8 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 3643, 3656 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1897).
146
15 Stat. 223.
147
Id.
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state’s authority to strip an individual’s citizenship.148 The individual was the
only conceivable subject of the underlying verb “expatriate.”
B. Precession to the State as Subject
The Expatriation Act of 1868—giving United States citizens the inherent right to relinquish their citizenship and providing for the protection of
foreign citizens who relinquished their native citizenship to become U.S.
citizens—had to be implemented by the executive branch, primarily in the
context of international relations. That implementation began the precession
of the subject of “expatriate” to the state. Although expatriation was a
largely American conception in the late eighteenth century, by the end of the
nineteenth century, it had begun to gain international recognition, especially
in the Western world.149 Difficulties in implementation and inconsistencies
between the naturalization and emigration laws of different countries, however, led to the need for international agreements.150 Recognizing that the
United States had no authority to determine whether a foreign nation, under
its law, considered a particular individual its citizen or subject, the United
States entered into a series of international treaties and began to formulate a
body of executive branch common law to implement them. The State Department was responsible for receiving and responding to requests for assistance from U.S. citizens abroad, and, in administering this responsibility, it
applied the executive branch common law. In these expatriation inquiries,
the individual remained the subject, the only entity with the authority to
exercise her right of expatriation. But the state began to establish rules and
procedures for effectuating an individual’s actions that would resolve differences in national laws.
Ultimately, the rules and procedures of the executive branch common
law were codified. The Expatriation Act of 1907,151 developed by the executive branch officials who had been administering the international treaties,152
148
See To Amend the Nationality Act of 1940: Hearings on H.R. 6250 Before a Subcomm.
of the S. Comm. on Immigration, 77th Cong. 6 (1942) (Statement of John F. Finerty (D-Ill.))
(“[C]ertainly up to the passage of the expatriation act by the Congress, in 1868 . . . there was
the greatest dispute; not whether a citizen could be deprived of his citizenship, but whether he
could even surrender it if he wanted to.”).
149
Green, supra note 3, at 315.
150
Id.; HERZOG, supra note 22, at 57–61.
151
Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228 (1907).
152
In 1906, the Senate passed a joint resolution calling for the President to appoint, with
the advice and consent of the Senate, a commission “to examine into the laws, rulings, and
practice of the United States relative to citizenship, expatriation, and the protection abroad of
citizens of the United States and those who have made the declaration of intention to become
citizens of the United States, and to make a report and recommendations thereon to the President, who shall transmit the same to Congress for its consideration.” S.J. Res. 30, 59th Cong.
(1906). The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, to which the resolution was referred, recommended it not be passed because “such commissions are sure to be leisurely, certain to be
costly, and apt to be ineffective.” H.R. REP. NO. 59-4784, at 1 (1906). Instead, the Committee
recommended that the “Secretary of State select some of the gentlemen connected with the
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largely codified the existing law of expatriation and contemporary administrative practice. As a result, the 1907 Act did not alter significantly the doctrine of expatriation. But it did, for the first time, establish in a statute
particular actions by which a citizen “shall be deemed to have expatriated
himself.”153 In the 1907 Act, those actions mirrored the historical understanding of expatriation as an individual right.
The second major codification of expatriation law, the Nationality Act
of 1940,154 went further. It went beyond the historical acts that, by definition,
constituted an individual’s exercise of his right to expatriation, and instead
legislated circumstances in which an individual citizen “shall lose his nationality.”155 In the Nationality Act of 1940, evidence that the executive
branch had formerly considered relevant to expatriation, such as voting in a
foreign election or employment by a foreign nation, became expatriation itself, what Justice Frankfurter would later call “statutory expatriation.”156
With the 1940 Act, the precession to the state was complete: the state was no
longer recognizing expatriation or even “deeming” it to have occurred. The
state was expatriating the individual.
1. Early Administrative Practice and the Expatriation Act of 1907
Until the first general statute governing the loss of citizenship was
passed in 1907, the individual right of expatriation was largely handled administratively. The Expatriation Act of 1868 established definitively the
right of expatriation, but, as Justice Patterson had recognized eighty years
previously in Talbot’s Case,157 Congress still had not provided individuals
any means for exercising the right.158 The United States’s recognition of the
right of expatriation had been mirrored in other Western countries, including
Great Britain,159 but some means by which to administer the transfer of citizenship and naturalization of foreign citizens was necessary. Accordingly,
the United States concluded numerous treaties with foreign nations, collectively known as the “Bancroft treaties” after the U.S. official who concluded

State Department who have given special attention to these subjects, have them prepare a
report and propose legislation that could be considered by Congress at the next session.” Id.
Upon this recommendation, three State Department officials were directed to make this inquiry, and submitted their recommendations to Congress. See H.R. DOC. NO. 59-326, at 1–2
(1906) [hereinafter 1906 State Department Report].
153
Expatriation Act of 1907, § 2.
154
Nationality Act of 1940, § 401, 54 Stat. 1137, 1168–69.
155
Id.
156
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 48 (1958).
157
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 163–65 (1795).
158
FREDERICK VAN DYNE, CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES 272 (1903) (“[T]here is
no mode of renunciation of citizenship prescribed by our laws. Whether expatriation has taken
place in any case must be determined by the facts and circumstances of the particular case. No
general rule that will apply to all cases can be laid down.”).
159
Green, supra note 3, at 315; Spiro, supra note 36, at 1428–29.
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the first with the North German Federation.160 These treaties governed the
naturalization and expatriation of citizens of the two countries.161 But given
the waves of immigrants coming to the United States, there was a need to
establish uniformity both domestically and abroad in naturalization and expatriation procedures and formality. In 1876, in his last message to Congress, President Grant summed up the situation, which would largely
continue for the next three decades:
The United States has insisted upon the right of expatriation, and
has obtained, after a long struggle, an admission of the principle
contended for by acquiescence therein on the part of many foreign
powers and by the conclusion of treaties on that subject. It is, however, but justice to the government to which such naturalized citizens have formerly owed allegiance, as well as to the United
States, that certain fixed and definite rules should be adopted governing such cases and providing how expatriation may be
accomplished.
....
. . . The delicate and complicated questions continually occurring with reference to naturalization, expatriation, and the status of
such persons as I have above referred to induce me to earnestly
direct your attention again to these subjects.162
Because Congress had not legislated on the subject, the duty of implementing the right to expatriation recognized in the 1868 Act fell largely to
the executive branch and, specifically, to the State Department.163 The State
160
Spiro, supra note 36, at 1428, n.73; Treaty, Prussia-U.S., June 12, 1871, 15 Stat. 615
(1868). The United States would continue to enter into a number of analogous treaties with
countries all over the world, including Bavaria, Mexico, Denmark, Brazil, and Honduras.
HERZOG, supra note 21, at 58–59.
161
See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. at 48 (describing these treaties); HERZOG, supra note
22, at 57.
162
Ulysses S. Grant, President, Eighth Annual Message (Dec. 5, 1876), in 10 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 4353, 4359–60 (James D. Richardson
ed., 1897). President Grant also noted two of the primary problems that most often raised
difficult citizenship questions: individuals living abroad asking for the protection of the United
States as citizens and marriages between U.S women and foreigners, as well as the children of
those marriages. Id. (“While emigrants in large numbers become citizens of the United States,
it is also true that persons, both native born and naturalized, once citizens of the United States,
either by formal acts or as the effect of a series of facts and circumstances, abandon their
citizenship and cease to be entitled to the protection of the United States, but continue on
convenient occasions to assert a claim to protection in the absence of provisions on these
questions. And in this connection I again invite your attention to the necessity of legislation
concerning the marriages of American citizens contracted abroad, and concerning the status of
American women who may marry foreigners and of children born of American parents in a
foreign country.”).
163
See Spiro, supra note 36, at 1439. Later, the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
which was a part of the Department of Labor until it was transferred to the Department of
Justice in 1940, see Reorganization Act of 1939, ch. 36, 53 Stat. 561 (the transfer was part of
Reorganization Plan No. V, 5 Fed. Reg. 2223, 5 U.S.C. § 133t note (1940), submitted by the
President pursuant to the Reorganization Act), would also play a role in determining citizen-
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Department was responsible for implementing the Expatriation Act of 1868
and the various Bancroft treaties and for responding to calls for diplomatic
protection from U.S. citizens abroad, the context in which expatriation decisions typically occurred. The lack of any definition in the Expatriation Act
of 1868 left the State Department and other executive branch departments
with an “absence of authoritative or of legislative definition” and “much
doubt” about the principles of expatriation,164 leading to somewhat inconsistent results.165 But a general approach developed, by which the State Department would apply a “balancing test” to determine whether “the individual
showed more attachment to the other country than to the United States.”166
Domicile abroad was not sufficient to imply expatriation, for example,
but if a naturalized U.S. citizen returned to her native country and circumstances demonstrated a “definitive abandonment of residence and domiciliary or representative business interest in the United States,” then the State
Department would presume a relinquishment of U.S. citizenship.167 The Department also looked to see whether the individual, though residing abroad,
had engaged in “acts of allegiance” to the United States, such as paying her
taxes, and the absence of such acts could raise a presumption of renunciation
of citizenship.168 This inquiry, which ultimately resembled a “totality of the
circumstances” test, was an attempt to determine whether a particular person
had in fact transferred her allegiance to a foreign country, the only conclusive act of expatriation, of which the best evidence was naturalization in a
foreign state.169
The Expatriation Act of 1907 in large part codified the State Department’s approach and international practice under the Bancroft treaties.170
ship and would reach different conclusions on some questions of expatriation than the State
Department, forcing the Attorney General to resolve the disagreements. See infra text accompanying note 193.
164
No. 497 Letter from Hamilton Fish, Sec’y, Dep’t of State, to Ulysses S. Grant, President
(Aug. 25, 1873), in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1186 (1873) (hereinafter
“Papers Relating to Expatriation”).
165
See TSIANG, supra note 1, at 8.
166
Spiro, supra note 36, at 1440.
167
TSIANG, supra note 1, at 99.
168
Spiro, supra note 36, at 1440.
169
See, e.g., id.; TSIANG, supra note 1, at 101–02; see also Expatriation–Foreign Domicile–Citizenship, 14 Op. Att’y Gen. 295–97 (1873) (consisting of a letter from George H.
Williams, Attorney General, to President Ulysses S. Grant) (“Residence in a foreign country
and an intent not to return are essential elements of expatriation; but to show complete expatriation as the law now stands, it is necessary to show something more than these. . . . [I]n
addition to domicile and an intent to remain, such expressions or acts as amount to a renunciation of United States citizenship and a willingness to submit to or adopt the obligations of the
country in which the person resides, such as accepting public employment, engaging in a
military service . . . may be treated by this Government as expatriation, without naturalization.
Naturalization is, without doubt, the highest but not the only evidence of expatriation.”);
MOORE, supra note 36, at 574 (quoting Secretary of State Cass) (“The moment a foreign
becomes naturalized, his allegiance to his native country is severed forever.”); FREDERICK VAN
DYNE, CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES 272 (1903) (“The most obvious and effective form
of expatriation is by naturalization in another country.”).
170
See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 36, at 1441; TSIANG, supra note 1, at 106–07.
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However, it also codified for the first time the exclusionary mien of expatriation. By the start of the 20th century, the country had switched from concern
for “ingress and inclusion, defending those who wanted to become American citizens,”171 to concern about the high levels of immigration.172 Whereas
the right of expatriation had derived, in part, from the need of the United
States to populate its country,173 the United States at the turn of the century
started to be concerned about this population and about potential fraud.174 It
was in this context that Congress passed the Expatriation Act of 1907. Further, faced with the increasing incidence of foreign citizens naturalizing in
the United States before returning to their native country shortly thereafter
and there claiming the protections of U.S. citizenship, several Presidents had
“repeatedly urged Congress to define the acts by which a citizen might be
deemed to have lost or forfeited his citizenship.”175 The conception of citizenship as a compact, inherently composed of both individual rights and
obligations, and the paramount importance of domicile and allegiance in
securing that relationship, led to the codification in the 1907 Act of actions
constituting the abandonment or transfer of allegiance, i.e., acts of
expatriation.
The 1907 Act originated in the report submitted by a commission composed of three State Department officials tasked with examining the law and
practice related to citizenship, expatriation, and protection abroad.176 The
Commission recommended that the Expatriation Act of 1868 “be supplemented by an act declaring that expatriation of an American citizen may be
assumed” when 1) “he obtains naturalization in a foreign state”; 2) “he
engages in the service of a foreign government and such service involves his
taking an oath of allegiance to such government”; and 3) “when he becomes
domiciled in a foreign state, and such domicil [sic] may be assumed when
he shall have resided in a foreign state for five years, without intent to return
to the United States.”177 The commission also recommended that the presumption of foreign domicile arising from five years’ residence abroad in the
third category could be overcome by “competent evidence,” and that the
exercise of the right to expatriation “shall only be permitted or recognized in
time of peace.”178 These recommendations largely reflected acts that constituted loss of citizenship prior to 1907 according to various treaties between
171

Green, supra note 3, at 315.
See HERZOG, supra note 21, at 43.
173
See TSIANG, supra note 1, at 111–12.
174
See Green, supra note 3, at 315–16.
175
TSIANG, supra note 1, at 104; see also 1906 State Department Report, supra note 152,
at 17 (noting that “our Government may be called on to protect during the period of liability to
military service a person who has no intention of ever residing in the United States or performing any obligations to it, but who, after shielding himself from the performance of his duty to
the Government under which he resides by the ambiguity of his position, finally accepts the
allegiance of the country of his birth or continued domicile.”).
176
See TSIANG, supra note 1, at 104–05.
177
1906 State Department Report, supra note 152, at 23.
178
Id.
172
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the United States and foreign nations.179 In a separate section of its report
dealing specifically with the effect of naturalization upon the status of wives
and minor children, the commission recommended that an American woman
who married a foreign citizen should take the nationality of her husband
“during coverture”, but could “revert to her American citizenship” upon
death of her husband or divorce by either registering within a year or returning to the United States to live.180
The 1907 Act largely adopted the Report’s recommendations about naturalization and taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign country,181 and also
adopted its recommendations about the citizenship of American women who
married foreign citizens and the children of such marriages.182 The 1907 Act
also provided, as suggested by the Report, that “no American citizen shall
be allowed to expatriate himself when this country is at war.”183 With respect
to domicile abroad, however, the 1907 Act departed from the Report’s recommendations. The Report had recommended a broad presumption of permanent domicile abroad—which would result in an assumption of
expatriation—after a certain period of residence abroad, applicable to all
American citizens, natural born and naturalized.184 The 1907 Act, however,
limited the applicability of this provision to naturalized citizens, excluding
native-born citizens from its reach.185 Naturalized U.S. citizens who resided
for two years in their native state or five years in any other foreign state were
presumed to “ha[ve] ceased to be an American citizen,” but naturalized

179

See HERZOG, supra note 21, at 43.
1906 State Department Report, supra note 152, at 29.
181
The Report justified the second provision, providing for expatriation by accepting employment in the service of a foreign government if such employment required the taking of an
oath of allegiance, principally on the basis of the meaning of the oath. See 1906 State Department Report, supra note 152, at 23 (explaining that an American citizen who “takes an oath of
allegiance to a foreign government in order to enter its service” has forsworn his allegiance to
the United States and “has expatriated himself from the United States” has done so “with
equal certainty” as an American citizen who naturalizes in a foreign country); see also id.
(“[N]o man should be permitted deliberately to place himself in a position where his services
may be claimed by more than one government and his allegiance be due to more than one.”).
In accord with this reasoning, the 1907 Act adopted the taking of the oath of allegiance as the
act constituting expatriation and did not require the additional condition that the individual
have entered into the employment of the foreign country. Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534
§ 2, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228 (1907).
182
See 1907 Act, §§ 3–6, 34 Stat. at 1229.
183
1907 Act, § 2, 34 Stat. at 1228.
184
See 1906 State Department Report, supra note 152, at 23. The Report catalogued the
long, though not entirely consistent, history of treating naturalized and native-born citizens
equally in terms of their rights of citizenship and in protection abroad. See id. at 8 (“This
protection has always been accorded to naturalized citizens equally with native citizens, except
that there was fluctuation in the practice of protecting naturalized citizens upon their return to
the country of their origin until the [Expatriation Act of] 1868.”); id. at 12 (“The able and
exhaustive report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House . . . and the debates in the
Senate and House . . . left no doubt of agreement on the great point of the right of absolute
equality of protection of naturalized and native Americans while in foreign state.”).
185
See 1907 Act, § 2, 34 Stat. at 1228.
180
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citizens could overcome this presumption “on the presentation of satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States.”186
2. Interpretation and Implementation of the 1907 Act
The State Department circular that went out following the passage of
the 1907 Act reiterated the three methods of expatriation enumerated in the
Act—naturalization in a foreign country, the taking of an oath of allegiance
to a foreign country, and continued residence abroad by naturalized citizens—and directed every United States foreign service officer to notify the
Department if a U.S. citizen naturalized in a foreign country or took an oath
of allegiance to a foreign country.187 The circular also set out three methods
by which a naturalized citizen who had lived abroad in her native country for
two years or in any other foreign country for five could overcome the presumption of expatriation: 1) if residence abroad was primarily the result of
American trade or business; 2) if residence abroad was for bona fide reasons
of health or education; and 3) if an unforeseen exigency prevented the person from returning to the United States as intended.188 The Secretary of State
stated in the circular that the “evidence required to overcome the presumption must be of specific facts and circumstances which bring the alleged
citizen under one of the [specified] categories, and mere assertion, even
under oath, that any of the enumerated reasons exist will not be accepted as
sufficient.”189
a. Naturalization in a Foreign Country
With respect to naturalization in a foreign state, the State Department
determined that involuntary naturalization did not affect loss of citizenship.190 For example, a U.S. citizen who applied for Russian citizenship after
“being told he ‘would be without the law’ during his stay in Russia if he did
not become a Russian,” was ruled not to have voluntarily naturalized and
remained a U.S. citizen.191 Some difficulties arose with respect to foreign
laws that bestowed citizenship on individuals when certain requirements
were met; the State Department had to determine whether an individual had
“accept[ed] or reject[ed] the citizenship thus thrust upon him” by the foreign state.192 In these cases, the State Department developed what Professor
John P. Roche dubbed the “doctrine of supplemental acts,” looking at acts
such as applying for an identity card, holding office, or performing other
186

Id.
See TSIANG, supra note 1, at 106.
See id.
189
Id.
190
See John P. Roche, Loss of American Nationality—The Development of Statutory Expatriation, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 25, 28 (1950).
191
Id. at 28.
192
Id.
187
188
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acts “ordinarily open only to [the foreign state’s] subjects” in order to determine whether the individual had accepted the nationality thrust upon her.193
Another difficulty that arose concerned children who were born in the
United States but whose parents naturalized in foreign states during the
child’s minority.194
Ultimately, the Supreme Court resolved the issue in Perkins v. Elg in an
opinion that is instructive about the Court’s understanding of expatriation
and the 1907 Act.195 Marie Elizabeth Elg was born in Brooklyn to naturalized U.S. citizens native to Sweden. During her childhood, her parents
moved back to Sweden and voluntarily reassumed their Swedish citizenship.
Marie returned to the United States when she was 21 and was admitted as a
citizen.196 But six years later she was informed that she was not a citizen and
threatened with deportation.197 Her action to establish her citizenship reached
the Supreme Court, which held, citing executive branch opinions, actions,
and administrative guidances that both pre- and post-dated the 1907 Act, that

193
Id. at 29. Another problem involved individuals who had naturalized in foreign countries during World War I. The 1907 Act provided that “no American citizen shall be allowed to
expatriate himself when this country is at war.” Expatriation Act of 1907, ch. 2534 § 2, 34
Stat. 1228, 1228 (1907). The Secretary of State and Department of Labor, which then housed
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, disagreed on what the correct approach to these
individuals should be. See 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 474, 476 (1940). While the Secretary of State
determined that individuals who had voluntarily naturalized in other countries during the war
would be considered citizens until July 2, 1921, see Exceptions, 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 9, § 248, at 264–65, the Secretary of Labor asserted that attempted
wartime expatriation should be regarded as never becoming effective, see Loss of Citizenship
Through Marriage to Alien, Foreign Naturalization, or Foreign Oath of Allegiance, 39 Op.
Att’y Gen. at 476 (quoting from a memorandum prepared by the Solicitor of Labor). Ultimately, Attorney General Jackson resolved the issue in favor of the Secretary of State’s position, concluding that “American citizens who were naturalized abroad after entry into the
war . . . and prior to the congressional resolution . . . declaring the war at an end, lost their
citizenship as of the latter date.” Id. at 481. He reasoned that the provision had been “intended
to protect the interests of the United States,” and it would be “clearly contrary to the interests
of the United States, that one who has in fact abandoned his former allegiance and taken upon
himself the allegiance of a foreign power is, nevertheless, free to enter our country at will with
all the rights of a citizen.” Id.
194
See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 73 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1934); Citizenship of Ingrid
Therese Tobiassen, 36 Op. Att’y Gen. 535 (1932); Roche, supra note 190, at 30. The fact that
children born as U.S. citizens who wanted to return and claim that citizenship upon reaching
majority would not be able to do so under the prevailing view led Congress to pass statutes to
allow specific individuals who had been deemed to have expatriated themselves during their
childhood to return to the United States as citizens. See Act of July 13, 1937, ch. 493, 50 Stat.
1030 (“[I]n the administration of the immigration laws, James Lincoln Hartley, a native-born
citizen of the United States who involuntarily lost his citizenship at the age of seven years by
reason of the naturalization of his father as a citizen of Canada, shall be held and considered to
have been legally admitted to the United States for permanent residence. Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, said James Lincoln Hartley may be naturalized as a citizen of the
United States . . . .”).
195
307 U.S. 325 (1939).
196
Id. at 327.
197
Id. at 328.
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she was a citizen because she had elected to retain her U.S. citizenship on
reaching maturity.198
Petitioners stress the American doctrine relating to expatriation. By the Act of July 27, 1868, Congress declared that “the
right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people.”
Expatriation is the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of nationality and allegiance. It has no application to the removal from
this country of a native citizen during minority. In such a case the
voluntary action which is of the essence of the right of expatriation
is lacking. That right is fittingly recognized where a child born
here, who may be, or may become, subject to a dual nationality,
elects on attaining majority citizenship in the country to which he
has been removed. But there is no basis for invoking the doctrine
of expatriation where a native citizen who is removed to his parents’ country of origin during minority returns here on his majority
and elects to remain and to maintain his American citizenship. Instead of being inconsistent with the right of expatriation, the principle which permits that election conserves and applies it.
....
. . . Having regard to the plain purpose of Section 2 of the Act
of 1907, to deal with voluntary expatriation, we are of the opinion
that its provisions do not affect the right of election, which would
otherwise exist, by reason of a wholly involuntary and merely derivative naturalization in another country during minority.199
Of course, executive branch officials still had to determine after Elg what
constituted election after majority, which they did by looking to some of the
same acts that made up Roche’s “doctrine of supplemental acts.”200
b. Oath of Allegiance
Executive branch officials also had to determine what constituted an
“oath of allegiance” to a foreign state within the meaning of the 1907 Act.
They would evaluate each oath, looking at factors such as whether it was
required by the laws of the foreign state and sworn before a government
official. As one Secretary of State stated the inquiry: “The test seems to be
the question whether the oath taken places the person taking it in complete
subjection to the state to which it is taken . . . so that it is impossible for him
198

See id. at 330–49.
Id. at 334, 347.
Roche, supra note 190, at 31. An individual only had to make one election, however,
and once an election had been made, subsequent acts suggesting allegiance to the other country were not regarded as evidence of a different election. For example, a dual Canadian national who established U.S. residence after reaching majority but then returned to Canada to
vote in an election remained a U.S. citizen because of the initial election. In re M, 1 I. & N.
Dec. 536 (B.I.A. 1943).
199
200
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to perform the obligations of citizenship to this country.”201 Executive
branch officials struggled initially with oaths of allegiance required for service in foreign militaries, evaluating each oath individually to determine, for
example, whether the allegiance was temporary or permanent.202 Ultimately,
they started treating them all equally, a result affirmed by a federal court that
determined the length of the oath did not matter, only that the allegiance
sworn was total.203 Service in a foreign army that required an oath of allegiance of all soldiers would lead to an administrative presumption that a
citizen had taken the oath, which the individual bore the burden of
rebutting.204
As with naturalization during minority, the taking of an oath of allegiance by a minor also created disagreement within the executive branch.
The doctrine of “confirmatory acts” became a way to determine if minors
who took an oath of allegiance had expatriated themselves.205 A minor taking
an oath of allegiance did not expatriate herself unless, upon majority, she
engaged in confirmatory acts, which one decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals defined as “affirmative, overt act[s] which indicate[ ] a continued allegiance to the foreign state.”206 Although the State Department
initially took the view that a voluntary oath by a minor did constitute expatriation, it ultimately adopted the confirmatory acts doctrine after adverse
court decisions.207 Under this doctrine, “the overt act, in order to confirm the
oath, must have a direct relationship to the purpose for which the oath was

201

Roche, supra note 190, at 33.
Id. at 34.
203
Ex parte Griffin, 237 F. 445, 447 (N.D.N.Y. 1916). One exception to this practice was
the treatment of American citizens who joined the Canadian Army before the United States
entered World War II. They swore a special oath of “fealty,” that was designed to avoid the
loss of citizenship, and the Board of Immigration Appeals acquiesced in that workaround. See
In re T, 1 I. & N. Dec. 596 (B.I.A. 1943).
204
See United States ex rel. Rojak v. Marshall, 34 F.2d 219, 220 (W.D. Pa. 1929). Attorney General Jackson’s opinion about naturalization in a foreign country during World War I
also dealt with oaths of allegiance taken during that time. Loss of Citizenship Through Marriage to Alien, Foreign Naturalization, or Foreign Oath of Allegiance, 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 474,
481 (1941). Contrary to those who were naturalized in a foreign state during the war, the
Attorney General determined, consistent with the positions of the State Department and INS,
that individuals who took an oath of allegiance to the foreign state had not necessarily expatriated themselves, effective July 2, 1921. Id. Because “the nationality of the foreign state is not
acquired through the mere taking of an oath of allegiance,” id. at 482, an individual would not
be considered to have expatriated himself “unless he demonstrated by some confirmatory act
that he had actually abandoned his allegiance to the United States,” Roche, supra note 190, at
34.
205
Id. at 35.
206
Id.
207
See Minors, 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 9, § 249, at 270–74
(recounting the past decisions of the State Department regarding minors taking oaths of allegiance and quoting State Department decisions noting that the 1907 Act “does not attempt to
make any distinction between minors and adults” and concluding that “in the absence of a
clear showing of duress, any person, whether minor or adult, who takes an oath of allegiance
to a foreign state thereby becomes expatriated”).
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taken, thus amounting to a practical reaffirmation of the oath of
allegiance.”208
In many ways, the inquiry paralleled the naturalization inquiry. The
oath had to be voluntary and not taken under duress, although a citizen
claiming duress bore the burden of proof. And examples of “confirmatory
acts”—voting in a foreign election, obtaining a foreign identity card, joining
a foreign military force—mirrored the “supplemental facts” considered in
the naturalization inquiries. However, while naturalization in a foreign country almost universally required the individual to establish her residence in
that country, an oath of allegiance could be taken anywhere.209 The State
Department had a longstanding position, however, that expatriation could be
accomplished only by departure from the United States.210 Thus, an oath of
allegiance to a foreign country that was taken in the United States could not
constitute expatriation. Roche locates the basis for this position in the “early
interpretation of expatriation as a transfer of allegiance from one sovereign
to another—as opposed to simple loss of nationality.”211 Because a transfer
“could not by definition take place within the jurisdiction of the United
States,”212 expatriation could not occur.
c. Residence Abroad by Naturalized Citizens
The 1907 Act provided that when a naturalized citizen had lived abroad
for two years in his native country or five years in any foreign country, “it
shall be presumed that he has ceased to be an American citizen.”213 As
noted, the administrative guidance circulated by the State Department following the passage of the Act specified three ways in which the presumption
could be overcome: limited types of business abroad, health or education
abroad, or exigent circumstances. These were later expanded to include additional types of business abroad, and an exception made for residence in Canada and Mexico, but each method of overcoming the presumption included
as a necessary condition an ultimate intent to return to the United States and
reside there permanently.214
This provision was the subject of further disagreement within the executive branch. The State Department contended that an individual who could
208

Roche, supra note 190, at 35.
Minors, 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 9 § 249, at 274 (noting
that the State Department “made a further ruling to the effect that in view of the fact that there
were two or three Federal court decisions holding that a minor does not expatriate himself by
taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign government . . . [the Department] should follow these
decisions in the matter of granting passports, notwithstanding the fact that . . . [it] could, in the
exercise of the discretion conferred upon the Secretary of State in such matters, decline to do
so”).
210
Roche, supra note 190, at 36.
211
Id.
212
Id. at 37.
213
Act of Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 25, 34 Stat. 1228.
214
TSIANG, supra note 1, at 106.
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not overcome the presumption had expatriated herself, a position supported
by Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte.215 But Bonaparte’s successor, Attorney General George Wickersham, overruled the State Department’s view
and interpreted the 1907 Act in a more limited way. He contended that the
purpose of the presumption was “to relieve the Government of the obligation to protect such citizens residing abroad” not to “decitizenize them, but
to withdraw from them the ordinary protections of a citizen if they have
become permanent residents abroad.”216 The State Department at first resisted Wickersham’s interpretation and sought to undermine or overturn it,
refusing to deliver passports to citizens.217 The Department immediately
reassumed its interpretation of the statute when a district court rejected
Wickersham’s ruling.218 In 1926, however, in light of Supreme Court and
other judicial decisions that supported it,219 the State Department finally accepted the Wickersham view for good.220 Accordingly, from 1926 until the
Nationality Act of 1940, residence abroad “related only to the loss of protection by naturalized citizens abroad” and did not constitute expatriation.221
d. Married Women
The provision pertaining to married women222 led to the principal Supreme Court decision on the 1907 Act, a decision that would later become
215

WEIL, supra note 5, at 85.
Id.
217
Roche, supra note 190, at 39.
218
Id.
219
See United States v. Gay, 264 U.S. 353, 389 (1924) (“[P]lace of residence . . . might
be regarded as an element in continuing [an individual] a citizen and presumptions could be
erected upon it, and we are prompted to say it is a presumption easy to preclude, and easy to
overcome. It is a matter of option and intention.”).
220
Roche, supra note 190, at 39.
221
Id.
222
This provision, effecting the temporary loss of citizenship for women who married
foreign men, addressed fears that “alien men married American women simply to get a foothold in the United States,” and represented a “tremendous setback for women’s struggle for
full citizenship rights, as it implied that women derived their status as citizens from their
American husbands rather than their own individuality.” HERZOG, supra note 21, at 43. Because of this provision, the act was also known as the “Gigolo Act.” Id.; see also Green, supra
note 3, at 319. And one scholar has claimed that it “caused the feminist revolution.” Green,
supra note 3, at 319. The provision forcing women to take the citizenship of foreign husbands
was the subject of considerable resistance from U.S. women and those supporting women’s
rights, and this opposition led Congress to repeal it for the most part in the Cable Act of 1922,
which provided that “a woman citizen of the United States shall not cease to be a citizen of the
United States by reason of her marriage after the passage of this act.” Married Women’s Independent Citizenship (Cable) Act, ch. 411, 42 Stat. 1021, § 3 (1922); see Green, supra note 3, at
319. The Cable Act did not restore citizenship to women who had lost their citizenship under
the 1907 Act, however. Married Women’s Independent Citizenship (Cable) Act, ch. 411, 42
Stat. 1021, § 4 (1922); Janet M. Calvo, Gender, Wives, and U.S. Citizenship Status: The Failure of Constitutional and Legislative Protection, 9 INT’L REV. CONSTITUTIONALISM 263, 281
(2009). Under the Cable Act, women who married aliens who were themselves ineligible for
American citizenship continued to lose their citizenship, Calvo, supra, at 282–86, but this
exclusion was ultimately removed in 1931, see Act of March 3, 1931, ch. 442, 46 Stat. 1511,
§ 4(a) (1931).
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the subject of considerable disagreement among Supreme Court Justices. In
Mackenzie v. Hare,223 a woman who had been born in California and never
left was not allowed to register to vote in San Francisco because she had
married a citizen of Great Britain, thereby taking his nationality and relinquishing hers.224 She brought an action against the Board of Election Commissioners in San Francisco to compel her registration as a voter, relying on
statements from Osborn v. Bank of the United States225 and United States v.
Wong Kim Ark,226 among other things, to contend that Congress had no authority to denationalize her without her consent.227 The Court noted that her
arguments were “in exact antagonism to the statute,” but it ultimately determined that her case did not implicate the question of Congress’s authority to
provide for involuntary expatriation.228 Instead, the Court held that the plaintiff’s marriage to the foreign citizen was “a condition voluntarily entered
into, with notice of the consequences,” an act “as voluntary and distinctive
as expatriation.”229 In light of the international and domestic consequences
of American citizens marrying foreigners and the prevailing view of marriage as “unifying” the two, with the man’s identity subsuming the woman’s,
the Court found it was “no arbitrary exercise of government” to provide that
“as long as the relation lasts it is made tantamount to expatriation.”230
In 1950, following the passage of the Nationality Act of 1940,231 the
Court relied on Mackenzie in analyzing, under the 1907 Act, the effect of
naturalization in a foreign country by a U.S. citizen. The petitioner in
Savorgnon v. United States232 had applied for, and been granted, Italian citizenship in the United States, which she had been required to do to acquire
royal consent to her marriage to an Italian Vice Consul stationed in the
United States.233 She signed an oath in Italian, which she neither understood
nor had translated to her, which stated that she “renounce[d] [her] American citizenship,” but the district court found as a matter of fact that the
petitioner had intended to obtain Italian citizenship but “had no intention of

223

239 U.S. 299 (1915).
Id.
225
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827–28 (1822) (“A naturalized citizen is indeed made a citizen
under an act of Congress . . . . He becomes a member of the society, possessing all the rights of
a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the constitution, on the footing of a native. The
constitution does not authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power
of the national Legislature, is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and the exercise of
this power exhausts it, so far as respects the individual.”).
226
169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898) (“The power of naturalization, vested in congress by the
constitution, is a power to confer citizenship, not a power to take it away.”); see also id. (citing
Osborn, 22 U.S. at 827).
227
Mackenzie, 239 U.S. at 310.
228
Id. at 310–12.
229
Id. at 312.
230
Id.
231
See infra text accompanying notes 239–45.
232
338 U.S. 491 (1950).
233
Id. at 494.
224
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renouncing her allegiance to the United States.”234 Although the executive
branch contended that the petitioner had lost her citizenship when she signed
the oath under the 1907 Act, the Court ultimately did not resolve that question, relying instead on the petitioner’s subsequent residence in Italy to support her loss of citizenship.235 But the Court did address, and reject, the
petitioner’s contention that “her intent should prevail,” i.e. that she could not
lose her citizenship under legislation unless she intended to do so.236 The
Court reasoned that the United States “ha[d] long recognized the general
undesirability of dual allegiances” and that “[t]here is nothing . . . in the
Act of 1907 that implies a congressional intent that, after an American citizen has performed an overt act which spells expatriation under the wording
of the statute, he nevertheless can preserve for himself a duality of citizenship by showing his intent or understanding to have been contrary to the
usual legal consequences of such an act.”237 Relying on Mackenzie, the
Court held that the petitioner was “a competent adult” who “voluntarily and
knowingly” engaged in an expatriating act, the consequences of which she
was “responsible for understanding” and by which she was “bound.”238
3. The Nationality Act of 1940
The modern conception of expatriation originates in the Nationality Act
of 1940.239 In 1933, by Executive Order, President Roosevelt designated the
Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Labor as a
Committee on Immigration charged with reviewing U.S. immigration and
nationality laws and practices, recommending revisions, and proposing a single, comprehensive law to collect all of the formerly scattered provisions on
immigration.240 The eventual result was the Nationality Act of 1940, section
401 of which is the precursor of current section 349 and the basis for expatriation today.241 The bill was presented as a codification of existing law with
some recommended substantive changes,242 and was endorsed by all of the
234

Id. at 495.
Id. at 503.
236
Id. at 499–500.
237
Id. at 500.
238
Id. at 502.
239
The Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, 54 Stat. 1137. The full title of the Act displays its
purpose: “An Act to revise and codify the nationality laws of the United States into a comprehensive nationality code.” Id.
240
See generally 3 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, 76TH
CONG., REP. PROPOSING A REVISION AND CODIFICATION OF THE NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES V (Comm. Print 1938) [hereinafter 3 REP. ON NATIONALITY LAWS]. (“By
your Executive Order of April 25, 1933, you designated the undersigned a committee to review the nationality laws of the United States, to recommend revisions, and to codify the laws
into one comprehensive nationality law for submission to the Congress.”); see also HERZOG,
supra note 21, at 45.
241
Nationality Act of 1940 § 401.
242
2 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, 76TH CONG., REP. PROPOSING A REVISION AND CODIFICATION OF THE NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES III
235
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major executive branch departments.243 As a result, the law was subject to
little debate or dissent,244 even though it included several significant changes
to existing law, including to the law of expatriation.245 As originally passed,
section 401 included, and would be amended to include more, significant
departures from and additions to the 1907 Act and the historical conception
of expatriation. As a result, the Nationality Act of 1940, especially section
401, marks the culmination of the precession of the subject of “expatriate”
to the state.
a. Section 401
Section 401 of the Nationality Act of 1940 provided that a U.S. citizen
“shall lose his nationality” by performing any of a series of enumerated acts,
which included the two primary expatriation acts in the 1907 Act:
“[o]btaining naturalization in a foreign state” and “[t]aking an oath or
making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to a foreign
state.”246 But it also included several additional acts: 1) service in the armed
forces of a foreign state, 2) employment under the government of a foreign
state, 3) voting in a foreign election, 4) making a formal renunciation of
citizenship before a U.S. diplomatic officer in a foreign state, 5) conviction
of desertion, or 6) conviction for treason.247 The first four of these acts—
along with the use of a foreign passport as a national of that country, which
was ultimately not adopted—were proposed by the Commission and reflected a codification of the “supplemental facts” and “confirmatory acts”
that had been used by the executive branch in implementing the 1907 Act.248
The Commission described the addition of these new acts as “intended to
deprive persons of American nationality when such persons, by their own
acts, or inaction, show that their real attachment is to the foreign country and
not to the United States.”249 However, these four acts, unlike the historical
acts of expatriation, did not involve the assumption of a new nationality.250
(Comm. Print 1938) [hereinafter 2 REP. ON NATIONALITY LAWS] (transmitting “a report concerning the Revision and Codification of the Nationality Laws of the United States,” which
“indicate[d] the desirability from the administrative standpoint of having the existing nationality laws now scattered among a large number of separate statutes embodied in a single,
logically arranged and understandable code,” and noting that “[c]ertain changes in substance
are likewise recommended”).
243
HERZOG, supra note 21, at 45.
244
Id.
245
Herzog argues that these changes, and the fact that there was so little debate over them,
may be explained “by the anticipation of war and the concern that German Americans may
have dual loyalty.” Id. at 46.
246
§ 401(a),(b), 54 Stat. at 1169.
247
Id. § 401(c)–(h).
248
T. Alexander Aleinkoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471, 1477
(1986).
249
3 REP. ON NATIONALITY LAWS, supra note 240, at VII (“None of the various provisions in the Code concerning the loss of American nationality . . . is designed to be punitive or
to interfere with freedom of action.”).
250
HERZOG, supra note 21, at 46.
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They had formerly served as evidence of such an assumption, used to support a finding that voluntary expatriation had occurred,251 but, with the enactment of the Nationality Act of 1940, they became sufficient in and of
themselves to establish expatriation.
The fifth and sixth enumerated instances in which a U.S. citizen “shall
lose his nationality” were of an entirely different nature and origin. During
the Civil War, the United States found herself in the same position in which
European countries had formerly been—in need of conscription for military
service and facing the problem of citizens expatriating themselves to avoid
such conscription.252 In fact, naturalized citizens were returning to their native countries to avoid conscription in the Civil War and then appealing to
the United States to intercede when their native country attempted to impress
them into military service, a practice that led President Abraham Lincoln to
suggest Congress “fix a limit beyond which no citizen of the United States
residing abroad may claim the protection of his Government.”253
As a result, shortly before the end of the Civil War, Congress passed a
law designed to increase the punishment for desertion from the Union Army.
Section 21 of that bill provided that, “in addition to the other lawful penalties of the crime of desertion,” any deserter who failed to report within sixty
days of the passage of the bill “shall be deemed and taken to have voluntarily relinquished and forfeited their rights of citizenship,” and that “all persons who, being duly enrolled, shall . . . go beyond the limits of the United
States with intent to avoid any draft into the military or naval service, duly
ordered, shall be liable” to the same penalty.254 This law was, as one author
251

See supra text accompanying notes 163–86.
As Secretary of State Seward put it, the United States was, on one hand, resisting
foreign powers’ “claims for the exemption from [U.S.] military service of persons who appealed to their protection” and “on the other . . . enforcing [the] claims for the exemption of
the like class from military service in foreign countries, on the ground of their having acquired
the rights of citizenship in the United States.” TSIANG, supra note 1, at 83 (quoting William H.
Seward, Sec’y of State, to John Lothrop Motley, Minister to Austria, (Apr. 21, 1863)).
253
Id. at 83–84.
254
Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 79, 13 Stat. 487; see also TSIANG, supra note 1, at 84. It is
not clear whether the law intended to effect a loss of citizenship itself or a loss of only the
“rights of citizenship.” Because citizenship carried with it few, if any rights beyond voting at
that time of open borders, the loss of the right to vote was often conflated with the loss of
citizenship, making it difficult to discern whether the law intended to remove voting rights or
citizenship itself. Roche, supra note 190, at 62. Unsurprisingly given its history of pushing for
harsher interpretation of expatriation provisions, the State Department testified during hearings
related to the Nationality Act of 1940 that it interpreted the 1865 statute to impose a loss of
citizenship, not merely the “rights” that accompany it. To Revise and Codify the Nationality
Law of the United States into a Comprehensive Nationality Code: Hearing on H.R. 6127 superseded by H.R. 9980 Before the H. Comm. on Immigration and Naturalization, 76th Cong.
132–33 (1940) (statement of Richard W. Flournoy, Assistant Legal Advisor, Department of
State). The Board of Immigration Appeals had reached a different interpretation of the statute,
citing it as an example of Congress “depriv[ing] citizens of all or a part of the ordinary rights
of citizenship.” In re P, 1 I & N Dec. 127, 132 (B.I.A. 1941). In its view, “[d]eserters from
military service in time of war forfeit[ed] their rights of citizenship” under the statute, not
their citizenship itself. Id. (emphasis added). That view also appears to have been adopted by
President Coolidge, who issued a proclamation of amnesty for deserters who had been con252
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has described it, the “first occasion on which the revocation of citizenship
was introduced and actually performed.”255 In the debates over the legislation, the objections were “connected to the penal system or were part of the
protests against the Civil War itself,” and there was little discussion of the
power of Congress to revoke citizenship or the nature of citizenship.256
Subsections (g) and (h) in section 401 of the Nationality Act of 1940,
which provided for the loss of citizenship upon conviction for desertion or
for “[c]ommitting any act of treason against, or attempting by force to overthrow or bearing arms against the United States,”257 originated in this 1865
Civil War desertion statute. The Commission proposed only the loss of citizenship upon conviction for desertion, citing the 1865 law, which it described as “distinctly penal in character.”258 The provision providing for loss
of nationality upon conviction for treason or for attempting to overthrow or
bearing arms against the United States was not proposed by the Commission
or added during the extensive consideration of the bill in the House.259 Instead, it was added on the floor of the Senate as a “penalty,” recognized as
“drastic,” similar to the existing penalty for desertion proposed to be included in the new section 401.260 One commentator attributed the addition of
this provision to “congressional refusal to distinguish between loss of citizenship and loss of the rights of citizenship,” noting that the treason provision was a “penalty measure not unlike the old practice of banishment
employed by the Greeks.”261 These two provisions, unlike the other formerly
evidentiary acts that were codified as expatriation in the Nationality Act of
1940, “appeared to be concerned about something other than transferred or
divided allegiance,” and clearly “permitted the denationalization of citizens
who may not have acquired citizenship elsewhere.”262 And, unlike the historical acts of expatriation, they could not, by definition, constitute expatriation
themselves because only citizens could be convicted of treason or
desertion.263
victed after the close of fighting in World War I but while the U.S. was still technically at war.
A Proclamation, 43 Stat. 1940 (Mar. 5, 1924). President Coolidge referred to convicted deserters as “fellow citizens,” and proclaimed that there would be “fully remitted as to such persons
any relinquishment or forfeiture of their rights of citizenship.” Id. at 1940–41.
255
HERZOG, supra note 21, at 40.
256
Id. at 40–41. There was also a prior bill, the Wade-Davis Bill, that sought to strip the
citizenship of Confederate officials, which passed both Houses of Congress but was pocket
vetoed by President Lincoln because he thought it was too harsh a measure. See Afroyim v.
Rusk, 387 U.S. 252, 279–81 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing the bill).
257
Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 401(g),(h), 54 Stat. 1168, 1169.
258
1 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, 76TH CONG., REP. PROPOSING A REVISION AND CODIFICATION OF THE NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 68
(Comm. Print 1938) [hereinafter 1 REP. ON NATIONALITY LAWS].
259
Roche, supra note 190, at 56.
260
86 CONG. REC. 12430–31 (1940).
261
Roche, supra note 190, at 56.
262
Aleinkoff, supra note 248, at 1477.
263
See Morrow, supra note 54, at 553 (“While [Jefferson] believed that American citizens were free to divest themselves of [their citizenship] by acts manifesting their intention,
the laws did not admit that the bare commission of a crime amounts of itself to a divestment of
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b. Subsequent Amendments to Section 401
Congress established in the Nationality Act of 1940 that the loss of
citizenship could be imposed on the basis of provisions that were formerly
evidence of a transfer of allegiance and of provisions that “appear[ed] penal
in nature,”264 and it then proposed and enacted amendments to section 401
that furthered this concept of expatriation. In 1944, Congress added a new
subsection 401(j) effecting the loss of citizenship for any U.S. citizen who
departed or remained outside the United States “for the purpose of evading
or avoiding training and service in the land or naval forces of the United
States.”265 And in the Expatriation Act of 1954, Congress added additional
criminal convictions under the Smith Act, including conspiracy, to the existing provision providing for loss of citizenship for convictions for treason
or attempting to overthrow the government.266
The most perverse proposals to amend section 401 during this period,
however, were intended to address the “Japanese problem” and provided
various means by which to revoke the citizenship of the Japanese-Americans
interned during World War II.267 Ultimately, on the advice of Attorney General Biddle and in light of constitutional concerns expressed during the consideration of the various proposals,268 a neutral provision was enacted as
subsection (i) of section 401, which permitted U.S. citizens to renounce their
citizenship within the United States during a time of war.269 But its intent,
and ultimate effect, was directed solely at Japanese-American citizens, over

the character of a citizen, and withdraws the criminal from their coercion.”(internal quotation
omitted)).
264
Aleinkoff, supra note 248, at 1477.
265
Act of Sept. 27, 1944, ch. 418, 58 Stat. 746; Roche, supra note 190, at 60. This new
subsection mirrored a similar 1912 addition to the 1865 Civil War desertion statute. See Act of
Aug. 22, 1912, ch. 336, 37 Stat. 356; Roche, supra note 190, at 61.
266
Expatriation Act of 1954, ch. 1256, sec. 2, 68 Stat. 1146, 1146 (adding as expatriating
acts a conviction for “violating or conspiring to violate any of the provisions of section 2383
of title 18 . . . or willfully performing any act in violation of section 2385 of title 18 . . . or
violating section 2384 of said title by engaging in a conspiracy to overthrow, put down, or to
destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them”).
267
Expatriation of Certain Nationals of the United States: Hearings Before the H. Comm.
on Immigration and Naturalization on H.R. 2701, H.R. 3012, H.R. 3489, H.R. 3446, and H.R.
4103, 78th Cong. 13 (1944) [hereinafter Expatriation of Certain Nationals]; see also HERZOG,
supra note 21, at 47–48.
268
Roche, supra note 190, at 58.
269
An Act to Provide for the Loss of United States Nationality Under Certain Circumstances, Pub. L. No. 78-405, ch. 368, 58 Stat. 677 (1944). Herzog notes that the “appearance
of this amendment as a bureaucratic correction has caused legal scholars surveying expatriation laws to ignore its existence or to underestimate its importance,” which he describes as
“one of the darkest hours in American domestic history.” HERZOG, supra note 21, at 46.
Writing while the events of World War II and the internment of Japanese Americans was still a
fresh memory, Roche does not ignore this history and comprehensively describes the underlying rationale for this provision: to denationalize Japanese-American U.S. citizens. Roche,
supra note 190, at 57–60.
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5000 of whom renounced their U.S. citizenship through this provision while
incarcerated in concentration camps during the war.270
Section 401, especially the penal elements included originally and in
subsequent amendments, represented a distinct turn in the law of expatriation.271 Acts that did not necessarily involve a transfer of allegiance but had
formerly been used to confirm the voluntariness of an individual’s act of
expatriation, i.e. naturalization in a foreign country or an oath of allegiance
to a foreign country, themselves became acts of expatriation. And they were
combined with provisions stripping individual citizens’ nationality as punishment. Section 401 thus represented the birth of “statutory”272 or “involuntary”273 expatriation, where the government, by statute and against the
individual’s will, declares citizenship to be lost on the basis of acts prescribed by the government.274 Representative of this new conception, and of
270
See HERZOG, supra note 21, at 46–47 (“The nominal generality of the law was intended to obscure the specific aim of its legislators—namely, to find and establish a measure
that would enable the American government to expatriate and deport as many native-born
American citizens of Japanese descent as possible without interference by the Supreme
Court.”); see also Roche, supra note 190, at 58–59.
271
Aleinkoff, supra note 248, at 1477; Roche, supra note 190.
272
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 48 (1958).
273
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 263 (1967).
274
Section 401 was not the only provision of the Nationality Act of 1940 that reflected a
changing conception of expatriation that included the possibility of the state acting as subject.
Another significant change was the codification of the State Department’s long-repressed view
on residence abroad. Instead of raising a rebuttable presumption that “never ripen[ed] into
actual expatriation,” and could be easily overcome by a return, or an expressed intent to return
to, the United States, section 404 of the 1940 Act established that residence abroad by a naturalized citizen for two years in her native country or five in any other effected the loss of
citizenship. Roche, supra note 190, at 40; see Act of Oct. 14, 1940, ch. 876, § 401, 54 Stat.
1137, 1169–70. A State Department official, testifying in favor of this provision, stated it was
“the most important proposed change in the whole code, and may be the subject of some
controversy,” that but it was necessary because the State Department, given the numerous
citizens abroad who were applying to it for protection or passports, though that “there should
be some point at which such person should lose not only his right to protection but his citizenship itself.” Roche, supra note 190, at 40; see also 2 REP. ON NATIONALITY LAWS, supra note
242, at VII (“The mere presumption of expatriation provided for in section 2 of the act of
March 2, 1907, in cases of naturalized citizens residing for 2 years in the foreign states from
which they came or 5 years in other foreign states, has proven inadequate.”). Sections 405 and
406 exempted the citizens abroad from the effect of section 404 for the reasons previously
specified as ways to overcome the presumption of the 1907 Act. Section 405 exempted from
section 404 citizens living abroad who were employed by the United States or who were living
abroad due to disability incurred in the service of the United States. Section 406, which largely
codified the State Department’s implementation of the 1907 provision, exempted: (1) citizens
who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years before moving abroad and were at
least sixty-five years old; (2) citizens residing abroad solely or principally to represent a U.S.
“educational, scientific, philanthropic, religious, commercial, financial, or business organization” or an international agency in which the United State participated; (3) citizens residing
abroad on account of health; (4) citizens residing abroad “for the purpose of pursuing studies;
(5) citizens under twenty-one years old who were the wife, husband, or child of an American
citizen who fit into one of the other categories; (6) citizens who were “born in the United
States or one of its outlying possession, who originally had American nationality, and who,
after having lost such nationality through marriage to an alien, required it.” 54 Stat. at 1170.
But the law, as emphasized by Roche shortly after its passage, “provided for automatic denationalization for those who could not claim immunity under sections 405 and 406. Roche,
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the precession of the subject of “expatriate” to the state, is a law professor’s
statement read by a congressman in 1944 in support of a proposal to strip the
citizenship of native-born U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry: “The language
of the fourteenth amendment was declaratory and there is nothing here or
elsewhere in the Constitution which abridges either the individual’s right of
expatriation or the Nation’s right to expatriate in appropriate
circumstances.” 275
The codification and multiplication of “expatriative acts” in the Nationality Act of 1940 and subsequent amendments occurred immediately
prior to the entry of the United States into World War II, during the war, and
then during the initial years of the Cold War.276 In the guise of protecting the
nation from outside threats during these periods of potential and actual war,
the Nationality Act of 1940 and its subsequent amendments unleashed a new
concept of expatriation untethered to the individual “natural right” advocated by Thomas Jefferson and recognized by the Expatriation Act of 1868.
As the executive branch began applying the new statutory regime governing
expatriation to tens of thousands of American citizens,277 the debate over
expatriation no longer centered around the authority of the state to restrict or
define an individual’s exercise of her right of expatriation. Instead, the debate centered around the authority of the state itself to “expatriate” a U.S.
citizen. That debate, over the state as subject of “expatriate,” would soon
bitterly divide the Supreme Court.
C. The Supreme Court and Precession Back to the Individual
As the executive branch implemented the Nationality Act of 1940, numerous individuals challenged their loss of citizenship under the Act’s various provisions. Ultimately, the Supreme Court would wrestle with the Act
and expatriation in a dramatic series of cases resolved by an array of 5-4
supra note 190, at 41. In early litigation over this provision, the D.C. Circuit in Lapides v.
Clark, rejected the argument that it was unconstitutional because it arbitrarily discriminates
against naturalized citizens. 176 F.2d 619, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (“The statute has a purpose in
the international policy of our government. The Act does not arbitrarily impose a loss of citizenship. It deals with a condition voluntarily brought about by one’s own acts, with notice of
the consequences. . . . [T]o avoid embarrassments and controversies with foreign governments . . . we cannot doubt that . . . Congress has the power to distinguish between native born
and naturalized citizens.”). One judge dissented from the ruling, arguing that naturalized citizens must be treated equally to native born citizens. Id. at 623 (“Aside from the Nationality
Act, citizens may live abroad. By imposing a heavy penalty on the exercise of this liberty the
Nationality Act takes part of it away from all naturalized citizens, regardless of their devotion
to America and their connections here. All native citizens, regardless of possible devotion to a
foreign country and connections there, are exempt. Congress may expatriate citizens on reasonable grounds. No doubt these may include five years residence abroad. But it does not
follow that Congress may expatriate some citizens and not others on this ground.”).
275
Expatriation of Certain Nationals, supra note 267, at 15 (statement of Hon. Leroy
Johnson) (emphasis added).
276
HERZOG, supra note 21, at 45.
277
WEIL, supra note 5, at 83–107.
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decisions, with Justices repeatedly switching positions to swing the majority
and adopting diverse rationales to support their desired outcomes.278 The various opinions reflect disagreement not only about the power of Congress to
enact the loss of citizenship provisions in the Nationality Act of 1940 but
also, more fundamentally, disagreement about the nature of citizenship and
expatriation. Underlying this disagreement is the additional question of
which entity or entities are, or may be, the arbiters of that nature and what
means may be permissibly employed in that determination.
After the initial discord, the Supreme Court ultimately settled the question of expatriation and loss of citizenship in its 1967 landmark decision
Afroyim v. Rusk,279 which overruled the Court’s 1958 decision in Perez v.
Brownell.280 Though some confusion remained until 1980, when the Court
reaffirmed and elaborated upon Afroyim in Vance v. Terrazas,281 the Court’s
decision in Afroyim definitely rejected congressional authority to strip an
individual’s citizenship and, in so doing, rejected the state-as-subject expatriation codified in the Nationality Act of 1940. In this way, the Court forced
the precession of the subject back around to the individual. In so doing,
however, the Court did not reverse the precession and reestablish the historical conception of the individual right of expatriation, an endeavor for which
Chief Justice Warren had advocated in his dissent in Perez.282 Instead, the
Afroyim majority neglected entirely the historical concept of expatriation and
instead accepted the contemporary conception, adding a constitutional overlay based on the Fourteenth Amendment. That approach, cemented by the
Court’s decision in Terrazas, continued the precession of the subject back
around to the individual while retaining the state as a viable subject, rather
than recognizing and reversing the distortion that had occurred from its past
course.
1. Initial Discord
On March 31, 1958, the Supreme Court announced three opinions from
a narrowly divided court on the implementation of the 1940 Act, as
amended: Perez v. Brownell,283 Trop v. Dulles,284 and Nishikawa v. Dulles.285
In his exhaustive exploration of the Justices’ papers underlying these and
subsequent cases involving the 1940 Act, Patrick Weil notes that Justice
Douglas described these three opinions at the time as “the most important

278
See id. at 14–65 (relying on Justices’ papers to describe the volatility and disagreement
in the Justices’ opinions and the numerous instances of Justices changing their vote).
279
387 U.S. 253 (1967).
280
356 U.S. 44 (1958).
281
444 U.S. 252 (1980).
282
Perez, 356 U.S. at 62 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
283
356 U.S. 44 (1958).
284
356 U.S. 86 (1958).
285
356 U.S. 129 (1958).
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constitutional pronouncements of this century.”286 The three cases had been
argued in May 1957 and were reargued before the full Court in October, and,
after much internal discussion and wrangling over the outcomes and draft
opinions, the Court announced all three decisions at the same time, consisting of twelve separate opinions.287 The divisiveness of the cases led Time
magazine to opine that the “fundamental bitterness” between the Justices
had been “unknown since 1946, when Justice Robert Jackson began feuding
in public with Justice Hugo Black.”288
The opinion in each case involved a different provision of the 1940 Act,
as amended. Clemente Martinez Perez was born in the United States but
taken to Mexico when he was eleven years old.289 He remained in Mexico
for twenty-three years, a period that included the beginning of World War II,
and then applied for and received admission to the United States as an alien
laborer, indicating in those applications that he had been born in Mexico.290
He ultimately applied for admission on the basis of his natural-born citizenship, but he was ordered excluded by immigration officials on the basis of
his admissions that he had remained outside the United States in order to
avoid military service and had voted in political elections in Mexico.291 He
then entered as an alien once again and, in administrative hearings before
immigration officials, claimed the right to remain based on his natural-born
citizenship.292 After being ordered deported, he brought suit in district court
seeking a declaration of his citizenship.293
Albert L. Trop was also born in the United States, and served in the
United States Army in French Morocco in 1944.294 There, he escaped from a
stockade imposed for disciplinary reasons because he found the “conditions
intolerable,” and he was gone for less than a day before surrendering to an
army officer willingly.295 He was convicted of desertion and sentenced to
hard labor, forfeiture of pay, and a dishonorable discharge.296 In 1952, he
applied for a passport, but his application was denied on the ground that he
had lost his citizenship pursuant to the 1940 Act.297
Mitsugi Nishikawa was born in California to Japanese citizens, giving
him dual citizenship at birth.298 He remained in the United States and graduated from the University of California before returning to Japan in 1939,

286

WEIL, supra note 5, at 147.
Id.
288
Id.
289
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 46 (1958).
290
Id.
291
Id.
292
Id. at 46–47.
293
Id. at 47.
294
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 87 (1958).
295
Id.; see also Brief of Petitioner at 3, Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (No. 56-70).
296
Trop, 356 U.S. at 88.
297
Id.
298
Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 131 (1958).
287
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intending to stay for a few years.299 In Japan, as the war began, he was
drafted in military service, and, at that time, due to his fear of Japanese
authorities and understanding that the American consulate would not aid
dual citizens, he did not attempt to renounce his Japanese citizenship, to
return to the United States, or to seek aid from U.S. consular officials.300 He
served as a mechanic in the Japanese Air Force during the war and after the
war sought an American passport from the U.S. Consulate in Japan.301 He
instead received a certificate of loss of nationality.302
The circumstances of the three cases were representative of the circumstances of thousands of U.S. citizens who had engaged in acts specified in
the 1940 Act, that put their citizenship in doubt. Executive branch officials
applied the expanded provisions of the 1940 Act aggressively in the context
of the Cold War and communist “scare”: if they were aware of an act occurring, they denied the citizenship of the individual.303 Thus, the thousands of
U.S. citizens who had been convicted of desertion, had voted in a foreign
election, or had served in the armed services of a foreign nation were regarded by executive branch officials as forfeiting their citizenship by these
acts.
In its trio of decisions, the Supreme Court put a sharp halt to many such
administrative determinations, but it could not garner a majority to stop all
of them. In Nishikawa, seven Justices agreed that the executive branch could
not determine that an individual citizen had lost his citizenship by serving a
foreign military without evidence that the individual’s foreign service was
actually voluntary, especially when the foreign country made it a crime not
to enlist.304 Because expatriation had historically been a voluntary act and
because of the “drastic” consequence of “denationalization,” the government bore the burden of proving voluntariness.305 In Trop, Chief Justice Warren wrote a plurality opinion for the four Perez dissenters holding first that
Congress lacked any authority to divest citizens of their citizenship.306 But,
given that a majority of the Court had rejected this view, expressed by the
same four Justices in dissent in Perez,307 the Chief Justice’s plurality opinion
also held in the alternative that the loss of citizenship upon a conviction for
desertion was penal in nature and, due to its severe nature, was “cruel and
unusual punishment” forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.308 However, the
deciding vote in Trop was cast by Justice Brennan, who agreed in a concur299

Id.
Id. at 131–32.
301
Id. at 131–33; see also Brief of Respondent at 5–6, Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129
(1958) (No. 57-19).
302
Nishikawa, 356 U.S. at 131.
303
WEIL, supra note 5, at 136–44.
304
Nishikawa, 356 U.S. at 137–38.
305
Id. at 134.
306
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92 (1958).
307
Id. at 93.
308
Id. at 101–02.
300
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ring opinion that the loss of citizenship was unconstitutional, but on the
ground that the loss of citizenship for desertion was “punishment” and that
“expatriation as punishment” lacked the “requisite rational relation” to
Congress’s legitimate authority over the military.309 Justice Frankfurter, the
author of the Perez majority, joined by three other Justices, dissented.310
In Perez, Justice Frankfurter delivered the majority opinion in a 5-4
decision, where the four Trop dissenters were joined by Justice Brennan.311
The majority upheld the immigration officials’ determination that Perez had
lost his U.S. citizenship, reasoning that Congress had the authority to provide for the loss of citizenship of U.S. citizens who voted in foreign elections because the provision was rationally related to its implied
constitutional authority over foreign affairs.312 Discussing the example of
U.S. citizens voting in the Saar plebiscite cited during the legislative debates, he argued that Congress had the power to “reduce to a minimum the
frictions that are unavoidable in a world of sovereigns sensitive in matters
touching their dignity and interests.”313 Chief Justice Warren, joined by the
other members of the Trop plurality, dissented, arguing strenuously that
Congress had no authority over citizenship, which was protected absolutely
by the Fourteenth Amendment.314
Though both opinions have been studied in depth, two characteristics of
the dueling Perez opinions warrant further attention. First, Justice Frankfurter’s opinion begins its analysis by turning to the history of “[s]tatutory
expatriation,” beginning with the 1907 Act, and he marks the Expatriation
Act of 1868 as Congress’s “starting point” for dealing with the international
difficulties of naturalization and allegiance.315 Like Justice Brennan in Trop,
who refers to Congress’s “imposition of expatriation,”316 Justice Frankfurter
acknowledges an active congressional role in choosing as its “means” the
“withdrawal of citizenship” and providing for the “termination of citizenship.”317 Chief Justice Warren’s opinion, by contrast, uses “expatriation”
only when referring to the individual right of expatriation and its historical

309

Id. at 108–11, 113–14 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Frankfurter would have held that the provision was an appropriate exercise of
Congress’s war powers, and he argued that the Court should defer to Congress’s determination
that the withdrawal of citizenship for a desertion was necessary. Id. at 121 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (“Possession by an American citizen of the rights and privileges that constitute
citizenship imposes correlative obligations, of which the most indispensable may well be [military service]. . . . It is not for us to deny that Congress might reasonably have believed the
morale and fighting efficiency of our troops would be impaired if our soldiers knew that their
fellows who had abandoned them in their time of greatest need were to remain in the communion of our citizens.”).
311
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 45 (1958).
312
Id. at 62.
313
Id. at 57.
314
Id. at 64–66 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
315
Id. at 48.
316
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 111 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring).
317
Perez, 356 U.S. at 58, 60.
310
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evolution.318 He refers to the actions taken pursuant to the 1940 Act only as
“denationalization” and denies Congress has any such “power to
denationalize.”319
Second, the opinions dispute the meaning of Mackenzie and Savorgnon
as they relate to expatriation. Justice Frankfurter cites the Court’s statement
in Mackenzie that the plaintiff had “not intended to give up her American
citizenship,” and states that “[w]hat both women did do voluntarily” in the
two cases “was to engage in conduct to which Acts of Congress attached the
consequence of denationalization, irrespective of—and in those cases contrary to—the intentions and desires of the individuals.”320 Chief Justice Warren, in response, argued that the two cases were not examples of Congress
exercising power to denationalize the plaintiffs but represented the principle
that “citizenship may not only be voluntarily renounced through exercise of
the right of expatriation but also by other actions in derogation of the undivided allegiance to this country.”321 While Congress lacked authority “to
divest United States citizenship,” the government could “giv[e] formal recognition to the inevitable consequence of the citizen’s own voluntary surrender of his citizenship.”322 And such voluntary surrender or
“abandon[ment]” could be effected historically only “by conduct showing
a voluntary transfer of allegiance to another country.”323
After the March 1958 triumvirate, the Court would address, and struggle with, the 1940 Act and loss of citizenship twice more before its landmark
decision in Afroyim. After the Trop and Perez decisions, the Court vacated
and remanded another case, Mendoza-Martinez v. Mackey,324 for further consideration, though it would ultimately return to the Court.325 Francisco Mendoza-Martinez was born in the United States to Mexican citizens and thus
had dual citizenship upon birth.326 He moved to Mexico in 1942 to avoid the
draft, and he was convicted of draft evasion in 1947 after he had returned.327
In 1953, the Department of Justice ordered him to be deported based on
section 401(j) of the Nationality Act of 1940, which effected the loss of
citizenship for draft evasion, and he filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of that provision.328
After the Court’s initial remand, the district court found section 401(j)
unconstitutional, and then the issue returned to the Supreme Court, where, as
Weil recounts, there was initially a six-Justice majority, which included Jus318

Id. at 66–69, 72.
Id. at 75, 78 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
320
Id. at 61.
321
Id. at 68 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
322
Id. at 68–69.
323
Id. at 73.
324
356 U.S. 258 (1958).
325
Mackey v. Mendoza-Martinez, 362 U.S. 384 (1960).
326
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 147 (1963).
327
Id.
328
Id. at 148.
319
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tice Brennan, to uphold Congress’s authority to declare Mendoza-Martinez’s
citizenship lost.329 Instead of issuing an opinion, however, the Court again
remanded the case, this time on a question of collateral estoppel.330 On its
return to the Court, although five Justices initially voted to rule against Mendoza-Martinez and a draft opinion was circulated upholding the power of
Congress “to recognize an abandonment of citizenship” under its war
power, the Court again did not decide it.331 Justice Whitaker, the fifth vote,
first rejected the draft opinion and then retired before the case was decided.332 The case was set for re-argument and combined with another expatriation case involving section 401(j), in which Joseph Cort, a doctor who
had been born in the United States but lived in England, had been determined to have lost his citizenship for failing to comply with an instruction to
return for military service.333 Unlike Mendoza-Martinez, Cort did not have
dual citizenship.334
Justice Frankfurter, the author of the majority in Perez and the principal
dissent in Trop, suffered a stroke in August 1962 and was replaced by Justice
Goldberg before Mendoza-Martinez and Cort were decided.335 Siding with
the three remaining Perez dissenters and Justice Brennan, who had retreated
from his initial vote in Mendoza-Martinez, Justice Goldberg provided the
fifth vote against expatriation, and he ultimately wrote the majority opinion.336 His opinion reasoned that the draft evasion expatriation provisions
were “invalid because in them Congress has plainly employed the sanction
of deprivation of nationality as a punishment—for the offense of leaving or
remaining outside the country to evade military service—without affording
the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.”337 He distinguished Perez as involving Congress’s foreign affairs
power and Trop as involving punishment imposed after a conviction for desertion that provided due process.338 Building on the language of Chief Justice Warren’s Perez dissent, Justice Goldberg discussed U.S. citizenship as
“a most precious right,” “one of the most valuable rights in the world today”—the loss of which amounted to a “deprivation of all that makes life
worth living.”339 In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan announced he had
“some felt doubts of the correctness of Perez, which I joined,” but noted
that these cases did not require him to resolve them since they did not involve either deliberative foreign attachment or the “participation by Ameri329

WEIL, supra note 5, at 166–67.
See id. at 167.
331
Id.
332
Id.
333
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 149–51.
334
Id. at 149.
335
WEIL, supra note 5, at 168.
336
Id. at 167–68.
337
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 165–66.
338
Id. at 164.
339
Id. at 159–60, 166.

R
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can nationals in the internal politics of foreign affairs.”340 In a footnote in
Justice Goldberg’s majority opinion, likely inconspicuous at the time, he
states that “[t]here is, however, no disagreement that citizenship may be
voluntarily relinquished or abandoned, either expressly or by conduct.” 341 In
light of later developments, this footnote becomes somewhat remarkable.342
This series of cases and spate of opinions, drawing numerous tenuous
distinctions and promulgating diverse rationales, left the state of the loss of
citizenship provisions in considerable confusion.343 As Justice Black would
later note, after Perez, the Court “consistently invalidated on a case-by-case
basis various other statutory sections providing for involuntary expatriation.”344 But Perez remained good law, and the changes in the membership
on the Court meant that even Justice Brennan’s “doubts” about his Perez
vote were not obviously sufficient to provide a fifth vote to overturn the
decision in a subsequent case. A review of the Supreme Court’s 1963 term in
the Harvard Law Review, after discussing these cases, noted that the “direction of future expatriation cases must remain uncertain.”345 Four years later,
the Court would resolve the uncertainty in Afroyim.
340

Id. at 187–88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 159 n.11 (emphasis added) (citing Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 48–49, 66–67
(1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting)).
342
See infra text accompanying notes 346–84. The Court would decide another expatriation case the next year involving section 404 of the Nationality Act of 1940, providing for the
loss of citizenship of naturalized citizens living abroad for specified periods of time. Schneider
v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964). The Court held this provision unconstitutional, reasoning that it
constituted “discrimination aimed at naturalized citizens” and created “a second-class citizenship” since native-born citizens were “free to reside abroad indefinitely without suffering loss
of citizenship.” Id. at 168–69. The Court’s reasoning echoed the dissenting opinion of Judge
Edgerton in the D.C. Circuit’s Lapides decision analyzing this provision and of Professor
Roche’s law review article discussing the provision and the Lapides decision. See Lapides v.
Clark, 176 F.2d 619, 622–23 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (Edgerton, J., dissenting); Roche, supra note
190, at 42–43. Justice Douglas’ opinion went on to discuss the foundation of expatriation provisions, noting that “[l]iving abroad, whether the citizen be naturalized or native born, is no
badge of lack of allegiance, and in no way evidences a voluntary renunciation of nationality
and allegiance.” Schneider, 377 U.S. at 169. This decision struck down the laws that had been
used to remove the citizenship of almost 40,000 U.S. citizens, rendering it effectively a nullity.
WEIL, supra note 5, at 170–71.
343
In another expatriation case the same term as Schneider, Marks v. Esperdy, 377 U.S.
214 (1964), the Court split 4-4, due to Justice Brennan’s relatively late recusal. WEIL, supra
note 5, at 171–72. Marks involved a native-born citizen who had voluntarily joined Castro’s
army but argued that he had “never renounced or intended to renounce his American citizenship” and that expatriation was cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by Trop. WEIL, supra
note 5, at 172 (quoting a bench memorandum from Justice Brennan’s papers); see also Marks
v. Esperdy, 315 F.2d 673, 674 (2d Cir. 1963). The Second Circuit had upheld his expatriation,
Marks, 315 F.2d at 676, and the Supreme Court’s 4-4 split affirmed that decision without
setting a precedent, Marks v. Esperdy, 377 U.S. 214 (1964). Though papers show that before
his recusal Justice Brennan had voted in conference to reverse the Second Circuit, he acknowledged at the time that he did not know “how he w[ould] finally retreat from Perez.” WEIL,
supra note 5, at 171.
344
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 255 (1967).
345
Note, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 177, 195 (1964). The author
claimed that “Perez may retain little vitality after th[e] [Schneider] decision,” and that
“[t]he plethora of attitudes within the Court on the propriety of expatriation and the tendency
341

R

R
R
R
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2. Afroyim, Executive Branch Interpretation, and Terrazas
The painter Beys Afroyim was native of Poland who immigrated to the
United States in 1912 and became a naturalized citizen in 1926.346 In 1950,
he went to Israel, where he voted the next year in an election for the Knesset.347 When he applied to renew his U.S. passport in 1960, the State Department informed him that he had lost his citizenship under the 1940 Act by
voting “in a political election in a foreign state.”348 Afroyim brought a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of the voting provision of the 1940 Act, and the government defended on the basis of Perez,
arguing that Congress was “empower[ed] to terminate citizenship without
the citizen’s voluntary renunciation.”349 Justice Black wrote the majority
opinion overturning Perez and holding, as Justice Black had advocated beginning in his Nishikawa concurrence, that Congress lacked “any general
power, express or implied, to take away an American citizen’s citizenship
without his assent.”350
Justice Black ultimately grounded his holding in the “language and the
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment,” acknowledging that prior “legislative and judicial statements may be regarded as inconclusive” and that the
Court’s holding “might be unwarranted if it rested entirely or principally
upon that legislative history.”351 But he spent a considerable amount of time
on unsuccessful, historical legislative proposals to take away citizenship,
quoting at length from the statements of legislators against these bills.352 Unlike Chief Justice Warren’s Perez dissent, Justice Black’s Afroyim opinion
does not delve into the history of expatriation and voluntary transfers of
allegiance except to stress that expatriation required the “assent” of the citizen.353 His framing of the issue excludes consideration of expatriation as
originally understood, which was, by definition, voluntary: “The fundamental issue before this Court here, as it was in Perez, is whether Congress can
consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment enact a law stripping an Amer-

of majority opinions to ignore relevant precedent . . . further obscures the significance which
Schneider will ultimately come to have.” Id.; see also Philip Kurland, The Supreme Court
1963 Term. Forward: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and executive
branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 170–75 (1964) (discussing the series of
expatriation cases that began with Perez and concluding that “[i]t would be interesting to
know what the ‘law of the land’ is on the subject of expatriation”).
346
Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 254; HERZOG, supra note 21, at 82.
347
Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 254.
348
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
349
Id. at 255.
350
Id. at 257; see also Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 138–39 (1958) (Black, J.,
concurring).
351
Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 261, 267.
352
Id. at 257–67.
353
Id. at 257.
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ican of his citizenship which he has never voluntarily renounced or given
up.”354
Administrative practice after Afroyim was mixed. The first footnote in
Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion for four Justices in Afroyim was prescient
in this regard. In the footnote, Justice Harlan thought it “appropriate to note
at the outset what appears to be a fundamental ambiguity in the opinion for
the Court” that would “surely cause still greater confusion in this area of the
law.”355 The ambiguity was whether the Afroyim opinion, by saying Congress had no power to expatriate a citizen “without his assent,” was adopting the reasoning of Chief Justice Warren’s Perez dissent, which
“acknowledged that ‘actions taken in derogation of undivided allegiance to
this country’ had ‘long been recognized to result in expatriation.’” 356 Because
the dissent found it “difficult to find any semblance of th[at] reasoning . . .
in the approach taken by the Court,” it read Justice Black’s opinion “instead
to adopt a substantially wider view of the restrictions upon Congress’ authority in this area.”357 The footnote accused the majority of “assum[ing] that
voluntariness is here a term of fixed meaning” when “in fact . . . it ha[d]
been employed to describe both a specific intent to renounce citizenship, and
the uncoerced commission of an act conclusively deemed by law to be a
relinquishment of citizenship.”358
Shortly after the Afroyim decision, Attorney General Ramsey Clark issued an opinion interpreting it to guide the State Department and INS in
their implementation of section 349.359 Clark highlighted the constitutional
mandate that a citizen cannot be deprived of citizenship “unless he has ‘voluntarily relinquished it,’” but noted that it left the contours of that requirement undefined.360 Specifically, Clark reasoned that Afroyim did not “reach
the question of whether it may be possible under some circumstances for
allegiance to be transferred or abandoned without constituting a voluntary
relinquishment of the status of citizenship.”361 For guidance, Clark determined that voluntarily relinquishment was not limited to a written renunciation but could “also be manifested by other actions declared expatriative
under the act, if such actions are in derogation of allegiance to this country.”362 However, “even in those cases, Afroyim leaves it open to the individual to raise the issue of intent,” which, once raised, must be proven by the
party asserting expatriation has occurred.363 Citing Justice Black’s statement
in his Nishikawa concurrence, that the voluntary performance of certain acts
354

Id. at 256.
Id. at 269 n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
356
Id.
357
Id.
358
Id.
359
Expatriation—Effect of Afroyim v. Rusk, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 397 (1969).
360
Id. at 398 (citation omitted).
361
Id. at 400.
362
Id.
363
Id.
355
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may be “highly persuasive evidence in the particular case of a purpose to
abandon citizenship,” Clark distinguished between acts that may be “sufficiently probative to support a finding of voluntary expatriation”—the acceptance of an important political post in a foreign government or voluntary
enlistment in the armed services of a foreign government engaged in hostilities against the United States—and acts that may not be so probative—accepting employment as a public school teacher or enlisting in the armed
forces of allied countries.364 In each case, however, executive branch officials would have to “make a judgment, based on all the evidence, whether
the individual comes within the terms of an expatriation provision and has in
fact voluntarily relinquished his citizenship.”365
In the administrative proceedings that implemented this guidance, the
results were quite mixed. The State Department and INS recognized, as had
the Attorney General, that specific intent was an aspect of inquiry after
Afroyim.366 But the ambiguity in Afroyim highlighted by Justice Harlan’s
footnote367 ultimately led to continued questions about the role of intent and
the types of evidence on which the executive branch could rely until the
Supreme Court’s decision in Vance v. Terrazas.368
Terrazas, unlike the Court’s past expatriation cases, involved one of the
two historical modes of expatriation codified in the 1907 Act: the taking of
an oath of allegiance to a foreign country. Laurence J. Terrazas was born in
the United States to a Mexican citizen, thus acquiring dual nationality at
birth.369 At the age of twenty-two he executed an application for a certificate
of Mexican nationality, for which he swore “adherence, obedience, and submission to the laws and authorities of the Mexican Republic” and “expressly
renounce[ed] United States citizenship, as well as any submission, obedience, and loyalty to any foreign government, especially to that of the United
States of America.”370 The primary issue in the case, and the only question
presented in the Solicitor General’s jurisdictional statement, was whether
Congress had the authority to provide for a lower evidentiary standard, preponderance of the evidence, in expatriation cases and whether it could erect
364

Id. at 400–01.
Id. at 401.
366
See Steven S. Goodman, Note, Protecting Citizenship: Strengthening the Intent Requirement in Expatriation Proceedings, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 341, 347 n.27 (1988)
(describing the positions of the agencies); see also HERZOG, supra note 21, at 90–93 (describing the establishment in 1967 of the Board of Appellate Review within the State Department to
hear appeals from decisions made by the Department, most of which involved citizenship).
367
For a contemporary explanation by a State Department official of the difficulty of
interpreting Afroyim and the administrative problems created by the addition of intent to the
expatriation inquiry, see Donald K. Duvall, Expatriation Under United States Law, Perez to
Afroyim: The Search for a Philosophy of American Citizenship, 56 VA. L. REV. 408 (1970).
368
444 U.S. 252 (1980); see also Note, United States Loss of Citizenship Law After Terrazas: Decisions of the Board of Appellate Review, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 829, 830
(1984) (noting that “Terrazas resolved decades of dispute over whether intent to relinquish
citizenship was a necessary element in establishing loss of nationality”).
369
Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 255.
370
Id. at 255–56, 255 n.2.
365
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a presumption of voluntariness that arose from the commission of any of the
acts specified by section 349.371
In the Supreme Court, however, the United States raised the issue of
intent and adopted a new position372 that it needed to prove only “the voluntary commission of an act . . . that ‘is so inherently inconsistent with the
continued retention of American citizenship that Congress may accord to it
its natural consequences, i.e. loss of nationality.’” 373 And that it need not
prove “a specific intent to renounce” citizenship in addition to the proof of
that voluntary act.374 Arguing that the Afroyim majority opinion incorporated
the rationale of the Chief Justice’s Perez dissent, the government pointed to
the same language to which Justice Harlan had pointed in his footnote: the
Chief Justice’s allowance that certain action “in derogation of undivided allegiance to this country” had “long been recognized” to constitute expatriation.375 But the Court rejected this argument, noting that Afroyim, not the
Chief Justice’s Perez opinion, was the majority opinion that established the
law and holding that it required that the “trier of fact must in the end conclude that the citizen not only voluntarily committed the expatriating act
prescribed in the statute, but also intended to relinquish his citizenship.”376
The Court cited Attorney General Clark’s opinion and administrative guidance issued by the State Department and INS to establish that the executive
branch had effectively conceded prior to this case that the question of intent
was relevant, even when one of the expatriating acts had been committed.377
The majority was “confident that it would be inconsistent with Afroyim to
treat the expatriating acts specified . . . as the equivalent of or as conclusive
evidence of the indispensable voluntary assent of the citizen.”378

371
Jurisdictional Statement at 3, Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980) (No. 78-1143)
(stating the question presented as “[w]hether 8 U.S.C. 1481(c), which provides that in actions
to determine the loss of United States nationality the party claiming that such loss has occurred
bears the burden of proving such claim by a preponderance of the evidence, and that a person
who has performed an act of expatriation is presumed to have done so voluntarily unless the
presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence, is unconstitutional under the
Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
372
Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 258 n.5 (noting that the question of whether the government must
prove an individual specifically intended to relinquish her citizenship was not raised in the
jurisdictional statement and had not been presented below but deciding to address the government’s argument).
373
Id. at 258–59.
374
Id. at 260.
375
Id.
376
Id. at 261.
377
Id. at 261–63.
378
Id. at 261. With respect to the other question presented, the Court reversed the Second
Circuit’s holding that Congress lacked the authority to provide for a finding of voluntariness by
a preponderance of the evidence and remanded the case. On remand, the district court found
that Terrazas had lost his citizenship by voluntarily taking the oath and specifically intending
to renounce his citizenship. See Terrazas v. Muskie, 494 F. Supp. 1017, 1020 (N.D. Ill. 1980),
aff’d sub nom. Terrazas v. Haig, 653 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1981).
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Following the Terrazas decision, the executive branch at first tried to
follow its previous administrative practices.379 But the issue of intent made it
difficult for any administrative determination of loss of citizenship to withstand challenge by an individual claiming she did not intend to renounce her
citizenship in performing a particular act.380 As a result, the executive branch
in 1990 ultimately adopted the policy that remains in place today. An individual who naturalizes in a foreign country or takes an oath of allegiance to
a foreign country is presumed not to have intended to renounce her citizenship.381 This presumption does not apply to formal renunciations of citizenship before a consular officer, service in a foreign military that is engaged in
hostilities against the United States, acceptance of a policy-level position in
a foreign state, or conviction for treason or attempting to overthrow the government.382 The latter grounds are uncommon, and potentially unconstitutional,383 and the first is the most common and most straightforward method
of expatriation, which is typically accompanied by the strongest proof of
intent. The executive branch thus bears a heavy burden in trying to prove a
citizen has lost her citizenship if she did not formally renounce it. As a
result, expatriation without the cooperation of the individual citizen is effectively inert under the current law. As Terrazas intended, “expatriation depends on the will of the citizen” today,384 and, in light of the intent
requirement, this is true both at the time of the action and at the time of the
administrative proceedings regarding loss of citizenship.
III. RESTORING EXPATRIATION
Modern expatriation law in the United States thus begins with Chief
Justice Warren’s dissent in Perez and Justice Black’s majority opinion in
Afroyim and effectively ends with the Court’s decision in Terrazas and the
executive branch’s implementation of that decision in its 1990 guidance.
Since that time there have been repeated attempts by legislators to amend
section 349, the direct descendant of section 401 of the Nationality Act of
379
See HERZOG, supra note 21, at 90–109 (recounting the history of the Board of Appellate Review’s decisions regarding citizenship following the Terrazas decision); Aleinkoff,
supra note 248, at 1501–03 (describing the State Department’s application of Terrazas).
380
See generally Alan G. James, Expatriation in the United States: Precepts and Practice
Today and Yesterday, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 853 (1990).
381
Id. at 895; see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ADVICE ABOUT POSSIBLE LOSS OF U.S. NATIONALITY AND DUAL NATIONALITY, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/legal-considerations/us-citizenship-laws-policies/citizenship-and-dual-nationality.html [https://perma.cc/
BXK8-FNWD].
382
James, supra note 380, at 895.
383
It appears that no individual has been expatriated under this provision since World War
II. See Lawrence Abramson, Note, United States Loss of Citizenship Law After Terrazas: Decisions of the Board of Appellate Review, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 829, 867. And the
Supreme Court’s holding in Trop v. Dulles that the stripping of citizenship upon conviction for
desertion constituted unconstitutional punishment would appear to apply equally to stripping
citizenship as punishment for treason or attempting to overthrow the government. See id.
384
Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 263 (1980).
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1940, to include additional “expatriating” acts. But each of these proposals
has been premised on the constitutional framework erected by the Court in
Afroyim and Terrazas. And although some may draw a direct line from Chief
Justice Warren’s Perez dissent to the Court’s prevailing Afroyim–Terrazas
framework,385 that narrative, which focuses on outcome, overlooks and obscures a fundamental distinction between the two: their conceptions of expatriation and the role of allegiance. As Professor Roche noted, while the
Court was building toward Afroyim, the court had “discovered two fundamentally different types of expatriation provisions . . . interwoven in one
statute and alleged to be founded on the same constitutional foundation.”386
The Court never untangled them.
This Article argues for the completion of Chief Justice Warren’s longneglected endeavor to restore the concept of expatriation to its historical
roots. The precession from the individual to the state as the subject of “expatriate”—not the power “to expatriate,” as Terrazas would later characterize
it387—was the animating force of the Chief Justice’s dissent and the basis for
the disagreement between the Chief Justice and the Perez majority. Their
disagreement was whether Congress had the authority to redefine “expatriation”: that is, to transform an act that had never been regarded as a transfer
of allegiance but had been used by the executive branch as evidence of such
a transfer into a statutory act the performance of which automatically resulted in the loss of citizenship. In the context of the facts at issue in Perez,
Chief Justice Warren rightly objected: Voting in a foreign election had never
itself been “expatriation” because it did not necessarily involve a transfer of
allegiance.388
The Afroyim–Terrazas framework takes a different approach, however.
Although the Court forced the subject of “expatriate” to rotate back to the
individual citizen, it did not ground these decisions in the long history of
expatriation or attempt to restore the historical concept. Instead, the majority
opinion in Afroyim largely rested on the Fourteenth Amendment,389 citing a
separate “inconclusive” history for whatever it was worth as additional support.390 The majority conceived of citizenship as a fundamental “right” and
forced the precession of the subject from the state back around to the individual without first disentangling expatriation from the distinct concept of
involuntary citizenship stripping. In the context of expatriation, shrouding
citizenship in the language of rights is both a poor fit with historical practice
385

See Aleinkoff, supra note 248, at 1480–82.
Roche, The Expatriation Cases, supra note 107, at 355. Roche noted that the first
“type[ ] of expatriation provision[ ]” related to “transfers of loyalty” and the second concerned “betrayals of allegiance.” Id.
387
444 U.S. at 259–60.
388
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 78 (1958) (“The mere act of voting in a foreign election, however, without regard to the circumstances attending the participation, is not sufficient
to show a voluntary abandonment of citizenship.”).
389
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267 (1967).
390
Id.
386
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and internally inconsistent. This Part attempts to restore expatriation and
unencumber it from the language of rights. The end result is an understanding of citizenship and expatriation that restores both the intended subject and
the intended principle, an understanding that closely mirrors Chief Justice
Warren’s position in his Perez dissent. As demonstrated in Section IV, this
restoration is necessary to begin a discussion of the place of expatriation in
today’s world and to prevent the erosion of the individual rights of citizens.
Restoration permits a distinction between expatriation and other actions parading under its umbrella and partaking in its history.
A. Restoration
In the judicial, congressional, scholarly, and popular discourse about
expatriation today, the consequence of the precession of the subject of “expatriate” is evident. One of the most recent contributions by the foremost
legal scholar in this area, for example, is entitled Expatriating Terrorists.391
This title refers to an action taken against terrorists by the state, and the bills
proposed to amend section 349 in the recent years have been similarly entitled “Terrorist Expatriation Act”392 and “Expatriate Terrorists Act.”393 Although the Afroyim–Terrazas framework establishes that the U.S.
Constitution permits only the individual to act as the subject of “expatriate,”
the prevailing conception of expatriation, as a result of the historical precession of its subject, is not so limited. A word or concept’s development of
new meanings or connotations as it moves or is moved from one historical,
sociological, or linguistic context to another is nothing new or surprising.394
But, in a common law system, where the jurisprudence surrounding a particular concept is based on its history, it is vital to understand that movement
and alteration.
Both the majority opinion and Chief Justice Warren’s dissent in Perez
grounded their conclusions in historical practice regarding expatriation, and,
in light of the different conceptions of citizenship and expatriation underlying their analyses, both were correct that historical practice provides some
support for their conclusions. Justice Frankfurter located the “starting point”
for the dispute in the Expatriation Act of 1868, and identified the 1907 Act
as the “first introduc[tion]” of “statutory expatriation, as a response to
problems of international relations.”395 He cited Mackenzie, which addressed
the provision of the 1907 Act depriving women married to foreigners of

391

See generally Spiro, supra note 34.
S. 3327, 111th Cong. (2010).
S. 2779, 113th Cong. (2014).
394
Cf. Jonathan David Shaub, A Foucauldian Call for the Archaeological Excavation of
Discourse in the Post-Boumediene Habeas Litigation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 869, 870–71 (2011)
(arguing that the meaning of “unlawful enemy combatant” was altered by the discourse surrounding Guantanamo and al-Qaeda).
395
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 48 (1958).
392
393
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their citizenship, as the first instance in which the courts addressed “[t]he
question of the power of Congress to enact legislation depriving individuals
of their American citizenship.”396 The Chief Justice responded that “[t]he
Government is without the power to take citizenship away” because of the
Citizenship Clause and the nature of sovereignty.397 He argued that the provision at issue in Mackenzie was “merely declarative of the law as it was then
understood” and that the case ultimately “acknowledges that United States
citizenship can be abandoned, temporarily or permanently, by conduct showing voluntary transfer of allegiance to another country.”398 Justice Frankfurter clearly understood expatriation to include the state acting as subject,
an authority he believed Congress had as part of its authority to regulate
foreign relations. Chief Justice Warren understood expatriation differently.
Chief Justice Warren’s dissent in Perez was faithful to the historical
conception of expatriation and represented an attempt to reverse the precession of the subject that had occurred. By contrast, in Afroyim, Justice Black
distinguishes between “involuntary expatriation” and “voluntary expatriation,” and he argues that the Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment “specifically considered the subject of expatriation,” citing bills that
were “introduced to impose involuntary expatriation on citizens who committed certain acts.”399 Whereas Chief Justice Warren had relied on the history of the individual right of expatriation and the executive branch’s
administration of that right to argue that the act that was the basis for Perez’s
loss of citizenship was not expatriation, Justice Black uses the word “expatriation” but relies on history related to congressional power to strip citizenship, citing legislators’ statements from the early 19th century about the
failed Thirteenth Amendment, which would have removed the citizenship of
any United States citizen who had received a title of nobility from a foreign
country,400 and statements from the debates about congressional power over
citizenship from the early legislative proposals related to expatriation and
the Expatriation Act of 1868.401
Arguably, the history cited by Justice Black is more apt to the question
of congressional authority than the history of the right of expatriation. Not
only is this history of questionable persuasive value on the point for which it
is presented,402 but it also never recognizes that the question of congressional
396

Id. at 51.
Id. at 77–78 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
398
Id. at 71–73.
399
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 263 (1967) (emphasis added).
400
See supra text accompanying note 106.
401
Afroyim, 387 U.S. at 258–60.
402
See id. at 271–93 (Harlan, J. dissenting) (carefully demonstrating the weaknesses of
Black’s historical evidence). For example, Justice Harlan notes, with respect to the early discussions, that the discussion of expatriation provisions “was seriously clouded by the widely
accepted view that authority to regulate the incidents of citizenship had been retained, at least
in part, by the several States.” Id. at 271. He also objects to the majority’s almost total reliance
on the Fourteenth Amendment because he argues that “twice in the two years immediately
prior to its passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress exercised the very authority which
397

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\55-2\HLL205.txt

2018]

unknown

Expatriation Restored

Seq: 57

18-MAY-18

10:50

419

authority is not the only relevant question. Nor does it acknowledge the nature and history of the provision at issue—an attempt by Congress to legislate executive branch evidentiary practices into statutory absolutes in order
to reach desired results. Justice Black never engages with the critical issue in
Chief Justice Warren’s dissent on the exact same provision, that voting in a
foreign election did not “invariably involve[ ] a dilution of undivided allegiance sufficient to show a voluntary abandonment of citizenship,” i.e., that
it did not, by definition, constitute expatriation as historically understood.403
Nor does he wrestle with the relationship, and possible tension, between his
conception of expatriation as relying on the “assent” of the citizen and the
principle on which Justice Goldberg found “no disagreement” only a few
years earlier, “that citizenship may be voluntarily relinquished or abandoned, either expressly or by conduct.”404
Black’s Afroyim opinion states the holding of the Court as “the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to, and does, protect every citizen of this
Nation against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship.”405
“Forcible destruction of citizenship” is here synonymous with the term he
later uses: “involuntary expatriation.”406 Terrazas would similarly describe
the Perez majority opinion as “affirm[ing] the power of Congress to expatriate” and “sustain[ing] congressional power to expatriate without regard
to the intent of the citizen for particular conduct.”407 Noting that Afroyim
held such power to be incompatible with the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Terrazas majority concluded that “[i]n the last analysis, expatriation depends on the will of the citizen rather than on the will of Congress and its
assessment of his conduct.”408 And by “will of the citizen,” Terrazas made
clear it meant intent of the citizen to relinquish citizenship, not to transfer
allegiance, the historical understanding that formed the essence of Chief Justice Warren’s dissent in Perez.409
In Afroyim and Terrazas, the Supreme Court thus forced the precession
of the subject back to the individual, ruling as a constitutional matter that the
state lacked authority to be the subject. But it also continued to use the concept of “expatriation” to describe the state authority it was rejecting. In so
doing, the Court furthered, rather than reversed, the precession, ensuring that
“expatriate” now carries both subjects, individual and state, even if the latter
lacks the constitutional authority to act. A telling contrast to this approach is
the Court now suggests that it should have recognized was entirely lacking,” citing the Civil
War desertion statute and another bill related to the Civil War passed by both houses in 1864
that would have “declared not to be a citizen of the United States” every person “who shall
hereafter hold or exercise any office . . . in the rebel service.” Id. at 279–80.
403
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 75 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
404
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159 n.11 (1962).
405
387 U.S. at 268.
406
Id. at 254, 256, 263.
407
Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 259–60.
408
Id. at 260.
409
Id. at 263.
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Chief Justice Warren’s dissent in Perez. While the majority opinion in
Afroyim somewhat selectively uses historical evidence and largely distorts
the meaning of the evidence it does cite in order to support, in a heavily
qualified manner, its conclusion, Chief Justice Warren’s Perez dissent recounts in detail the history of the specific provision at issue in order to restore the concept of expatriation. He dissented because he would have
reversed the precession of the subject to the state that had been codified in
the 1940 Act.
Chief Justice Warren concluded his Perez dissent with this cogent
summary:
The power to denationalize is not within the letter or the spirit of
the powers with which our Government was endowed. The citizen
may elect to renounce his citizenship, and under some circumstances he may be found to have abandoned his status by voluntarily performing acts that compromise his undivided allegiance to
his country. The mere act of voting in a foreign election, however,
without regard to the circumstances attending the participation, is
not sufficient to show a voluntary abandonment of citizenship. The
record in this case does not disclose any of the circumstances
under which this petitioner voted. We know only the bare fact that
he cast a ballot. The basic right of American citizenship has been
too dearly won to be so lightly lost.410
As the history of expatriation demonstrates, the only acts that fall within the
Chief Justice’s category of “acts that compromise [a citizen’s] undivided
allegiance to his country” were acts of the individual to transfer her allegiance to another country voluntarily. Attorney General Black’s opinion, on
which the Chief Justice relied in part in Perez, emphasized that
“[e]xpatriation includes not only emigration out of one’s native country, but
naturalization in the country adopted as a future residence.”411 Expatriation
could not be “imposed” or “deemed” to have occurred. Historically, it occurred at the moment of a citizen’s voluntary transfer of allegiance.
Expatriation restored is the individual right of a citizen to renounce her
allegiance to the United States and transfer that allegiance to a foreign entity
and, in so doing, renounce her citizenship in the United States. Expatriation
restored is, therefore, by definition, an act that can never be “involuntary”
and can never be “statutory.” It is “conduct [that] invariably involves a
dilution of undivided allegiance sufficient to show a voluntary abandonment
of citizenship.”412

410

Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 78 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
Right of Expatriation, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 356, 359 (1866).
412
Perez, 356 U.S. at 75 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
411
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B. Extracting Expatriation From the Language of Rights
A full exploration of the history of and scholarly attention to the concept of citizenship is beyond the scope of this Article. But the Supreme
Court’s understanding of citizenship in Perez, Afroyim, and subsequent cases
is a vital, and often overlooked, factor in the development of the modern
conception of expatriation. Expressed most forcefully in the Chief Justice’s
dissent in Perez, though featuring prominently in various other opinions, is
the contention that “[c]itizenship is man’s basic right for it is nothing less
than the right to have rights.”413 The Court ultimately grounded this right in
the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This application of the
language of rights to citizenship and the identification of the Fourteenth
Amendment as its fount, however, has distorted the doctrine and application
of expatriation.
1. The Language of Rights
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that all
persons “born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens.”414 In his reconstruction of the events leading up to
the trio of decisions released on March 31, 1958, Weil reveals that the Chief
Justice had initially planned a joint majority opinion for Perez and Trop that
opened with this text.415 For Chief Justice Warren and the other Justices who
shared his view, this text resolved the inquiry because the Constitution bestowed citizenship on certain individuals and, as the Court had held in Wong
Kim Ark, Congress could not alter that “sufficient and complete right.”416 In
their view, the Fourteenth Amendment established a “right to citizenship,”
and, influenced by the work of Hannah Arendt,417 that “right” was the fundamental human right, without which no other rights existed.
Afroyim embraced this language, as would Terrazas and other subsequent Supreme Court cases, concluding that its “holding d[id] no more than
to give to this citizen that which is his own, a constitutional right to remain a
citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.”418 A review of the briefs in Trop, Perez, and Nishikawa, as well as
Afroyim, demonstrates that it was not necessarily assumed that the question
before the Court involved the “right to citizenship,” however. Of the peti413

Id. at 64.
U.S. CONST. amdt. XIV, cl. 1.
415
WEIL, supra note 5, at 150.
416
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898) (“The fourteenth amendment, while it leaves the power, where it was before, in [C]ongress, to regulate naturalization,
has conferred no authority upon [C]ongress to restrict the effect of birth, declared by the
constitution a sufficient and complete right to citizenship.”).
417
Aleinkoff, supra note 248, at 1479 n.42 (discussing Arendt’s work and its influence on
the Chief Justice).
418
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 263, 268 (1967).
414
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tioners’ briefs in the three 1958 decisions, only the petitioner’s brief in Perez
squarely based its argument on the “right to citizenship,” and situated it
within the rights framework that the Warren Court had been developing.
Whereas the government’s and others’ briefs in the cases appear to conceive
of citizenship as a status, which had been “lost” or “withdrawn” or of
which the individual had been “deprived” under the 1940 Act, the petitioner
in Perez argued forcefully that citizenship was a constitutional right, “undoubtedly the most precious right of all” because it is “the key to all the
other rights guaranteed by the Constitution.”419 After recounting the history
of expatriation, the brief associates historical expatriation with the waiver of
other constitutional rights, noting the Court has been reluctant to infer such
waiver and established “every reasonable presumption” against it.420 The petitioner’s brief in Afroyim picked up on the language of Chief Justice Warren
and similarly analogized citizenship to other rights, contending that the
“[a]brogation of a right explicitly guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
is intolerable on a lesser justification than infringement of a First Amendment right or other basic liberties.”421
2. Expatriation as a Relinquishment of a Constitutional Right
The language of rights has significant consequences for the doctrine of
expatriation. As Alexander Aleinkoff has recognized, “[i]n modern constitutional discourse, calling citizenship a ‘right’ gives it weight; it shifts the
burden to the government to come forward with compelling reasons for its
actions that abridge or deny citizenship.”422 Understanding citizenship as a
right transforms expatriation, at least with regard to Fourteenth-Amendment
citizens,423 from its historical conception as an individual right itself into the
waiver or relinquishment of the constitutional right to citizenship, as Perez
argued, which carries with it existing constitutional doctrine about the prerequisite facts and intent necessary for waiver, the party that bears the burden of establishing those facts, and the standard of evidence necessary in
their establishment.424 Aleinkoff notes some of the problems inherent in conceiving of citizenship as a right,425 and points out, as Spiro has done more
419

Brief of Petitioner at 8, Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958) (No. 57-44).
Id. at 17 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
421
Id. at 19.
422
Aleinkoff, supra note 248, at 1484.
423
In Rogers v. Bellei, decided four years after Afroyim and after Justice Blackmun had
replaced Justice Fortas, the Court held that Afroyim did not apply to jus sanguinis citizens—
children who are born abroad but become citizens at birth due to their parents’ citizenship—
because they were not “born or naturalized in the United States” within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 401 U.S. 815, 835 (1971).
424
Aleinkoff, supra note 248, at 1484 (“Our usual understanding is that while the state
may not normally abridge constitutional rights, the individual may waive them. In this light,
expatriation is not a right in and of itself; rather it is the waiver of the right to citizenship.”).
425
Id. at 1485–88 (counting among the “major difficulties” of a “‘rights’ understanding
of citizenship” the problem of locating its origin, the lack of any balancing of it as a “funda420
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recently,426 that, despite Chief Justice Warren’s recitation of the dire consequences of the loss of citizenship, what he calls the “right to have rights,”
citizenship today has relatively few consequences in terms of basic rights.427
Contemporary scholars questioned the factual truth of his statement at the
time as well.428 Legal permanent residents enjoy almost all of the rights of
citizens, aside from some so-called “political rights,” which include voting
and holding federal employment. Similarly, visitors, legal and illegal, enjoy
many basic rights as well, with the significant exception of the right to remain in the country.429
Today, citizenship may be better conceived of as the right to participate
in the state as a component of its sovereignty,430 than the right to have rights.
But regardless of its actual nature, its conception in the context of expatriation has significant ramifications. As discussed, the right of expatriation was
synonymous historically with the right of emigration and naturalization in
another country. The intentional transfer of allegiance was an intentional
severance of the citizenship relationship between an individual and her former country. The historical recognition of the right of expatriation established an individual’s authority to transfer her allegiance, if she so chose,
and, at the time of transfer, the individual had exercised that right. In other
words, the intent of the individual with respect to her citizenship qua citizenship was immaterial; citizenship was a legal relation based on allegiance.
The fundamental question for expatriation was whether the individual had
chosen to transfer her allegiance voluntarily.
This understanding of expatriation co-existed with the Fourteenth
Amendment comfortably. The Citizenship Clause overturned the Dred Scott
decision, resolved the question of federal versus state citizenship, and eliminated the authority of the government to exclude particular classes of individuals from citizenship.431 And its text and history are undoubtedly relevant
to the question of Congress’s authority, or lack thereof, to withdraw or abrogate citizenship. However, no one contends that the Fourteenth Amendment
reestablished perpetual allegiance by its use of the verb “are,” in the sense
that it abrogated the individual’s right to remove herself from its definition.
Nor could they, given the contemporaneous passage of the Expatriation Act
of 1868. One contemporaneous interpretation of the two acts together by
Secretary of State Hamilton Fish claimed that individuals who had expatrimental right” against compelling government interests, and the fact that “[c]itizenship is not a
right held against the state; it is a relationship with the state or, perhaps, a relationship among
persons in the state”).
426
Spiro, supra note 34, at 2170.
427
Aleinkoff, supra note 248, at 1484–85.
428
See Kurland, supra note 345, at 171 (calling the claim that citizenship is nothing less
than the “right to have rights” part of a “grandiloquent” argument but one that was “not
strong on fact”).
429
Cf. Spiro, supra note 34, at 2170.
430
See WEIL, supra note 5, at 184–85.
431
See Christina M. Rodriguez, The Citizenship Clause, Original Meaning, and the Egalitarian Unity of the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1363, 1365–66 (2009).
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ated themselves had chosen to no longer be “subject to the jurisdiction of”
the United States and thus were outside the scope of the Amendment’s definition.432 Whatever the rationale, it is clear the Fourteenth Amendment permits expatriation, as restored, i.e. the right of an individual to relinquish
citizenship. The language of rights, however, has obscured the nature of expatriation, which did not involve the relinquishment or waiver of a “right,”
but was itself an individual right: the fundamental right to transfer allegiance
from one country to another.
IV. EXPATRIATION RESTORED
The foregoing analysis is largely a theoretical enterprise, an attempt to
separate out distinct concepts that have merged over time into a single statute, section 349, and a single dialogue about expatriation. While there is
some intrinsic benefit to such endeavors, the true value is in permitting a
new dialogue to take place in which every participant is speaking the same
language and using the same concept. Expatriation restored and extracted
from the language of rights is a concept that is not a part of the current
discourse.
Two particular dialogues emerge from the process of restoring expatriation that warrant further discussion. First, expatriation restored is grounded
in allegiance—specifically the voluntary renunciation of allegiance to the
United States and transfer of that allegiance to a different sovereign.433 But
allegiance is no longer part of the analysis. Reacting to the precession of the
subject of “expatriate” to the state, the Supreme Court supplanted the inquiry into a citizen’s intent with respect to allegiance with an inquiry into a
citizen’s intent with respect to citizenship itself. Second, the entrenchment of
a robust “right” of “irreducible citizenship” under the Afroyim–Terrazas
framework434 may have unforeseen consequences. While “citizenship has
become absolutely secured” under this framework,435 the security of citizenship and the elimination of allegiance may also have the collateral consequence of degrading citizens’ individual rights. As a result of the
Afroyim–Terrazas framework, the tension between state and citizen that formerly found resolution in discussions about expatriation and allegiance may
have shifted to discussions over the scope of individual rights themselves.

432
Letter from Hamilton Fish, Sec’y of State, to Ulysses S. Grant, President (Aug. 25,
1873), in OPINIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS ON EXPATRIATION, NATURALIZATION, AND ALLEGIANCE, 11, 17, 18 (1873).
433
See supra notes 411–12.
434
Patrick Weil, Citizenship, Passports, and the Legal Identity of Americans: Edward
Snowden and Others Have a Case in the Courts, YALE L.J.F. (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www
.yalelawjournal.org/forum/citizenship-passports-and-the-legal-identity-of-americans [https://
perma.cc/9SAF-HQXM].
435
Id.
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A. Expatriation Restored and Allegiance
As one scholar has recently opined, the concept of allegiance “remains
opaque” at the same time as it remains “an essential element of citizenship.”436 The naturalization “oath of allegiance” continues to require an individual to declare under oath that she “absolutely and entirely renounce[s]
and abjure[s] all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate,
state, or sovereignty, of whom or which [she] ha[s] heretofore been a subject or citizen.”437 School children continue to pledge allegiance to the flag,
and the U.S. Code uses the concept of allegiance to define who constitutes a
U.S. national.438 Allegiance, or the lack thereof, thus remains a powerful
concept; a term, like citizenship, that has been used to delineate “us” from
“them” and to establish those individuals who constitute a particular society
or nation-state.
Allegiance no longer remains an essential element of expatriation, however. Subjective intent with respect to citizenship qua citizenship is the paramount inquiry. Until Afroyim, as interpreted by Terrazas, expatriation never
required an individual to intend to relinquish citizenship as a distinct right; it
required only a voluntary renunciation and transfer of allegiance. Without
allegiance, citizenship was not possible because, although dual citizenship
was acknowledged and permitted, an individual could voluntarily pledge allegiance only to one sovereign.439 Under the governing Afroyim–Terrazas
framework, an individual citizen can, in reality, transfer her allegiance to a
foreign state, but is not considered to have expatriated herself unless she also
desires not to be a citizen. But such an individual may want to retain citizenship for some tangible benefit, such as a passport to access Western nations
without a visa; that desire is today determinative. In those circumstances, her
allegiance is immaterial. Given the history of the concept of expatriation,
there are at least two potentially compelling reasons for this development.
First, given the history of the state ascribing to itself the power to expatriate, the specific intent requirement of the Afroyim–Terrazas framework
could be regarded as a prophylactic rule, ensuring that the individual’s volition remains paramount within the machinations of the administrative state
and that the arbiter does not become the actor. Even if one agrees in the
436
Ashwini Vasanthakumar, Treason, Expatriation and ‘So-Called’ Americans: Recovering the Role of Allegiance in Citizenship, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 187, 190–91 (2014).
437
See 8 C.F.R. § 337.1(a) (2017); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a)(2) (2012) (requiring a
person seeking to be admitted to citizenship to take an oath “to renounce and abjure absolutely
and entirely all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of
whom or which the applicant was before a subject or citizen”).
438
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22) (2012) (defining American national as a “person owing permanent allegiance to the United States”).
439
Cf. Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 500 (1950) (“There is nothing . . . in the
Act of 1907 that implies a congressional intent that, after an American citizen has performed
an overt act which spells expatriation under the wording of the statute, he nevertheless can
preserve for himself a duality of citizenship by showing his intent or understanding to have
been contrary to the usual legal consequences of such an act.”).
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abstract that an individual who has truly transferred or renounced her allegiance to the United States has voluntarily expatriated herself, the question
remains how a state can determine when the renunciation or transfer of such
a nebulous concept like allegiance has occurred. Because of the subjective
nature of allegiance, the only certain way is to ask the individual person.
Under this view, the prophylactic specific intent rule of the
Afroyim–Terrazas framework is a necessity, unless there are procedural, judicial, and administrative safeguards that were not present historically that
would also serve the same prophylactic function and prevent a repeat of the
precession to the state as subject.440
A second possibility is that in today’s global society, the acts that formerly constituted, by definition, a transfer of allegiance, such as naturalizing
in a foreign country, may not carry the same definitional clarity. Dual citizenship has occurred throughout history as a result of, among other things,
the doctrine of perpetual allegiance and the interaction of jus soli and jus
sanguinis citizenship,441 and has long been accepted in the United States.442
440
The text of the current section 349, originating in the Nationality Act of 1940, provides
that a citizen “shall lose his citizenship” when the prerequisites of the statute have occurred.
The 1907 Act provided that an individual “shall be deemed to have expatriated himself,” upon
taking an oath of allegiance to or naturalizing in a foreign country. Both statutes, the 1940
language more directly, provide that the act itself constitutes expatriation, leading to disputes
over whether an individual was a citizen at a specified time after one of the specified acts. A
different approach, and one perhaps less likely to lead to precession, would be to provide that
an individual citizen may expatriate herself by voluntarily renouncing or transferring her allegiance. The statute could provide particular examples of acts and procedures, such as formal
renunciation, or could allow an administrative agency such as the State Department to promulgate regulations doing so, while making clear that none of the acts itself could be a basis for
expatriation. The two essential inquiries would be, as they were originally, allegiance and
voluntariness. And the most difficult task would likely be defining “allegiance” in current
society. Further, instead of providing for automatic expatriation upon the commission of an
act, the statute could adopt several procedural protections to prevent precession: First, it could
require the government to present its evidence of a voluntary renunciation or transfer of allegiance to a neutral magistrate, either in a district court or a special court such as the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, and get an order permitting an expatriation inquiry. Evidentiary protections similar to those present in criminal law could be imposed in order to prevent a
finding of expatriation without any of the protections afforded in the criminal justice system.
And the executive branch could then be required to provide to the individual citizen notice of
an expatriation inquiry and an opportunity to appear to argue that she had not expatriated
herself. As in denaturalization proceedings, the burden on the government should likely be
“clear and convincing evidence.” See Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 137 (1958) (requiring clear and convincing evidence of voluntariness of expatriating act); Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943) (adopting clear and convincing evidence standard in
denaturalization proceedings). But see Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1980) (noting
these holdings were not constitutional rulings and allowing a preponderance of the evidence
standard and presumption of voluntariness under section 349). And even if lower standards are
adopted, the availability of presumptions about voluntariness should be limited to acts that
historically constituted expatriation: naturalization in a foreign country or the taking of an oath
of allegiance to a foreign country. Such a provision would impose a substantial burden on the
executive branch; one it may rarely find worth invoking. But the rationale for the provision
would not necessarily be functional. It would be to reestablish an objective method of determining allegiance, rather than following the dictates of ascriptive citizenship.
441
Spiro, supra note 36, at 1433. Jus sanguinis citizenship is transferred from parent to
child, no matter where the child is born; jus soli citizenship is citizenship accorded based on

R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\55-2\HLL205.txt

2018]

unknown

Expatriation Restored

Seq: 65

18-MAY-18

10:50

427

But ultimate allegiance has historically been singular, as represented by the
naturalization oath still today.443 The acts codified in the 1907 Act of naturalizing in a foreign country or taking an oath of allegiance to that country were
the acts of transferring allegiance; acts of expatriation. Or, in Chief Justice
Warren’s words, they were “acts that would of themselves show a voluntary
abandonment of citizenship.”444 Today, the notion of undivided allegiance
may have less salience, despite the naturalization pledge. An oath of allegiance to one country may not entail, by definition, a renunciation of allegiance to another. Divided, volitional allegiance seems more palatable in our
global society.445 As a result, the species of voluntary expatriation that occurred through the commission of acts that inherently constituted a transfer
of allegiance may be extinct. Under such a view, the intent requirement represents a way to account for these historical developments in the concept of
allegiance. In today’s world, the only remaining species of expatriation, even
as restored, is the specific, intentional renunciation of citizenship. Although
Chief Justice Warren’s dissent includes an understanding of expatriation that
is excluded by the Afroyim–Terrazas framework, that exclusion has been
rendered meaningless by the progress of history.
Either of these interpretations may make logical sense, but neither represents the way the Court conceived of or explained its actions in Afroyim
and Terrazas. And that has consequences. Calls to “strip” citizenship from
terrorists and others have been consistently made since 9/11.446 This movement has not been limited to the United States. Numerous Western and nonWestern countries have passed or updated legislation that allows them to
strip citizenship from citizens in particular circumstances.447 Great Britain
the place of birth. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 478–79 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 667 (1898).
442
See HERZOG, supra note 21, at 111–12.
443
Id. at 128; see 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 337.1 (2017).
444
Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 61, 75 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
445
Vasanthakumar, supra note 436, at 194–96. Furthermore, in previous transportation
eras, residence, or residence animo manendi, with the intention of remaining permanently, was
inseparable from allegiance and nationality. Returning to reside in the United States, or intending to do so, was held repeatedly to overcome any presumption that a citizen who had
been living abroad had transferred her allegiance, a presumption that itself was based on residence. See Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 339 (1939). The idea that voluntary choices about
residence have any relation to fundamental allegiances, or citizenship for that matter, may
have lost much of its salience in the age of the ever-shrinking, fully wired globe. But see, e.g.,
8 U.S.C. § 1401(g) (requiring that a citizen be physically present for a total of five years, two
of which must be after the age of fourteen, in the United States in order for his or her child to
also be a U.S. citizen if the child is born outside of the United States).
446
The debates surrounding the legislative proposals by Senators Cruz, Lieberman, and
Brown are the most prominent, though, despite the rhetoric about citizenship stripping, the
legislation would in reality not have altered the specific intent requirement. See supra text
accompanying notes __ to ___. The Patriot Act II, which would have erected a presumption of
specific intent, is probably more accurately described as a de facto stripping of citizenship.
447
See generally Esbrook, supra note 34, at 1281–90 (cataloguing the current state of the
law in numerous countries). The British law allows for the removal of citizenship “where the
Secretary of State is satisfied that the person has done something seriously prejudicial to the
vital interests of the U.K., provided . . . that revocation of citizenship would not render him
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has utilized its law to strip the citizenship of dual citizens engaged in terrorism prior to the targeting and killing of these individuals by drone strike448
and Australia has recently utilized its citizenship stripping law against an
Islamic State fighter as well.449 If more terrorist acts against the United
States are committed by U.S. citizens,450 these calls may get louder. The
“wind of war” seems almost constant today, as do fears about security, and
the increasing racial and cultural bias toward the Islamic community mirrors
the racial exclusions and fears about “un-American” communist sympathizers and Japanese immigrants of the past.451
As one scholar has pointed out, in practice the Afroyim–Terrazas framework does not entirely foreclose state-as-subject expatriation in practice.452 It
does require the government to prove intent, but, as the supporters and opponents of proposed legislation have noted, the government could take the position that engaging in particular actions related to terrorism demonstrates
intent,453 a position the Patriot Act II sought to codify by establishing the
commission of the act as sufficient to make a prima facie showing of intent

stateless.” Id. at 1285 (quoting British Nationality Act 1981, c. 61, § 40 (as amended by the
Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2002, c. 41, c. 13; Immigration Act 2014, c. 22)).
See generally Shai Lavi, Punishment and the Revocation of Citizenship in the United Kingdom, United States and Israel, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 404 (2010) (discussing the British law
and its uses and arguing for the revocation of citizenship as punishment for a breach of
allegiance).
448
See Susan Hennessy, Banished: A British Solution to Citizenship, Due Process, and
U.S. Drone Strikes, LAWFARE (Mar. 7, 2013, 8:51 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/banished-british-solution-citizenship-due-process-and-us-drone-strikes [https://perma.cc/KWK3DLWN]; Spiro, supra note 34, at 2182.
449
See Jacqueline Williams, A Fighter for ISIS Loses His Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
14, 2017, at A4.
450
Although there is no official list of the citizenship of individuals convicted of terrorism
since 9/11, U.S. citizens and permanent residents constitute a significant number. One list
compiled by The New America Foundation counts U.S. citizens and permanent residents as 84
percent of the 401 U.S. residents charged in terrorism cases since 2001. Peter Bergen, et al.,
Terrorism in America After 9/11: Who Are the Terrorists?, NEW AM., http://www.newamerica
.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/who-are-terrorists [https://perma.cc/LYZ6-H3PM]. U.S.
citizens have also been the perpetrators of some of the most high-profile terrorist attacks,
including Nidal Malik Hasan, the U.S.-born major who opened fire at Fort Hood, killing 13
and injuring 30 others, and Mohammad Youssuf Abdulazeez, a naturalized U.S. citizen who
shot and killed five people at military installations in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Dzhokar
Tsarnaev, one of the perpetrators of the Boston marathon bombing, was also a naturalized U.S.
citizen.
451
HERZOG, supra note 21, at 130 & tbl.9.1 (noting that military conflicts have been the
force behind many historical proposals about expatriation).
452
Vasanthakumar, supra note 436, at 213, 220–22.
453
See 160 Cong. Rec. S5726 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 2014) (remarks of Sen. Cruz) (stating
that the bill would “make fighting for ISIS, taking up arms against the United States, an
affirmative renunciation of American citizenship”); id. at S5728 (letter submitted by the
ACLU) (arguing that the bill “would strip U.S. citizenship from Americans who have not been
convicted of any crimes, but who are suspected of being involved with designated foreign
terrorist organizations”); Charlie Savage & Carl Hulse, Bill Targets Citizenship of Terrorists’
Allies, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2010, at A12 (quoting Scott Brown as stating that “[i]ndividuals
who pick up arms . . . have effectively denounced their citizenship, and this legislation simply
memorializes that effort”).
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and to put the burden on the individual citizen to disprove it.454 If an administration decided to utilize citizenship-stripping aggressively in the fight
against terrorism455 under a version of the legislation that has been proposed,
or even as a form of severe punishment for those engaging in “un-American” activities such as flag burning,456 the prevailing Afroyim–Terrazas
framework would be an impediment but not an absolute bar. The government would have to prove intent, but the acts that can be used to demonstrate
such intent are not limited and the question of allegiance is irrelevant. As
Professor Roche recognized over fifty years ago, some of the acts in section
349 that could potentially be the basis for expatriation are “based on the
proposition that ‘Bad Americans’ should be deprived of their nationality”
and “provide[ ] a mode of punishment additional to those provided by the
criminal law for certain heinous offenses against sovereignty.”457 Those acts,
and the impetus to act against “Bad Americans,” remain today.
Restoring expatriation would nullify that possibility. Expatriation law
would then not only continue to support the principle expressed in Chief
Justice Warren’s Perez dissent and established as law by Afroyim that Congress lacks the constitutional authority to strip citizenship, but it would also
remove the idea that a variety of acts can be the basis for expatriation as long
as Congress codifies them and the requisite intent is present. In contrast to
the acts specified by the current section 349, the two principal acts Congress
“deemed” to be expatriation by an individual in the 1907 Act were in fact
expatriation:458 under prevailing international understanding, they were voluntary transfers of allegiance from one country to another. Inclusion of only
454
The Patriot Act II, like the more recently proposed legislation, would have added several expatriating acts related to terrorism to section 349, but, unlike the later proposals, it
would also have added a provision stating that “[t]he voluntary commission or performance”
of two of the expatriating acts—namely joining the armed forces of a foreign state engaged in
hostilities against the United States or “joining, serving in, or providing material support . . . to
a terrorist organization . . . if the organization is engaged in hostilities against the United
States, its people, or its national security interests”—would necessarily constitute “prima facie
evidence that the act was done with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality.”
Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 § 501(b) (Jan. 9, 2003), http://www-tc.pbs.org/
now/politics/patriot2-hi.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2QE-KCGX].
455
The Department of Justice under Attorney General Sessions has committed to “aggressively pursue denaturalization of known or suspected terrorists,” when their naturalized citizenship has been procured illegally or by deception. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Justice Dep’t Secures the Denaturalization of a Repeat Child Sex Abuser (June 29, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-secures-denaturalization-repeat-child-sexabuser [https://perma.cc/JM56-LD6N]; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012); United States v.
Mohammad, 249 F. Supp. 3d 450, 457–58 (D.D.C. 2017). The Administration does not appear
to have pursued the expatriation of any terrorists at this time.
456
See Charlie Savage, Court Rulings Would Hinder Flag Stance from Trump, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2016, at A17 (quoting then-President-elect Trump’s tweet positing loss of
citizenship as a punishment for flag burning).
457
Roche, The Expatriation Cases, supra note 107, at 337.
458
The two acts being naturalization in a foreign country or the taking of a meaningful
oath of allegiance to a foreign country. As discussed, the provision dealing with residence
abroad raised only a presumption of expatriation, and the provisions dictating that women who
married foreign citizens lost their U.S. citizenship were not grounded in expatriation but rather
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these acts was significant. In the government’s view, individuals could not
expatriate themselves without performing one of these acts, precisely because they could not expatriate themselves without transferring their allegiance to another country.459 That was not a limitation imposed on the
individual by the state; it was a limitation in the concept of expatriation
itself. In passing the 1907 Act, Congress was thus exercising the authority to
codify the individual’s right of expatriation, not to grant the executive branch
new authority or alter the nature of expatriation itself. Justice Patterson had
advocated for such legislation over a century earlier in Talbot’s Case.460
As demonstrated by the repeated legislative proposals to add actions
related to terrorism as additional expatriating acts under section 349, the idea
that a citizen can lose her citizenship, or be deprived of it, on the basis of
actions that cast doubt on her continued loyalty to the state has not disappeared entirely.461 Although the precession of its subject of “expatriate” has
made expatriation the centerpiece of this dialogue, the debates are in reality
tied to the ancient concepts of banishment and exile.462 They are related to
expatriation only because they originate in the same fundamental concept of
citizenship as social compact or consensual relationship that gave birth to the
individual right of expatriation. But ultimately they are about the ways in
which the state may act as a subject, action incompatible with the concept of
expatriation restored. Relevant to that conversation, but not to expatriation
restored, are the 1865 Civil War provision that imposed the loss of the
“rights of citizenship” on deserters; the legislative proposal to revoke the
citizenship of officers in the Confederate Government that was pocket vetoed by President Lincoln; and current section 349(a)(7), originating in the
Nationality Act of 1940, that imposes the loss of citizenship as an additional
consequence of a conviction for treason or attempting to overthrow the
government.

in the historical subjugation of women to their husbands. See supra text accompanying notes
213–38.
459
Although it was an early source of controversy, the debate over the government’s authority to limit expatriation to particular acts, or to particular locations, has largely disappeared
as the individual right of expatriation has transformed into the voluntary waiver of the right to
citizenship. Although Jefferson contributed to the first expatriation law in Virginia, which provided formal procedures for the exercise of the right, he also opined that an individual could
exercise the right through any other effectual means. Bradburn, supra note 55, at 106. If an
individual has a right to expatriate, can Congress limit its exercise to, for example, acts committed on foreign soil, as section 349 continues to require? 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6). Superficially, the Afroyim–Terrazas framework stands for the principle that the individual is the
ultimate arbiter of expatriation; the government has no authority. But, on closer inspection,
they, in fact, do not address the question of government authority in this respect. Instead, they
stand for the proposition that the individual must be the subject, the entity exercising authority,
a response to the historical precession of the subject. They do not address to what extent
Congress or the executive branch have the inherent authority to limit, standardize, or interpret
such action or intent.
460
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 163–65 (1795).
461
See supra text accompanying notes 26–32.
462
Roche, supra note 190.
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As long as the prevailing conception of expatriation—as represented by
the text of section 349 as well as the legislative and scholarly dialogue—
contains the remnants of its past precession and includes under its umbrella
acts relevant only as evidence of allegiance along with punitive citizenshipstripping measures that have little relation to transfers of allegiance, the potential for the state to act as subject remains. The further addition of loss of
citizenship as punishment for acts such as terrorism that shock our sense of
society remains viable by analogy to the existing desertion and treason provision. Despite their repeated invocation of the term, however, those conversations are not about expatriation.
The requirement to prove specific intent and the analogy to the voluntary waiver of rights would make the functional use of such provisions difficult in practice and would likely render punitive additions ineffective. But it
would also operate as a panacea for any constitutional issues regarding Congress’s authority to define expatriating acts. As one scholar characterizes it,
“the requirement of specific intent would appear to collapse the distinction
between statutory expatriation and voluntary renunciation.”463 For example,
as long as the government is willing to try and prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that an individual intended to renounce citizenship when she,
for example, provided material support for terrorism,464 the loss of citizenship is no longer a “punishment” that runs afoul of Trop’s Eighth Amendment holding. It is simply a recognition of the “will of the citizen.”465
Similarly, whether becoming a member of a foreign terrorist organization, as
defined by the State Department, inherently constitutes a transfer of allegiance is irrelevant if the government can prove by circumstantial evidence
that in becoming a member the individual intended to relinquish her
citizenship.466
Even though the Afroyim–Terrazas framework is largely regarded as
fulfilling the vision begun by Chief Justice Warren in his Perez dissent, the
slight difference between the two is, in a word, allegiance. But the difference
is not the existence or meaning of allegiance; the true difference is the nature
of the inquiry into its existence. Chief Justice Warren, who attempted in his
dissent to restore the historical understanding of expatriation, acknowledged
that “United States citizenship can be abandoned, temporarily or permanently, by conduct showing voluntary transfer of allegiance to another coun-

463

Vasanthakumar, supra note 436, at 220.
See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 263 (1980); see also S. 361, 115th Cong. § 2
(2017) (adding “[b]ecoming a member of, or providing training or material assistance to, any
foreign terrorist organization designated under section 219” as an additional basis for loss of
citizenship). Almost all of the legislative proposals since 2001 to expand the expatriating acts
in section 349 to address terrorism have included similar provisions. See supra note 6.
465
Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 260.
466
Id. at 261 (“‘Of course,’ any of the specified acts ‘may be highly persuasive evidence
in the particular case of a purpose to abandon citizenship.’” (quoting Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 129, 139 (1958) (Black, J., concurring))).
464
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try.”467 But, in his view, such conduct was limited to “voluntarily
performing acts that compromise his undivided allegiance to his country.”468
Historically, those acts are limited to those that by definition transfer allegiance to another country. The Afroyim–Terrazas framework abandons the
focus on allegiance in favor of exalting specific intent regarding citizenship.
Under this view, the acts currently enumerated in section 349, as well as any
acts that may be subsequently added, trigger expatriation as long as the requisite intent is present.
The limitation imposed by the Afroyim–Terrazas framework is a limitation on the state: it may not expatriate an individual without her “assent,”
that is, without “anything less than an intent to relinquish citizenship.”469
But as long as the state can shoulder its burden of proving the two necessary
conditions—voluntary performance of an act listed in section 349 and specific intent to relinquish citizenship—the state has not violated the constitutional rule.470 In contrast, as explained by Chief Justice Warren’s dissent,
expatriation restored is, by definition, inherently limited to voluntary transfers of allegiance. The possibility of expatriation occurring necessarily by,
for example, providing material support to terrorism, joining a terrorist organization, engaging in hostilities against U.S. forces as part of a terrorist
organization, or even burning an American flag, does not exist. The restoration of allegiance as the foundation of expatriation ensures that.
B. Expatriation Restored and Citizens’ Individual Rights
Afroyim’s conception of citizenship as an individually held “right” that
is governed by familiar principles of voluntary waiver results in a sacred
view of citizenship as a “kind of ‘super-right’—one that cannot be balanced
away,” an “absolute right of citizenship.”471 That admirable view, reinforced
by Terrazas, has entrenched itself in American jurisprudence and society.472
One unacknowledged collateral consequence, however, of the disappearance
of expatriation as restored and allegiance from the dialogue and the emergence of an absolute right of citizenship may be the degradation of citizens’
individual rights.

467

Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 73 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 78. A similar sentiment appears on the Attorney General’s opinion interpreting
the Court’s decision in Afroyim, though its understanding of actions that would be “in derogation of allegiance” was based on the understanding of allegiance and expatriation prevailing at
that time, not on actions that were historically understood to constitute derogation of allegiance
to one’s country: “‘Voluntary relinquishment’ of citizenship is not confined to a written renunciation . . . . It can also be manifested by other actions declared expatriative under the act, if
such actions are in derogation of allegiance to this country.” Expatriation—Effect of Afroyim
v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 397, 400 (1969) (emphasis added).
469
Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 260.
470
Id. at 261.
471
Aleinkoff, supra note 248, at 1486–87.
472
WEIL, supra note 5, at 184–85.
468
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In his recent book on the history of denaturalization, Patrick Weil eloquently recounts the revolution in citizenship that began with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Afroyim: “By saying to each American that, as a citizen,
you are a part of the sovereign, independent of your age and your country of
origin, the Supreme Court provoked a silent revolution in the relationship
between the American people and their government.”473 He argues that the
Afroyim decision, which he views as the culmination of Chief Justice Warren’s leadership on the issue, “embrac[ed] an innovative concept of citizen
sovereign” and removed “the specter of expatriation that cast a pall shadow
over a great many American citizens.”474 This “citizen sovereignty” “protect[s] citizens from unwilling expatriation even if they also possess another
nationality.”475 Weil’s contentions about the revolution achieved by Afroyim
are insightful, and his book represents an important narrative cataloguing the
checkered history of the United States in utilizing denaturalization and citizenship stripping (state-as-subject “expatriation”) in support of racist exclusionary policies, xenophobia, the subjection of women, and the suppression
of particular political ideas. He does not recognize, however, the potential
collateral consequences of this revolution, and its subjugation of allegiance,
on the rights of citizens more broadly.
Many of the most important cases establishing citizens’ and noncitizens’
rights and the relative constitutional authority of the three branches of government, especially in the context of national security or war, involve U.S.
citizens who fall outside of prevailing socio-cultural norms about what constitutes a “citizen.”476 One scholar has argued that this is the result of a
category of “pseudo-citizenship,” in which citizens who lack many of the
characteristics of the “typical” citizen—racial, religious, and cultural—receive different treatment.477 Commentators have cited, for example, the differential treatment of John Walker Lindh and Yaser Hamdi by the Bush
Administration as an example of discrimination within the class of U.S. citi-

473

Id. at 184–85.
Id. at 183.
475
Id.
476
Examples of such cases could include, among others, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507 (2004); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942); Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902); and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See also al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 160,
164 (4th Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en
banc) (per curiam), vacated sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009); Padilla v.
Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 388 (4th Cir. 2005).
477
See Juliet Stumpf, Citizens of an Enemy Land: Enemy Combatants, Aliens, and the
Constitutional Rights of the Pseudo-Citizen, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79, 87 (2004); see also
Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2002); Hiroshi
Motomura, Immigration and We the People After September 11, 66 ALB. L. REV. 413, 422
(2003) (“What is really troubling about the government’s response to September 11 has not
been that the government is treating citizens and noncitizens differently. Rather, it is that
current policies treat many citizens as if they were noncitizens - at least if we look beyond a
narrow, legalistic definition of what it means to be a U.S. citizen.”).
474
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zens.478 Some of the characteristics they have highlighted, such as residence,479 were, in the past, used as indicia of allegiance and relevant to
questions of expatriation.480 The story of Yaser Hamdi, as the Supreme Court
considered his case and as the executive branch attempted to resolve his
situation after the ruling, illustrates the problems that may be inherent in
reducing citizenship to a waivable right, bereft of the concept of allegiance
that formerly defined it and governed expatriation.
1. Citizen Precedents
Yaser Hamdi was born in Louisiana where his father, a Saudi citizen
and chemical engineer, was stationed. He moved to Saudi Arabia with his
family as a young child.481 He was apprehended by the government in Afghanistan, allegedly fighting for the Taliban, and sent to Guantanamo until
the Administration transferred him to South Carolina after it learned of his
citizenship.482 The Administration claimed the authority to detain Hamdi
outside of the civilian criminal justice system as an enemy combatant, and a
divided Supreme Court ultimately upheld his detention.483 The Court also
required some level of due process, mandating that Hamdi receive “notice of
the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the
Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decision-maker.”484 Justice
Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that, under governing
law, congressional intent to authorize the detention of a citizen under the
laws of war must be explicit.485 And Justice Scalia penned a forceful dissent
based almost entirely on citizenship, arguing that Hamdi’s citizenship left
only two options for detaining him: the civilian criminal justice system or a
suspension of habeas corpus.486

478
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Assault on the Constitution: Executive Power and the War on
Terrorism, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 10 n.41 (2006) (“Hamdi’s situation is identical to that of
John Walker Lindh, except that Lindh was indicted and plead guilty to crimes.”); see also
Frank W. Dunham, Where Hamdi Meets Moussaoui in the War on Terror, 53 DRAKE L. REV.
839, 844 (2005) (suggesting that Hamdi was not prosecuted, despite identical circumstances to
Lindh’s, because “he did not look like he was born in the United States. He looked like he was
Saudi Arabian, he spoke Arabic; he was not, on the surface of it, an American citizen.”);
Ediberto Román, The Citizenship Dialectic, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 557, 559 (2006) (“While the
cases of these individuals may be more complex than the above suggests, the disparate treatment of three similarly-situated individuals allows critics of the judicial system to raise questions concerning the motivations behind and basis for the disparate treatment.”).
479
See Stumpf, supra note 477, at 111–12.
480
See supra note 445.
481
See Joel Brinkley, A Father Waits as the U.S. and the Saudis Discuss His Son’s Release, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2004, at Al5; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004)
(plurality opinion).
482
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510 (plurality opinion).
483
Id. at 510–11, 516–24.
484
Id. at 533.
485
Id. at 539–41 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
486
Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The principal case on which Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in
Hamdi relies is Ex parte Quirin.487 Her opinion rebuts Justice Scalia’s formal
distinction of the citizen by pointing to Quirin’s holding that “[c]itizens
who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government,
and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile
acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of . . . the law of war.”488
Quirin, of course, is the (in)famous case of the would-be German “saboteurs” who entered the United States surreptitiously with some notion of
sabotage and then promptly surrendered.489 The Court agreed to hear their
habeas case under its original jurisdiction on July 27, received briefing from
the parties on July 29, heard oral argument that day and the next, July 30,
and issued a short per curiam decision upholding the constitutionality of the
trial of the saboteurs by military commission on July 31.490
One of these saboteurs, Haupt, contended he was a U.S. citizen and
thus entitled to the procedural rights guaranteed to him by the Constitution,
including that of a trial by jury.491 His parents had traveled to the United
States when he was a child and naturalized, making him a naturalized citizen
as a child.492 Under the governing law at the time Quirin was decided, however, Haupt was almost certainly not a citizen.493 The United States argued
that Haupt had lost his U.S. citizenship because, upon reaching majority,
Haupt had “elected to maintain German allegiance” and had “by his conduct [i.e. by joining the hostile German armed forces and presumably swearing an oath to Germany] voluntarily renounced or abandoned his United
States citizenship.”494 The Court brushed the argument aside in a single paragraph, holding that citizenship would not matter given that Haupt was

487

See generally id. (plurality opinion) (relying on Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)).
Id. at 519 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37).
489
Andrew Kent, Judicial Review for Enemy Fighters: The Court’s Fateful Turn in Ex
Parte Quirin, the Nazi Saboteur Case, 66 VAND. U. L. REV. 153, 160–65 (2013) (providing the
background of the case).
490
Id. at 164–65. The Court noted in its per curiam opinion that “a full opinion” would
issue at a later date. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1. Six of the saboteurs were found guilty by
the military commission three days later and then executed shortly thereafter. MICHAEL
DOBBS, SABOTEURS: THE NAZI RAID ON AMERICA 263 (2004). The Court’s opinion explaining
its rationale did not issue until over two months later on October 29, 1942. 317 U.S. at 1.
491
Kent, supra note 489, at 213.
492
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20.
493
See 8 U.S.C. § 801 (1940); Burt Neuborne, Spheres of Justice: Who Decides?, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1090, 1109 n.23 (2006).
494
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20. That argument echoed the doctrines of confirmatory
and supplemental acts that the State Department had formerly used to determine whether
someone had truly transferred their allegiance to another sovereign. See supra text accompanying notes 187–221.
488
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clearly an enemy belligerent.495 That choice allowed the Hamdi plurality to
reject Justice Scalia’s attempt to draw a bright-line rule at citizenship.496
The Court’s decision in Hamdi has had significant consequences for the
due process rights of American citizens in the national security context. The
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel concluded, largely relying
on Hamdi, that the extraterritorial targeting of Anwar Al-Awlaki comported
with due process, despite the lack of any notice or judicial review.497 Further,
although the Obama Administration made it a policy not to detain any U.S.
citizens as enemy combatants outside of the U.S. criminal justice system,
Hamdi leaves that possibility open for future administrations. As a candidate, President Trump indicated a desire to make that possibility a reality,498
and the Trump Administration has recently detained a U.S. citizen as an
enemy combatant in Iraq after the citizen surrendered to U.S.-aligned forces
in Syria.499 The Hamdi decision, and the lower courts’ implementation of it,
allow for reduced due process protections, such as reliance on hearsay and a

495
Id. at 37–38. Under the principle of election, had it remained in existence in 2001,
Hamdi may not have been a citizen either. The doctrine, which the Court implicitly accepted in
Perkins, held that native-born citizens who moved abroad during their minority and gained
another citizenship through their parents, had to make a choice of allegiances upon reaching
majority. Hamdi was twenty years old when he traveled to Afghanistan on a Saudi passport
and had never indicated an intent to return to the United States. Under the law existing at the
time of Perkins, assuming the age of majority was 18, Hamdi’s decision to continue his allegiance to Saudi Arabia may have been regarded as presumptively renouncing his U.S. citizenship, a presumption that could have been overcome had he demonstrated an intent to return to
the United States to live permanently in the future. See Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 333–34
(1939).
496
See Stumpf, supra note 477, at 109 (“By aggregating citizens and non-citizens within
the single category of enemy belligerents, Quirin allowed norms created for non-citizens and
pseudo-citizens to apply to U.S. citizens.”).
497
See Memorandum for the Att’y Gen. from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel (July 16, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/olc/olc-foia-electronicreading-room [https://perma.cc/63P6-2ML3]. The same phenomenon of providing reduced
rights to citizens who seem to be so only by accident may be at work in the OLC opinion as
well. Like Hamdi, Al-Awlaki was born in the United States but taken back to his parents’
native country, Yemen, during his childhood. Unlike Hamdi, Al-Awlaki returned to the United
States after reaching majority and made the United States his home. Al-Awlaki thus would
have a stronger claim than Hamdi to citizenship under expatriation as understood under the
1907 Act because of his election to return, but his later extended residence in Yemen would
have raised a presumption of expatriation, one that could have been overcome by a return to
the United States but would have prevented him from receiving the protection of the United
States while he lived abroad. See supra text accompanying notes 194–200.
498
See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Trump Backs Guantanamo for Trials of Americans, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2016, at A11.
499
See Doe v. Mattis, No. 17–cv–2069 (TSC), 2018 WL 534324, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 23,
2018); ACLU v. Mattis, No. 17–cv–2069 (TSC), 2017 WL 6558503, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 23,
2017); see also Spencer S. Hsu, U.S. Judge Balks at Nearly Three-Month Detention of Unnamed American ISIS Suspect, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/local/public-safety/us-judge-to-question-nearly-3-month-detention-of-unnamed-american-isis-suspect/2017/12/10/c6fd50e6-dc4d-11e7-b859-fb0995360725_story.html [https://per
ma.cc/QA4W-BVJD].
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presumption in favor of the Government’s evidence,500 which set a precedent
about the scope and nature of every citizen’s due process rights. There is no
separate Due Process Clause for citizens who are accused of being terrorists
or citizens who are facing other coercive government actions.501 The Hamdi
precedent applies equally to all citizens (and non-citizens where applicable)
in that regard, even if one can attempt to distinguish it based on its nationalsecurity context.502 And the primary basis for its refusal to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens was a case about an individual who may
very well not have been a citizen because he had voluntarily transferred his
allegiance to another country before embarking on his mission of sabotage.
If the Court had analyzed Haupt’s actions in light of the doctrine of
expatriation restored, it may very well have concluded that Haupt was not a
citizen, as he was most certainly not under the governing state-as-subject
expatriation regime at the time. Instead, the Court set down a precedent in
Quirin, which Hamdi picked up and furthered, setting another precedent,
which was extended in the OLC opinion and is now the basis for the detention of another U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant.503 Had expatriation restored been the basis of the Quirin decision, that precedent would not have
been available in Hamdi. And a majority of the Justices in Hamdi would
almost certainly have found the detention unconstitutional.
If Quirin had been a decision about Haupt’s allegiance and expatriation
restored, it would likely have its own perils given the pressure on the Court
to defer to the Executive. But the reinsertion at the forefront of the debate of
the concept of allegiance as an express consideration, rather than an unconscious consideration, may also have prevented the degradation of citizens’
rights. Express consideration of allegiance in both Quirin and Hamdi may
even have elevated the importance of citizenship enough to sway a few Justices toward Justice Scalia’s bright-line view. Based on Quirin, the plurality
rejected the idea that Hamdi should have more rights based on his “accident” of birth.504 A more robust conception of citizenship that included alle-

500
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533–34 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also AlBihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 868–69 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (rejecting due process challenge to
the use of hearsay and a preponderance of evidence standard).
501
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 528–34 (grounding the due process analysis in the generally
applicable test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), a case involving social security benefits).
502
See, e.g., El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (relying on Hamdi in a due process analysis over the destruction of property in an
Afghanistan airstrike); Hicks v. Colvin, 214 F. Supp. 3d 627, 636 (E.D. Ky. 2016) (rejecting
the Social Security Administration’s argument that Hamdi is “fundamentally different” and
relying on it as part of its due process analysis); see also Mohamed v. Holder, No. 1:11–cv–50
(AJT/MSN), 2015 WL 4394958, at *5 (E.D. Va. Jul. 16, 2015) (applying Hamdi in the context
of a citizen’s challenge to his placement on the No Fly List).
503
See Doe v. Mattis, No. 17–cv–2069 (TSC), 2018 WL 534324, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 23,
2018); ACLU v. Mattis, No. 17–cv–2069 (TSC), 2017 WL 6558503, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 23,
2017).
504
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519, 522–24 (plurality opinion).
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giance would prevent such a dismissal of citizenship in favor of protecting
citizens’ rights or limit the applicability of the holding so that citizens’ rights
were not diminished.
2. The Right to Citizenship and “Voluntary” Expatriation
The aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi also demonstrates the danger of considering citizenship a “right” as opposed to a status
created by an individual’s allegiance. Several months after the Court’s decision, the Administration announced that Hamdi would be released to Saudi
Arabia pursuant to an agreement.505 As one condition of this release, Hamdi
agreed “to appear before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United
States . . . to renounce any claim that he may have to United States nationality pursuant to Section 349(a)(5)” of the Immigration and Nationality Act.506
If he failed to fulfill this condition, or any other condition of the agreement,
Hamdi could “be detained immediately insofar as consistent with the law of
armed conflict.”507 News reports indicate the Trump Administration has considered a similar resolution with respect to the U.S. citizen currently detained as an enemy combatant in Iraq: transferring him to Saudi Arabia but
forcing him to renounce his citizenship as a condition of release.508
The fundamental necessity for expatriation from its inception has been
voluntary action.509 In Nishikawa, even Justice Frankfurter, the author of the
Perez majority, stressed in his concurring opinion the necessity that expatriation be voluntary, and he reasoned that a presumption of involuntariness was
appropriate “[w]here an individual engages in conduct by command of a
penal statute of another country to whose laws he is subject,” especially
when “a consequence as drastic as denationalization may be the effect of
such conduct.”510 In the infamous case arising from the coerced renunciation
of citizenship by Japanese Americans interned at the Tule Lake Camp, a
court concluded that
the Government was fully aware of the coercion by pro-Japanese
organizations and the fear, anxiety, hopelessness and despair of the
renunciants . . . the existence of which . . . was adequate to pro-

505
Press Release, Mark Corallo, Dir. of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Regarding
Yaser Hamdi (Sept. 22, 2004), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2004/September/04_opa
_640.htm [https://perma.cc/2PDR-RPR8].
506
Hamdi Release Agreement ¶ 8, http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/91704stlagr
mnt3.html [https://perma.cc/89S3-8W7L].
507
Id. at ¶ 12.
508
ACLU v. Mattis, No. 17–cv–2069 (TSC), 2017 WL 6558503, at *2 (Dec. 23, 2017).
509
See Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 334 (1939) (noting that “voluntary action . . . is of
the essence of the right of expatriation”).
510
Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 141–42 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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duce, at least, a confused state of mind on the part of the renunciants and in which considered decision became impossible.511
If expatriation is conceived of as the waiver of the right to citizenship,
however, rather than a right itself, the analysis changes. Under the doctrines
governing the waiver of “rights,” however, U.S. citizens may voluntarily
enter into plea agreements with the government that waive their fundamental
constitutional rights in exchange for reduced sentence terms or other
considerations.512
The executive branch has explicitly relied on an analogy between this
doctrine and expatriation in exchange for an agreement not to pursue denaturalization to argue that such expatriation remains voluntary. Two former
Nazi officials were facing denaturalization for having lied about their service
to the Nazi regime upon seeking naturalization, but the United States agreed
not to pursue denaturalization, which would potentially have the effect of
removing Social Security benefits, if the two individuals left the country and
renounced their U.S. citizenship.513 OLC concluded that such renunciation
was voluntary because, as in a plea agreement, “the individual[s] g[a]ve[ ]
up valuable constitutional rights—the right to citizenship, in the case of
[former Nazi officials], and the rights to trial by jury and to confront witnesses and the protection against self-incrimination in the case of criminal
defendants—in exchange for less severe treatment by government prosecutors.”514 The OLC opinion noted that there were “procedural differences”
between the two practices, but reasoned that similarity of the “substantive
issues involved—i.e. whether a waiver of constitutional rights as part of a
bargain with government prosecutors can be considered voluntary” made the
plea bargain analogy “highly relevant.”515
The analogy of the OLC opinion is difficult to fault under the
Afroyim–Terrazas conception of expatriation. Applying that framework,
Hamdi did have the specific intent to renounce his citizenship, as evidenced
by the fact that, advised by counsel, he expressly agreed to expatriate himself, and the plea bargain analogy makes it difficult to argue that his renunciation was not voluntary. And Hamdi could, under the threat of continued
indefinite detention, be forced to “expatriate” himself, even though
Nishikawa had not acted voluntarily to expatriate himself while serving in
the Japanese army under threat of penal sanction, because Hamdi received a

511
Abo v. Clark, 77 F. Supp. 806 (N.D. Cal. 1948), aff’d, rev’d, and amended in part, 186
F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1951).
512
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970).
513
Voluntariness of Renunciations of Citizenship Under 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6), 8 Op.
O.L.C. 220, 222–24 (1984).
514
Id. at 231.
515
Id.
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“benefit” from the United States, i.e. an agreement not to detain him indefinitely as an enemy combatant.516
One could certainly question the correctness of the plea bargain doctrine or question the aptness of the analogy. But setting those two potential
objections aside, the concept of expatriation restored also shows the fundamental problem with the Hamdi agreement. Under expatriation restored, citizenship is not a right to be waived but the consequence of allegiance.
Because allegiance has no role, the “voluntariness” of expatriation is reduced to the individual’s intent with respect to her citizenship. The question
should not be whether Hamdi intended to relinquish his citizenship and did
so voluntarily in order to receive a benefit; the question should be whether
Hamdi made a conscious decision to renounce or transfer his allegiance or
whether he, like Nishikawa, engaged in particular actions because the government threatened severe consequences if he did not, and never voluntarily
decided to transfer his allegiance away from the United States. The precedent is troubling in that it would allow the government to use its ample
powers of coercion to induce “voluntary” transfers of allegiance whenever
doing so would be convenient.
***
Expatriation restored, a concept grounded in allegiance, provides a
functional, as opposed to a merely formal, foundation for the rights of citizens, even citizens who may not fit the dominant sociocultural construct of a
citizen. As one scholar has remarked, “[r]elying too heavily on a formal
distinction between citizens and non-citizens will fail to anticipate the effect
on citizens of rules now being crafted for non-citizens.”517 Under the
Afroyim–Terrazas framework, however, the formal distinction is the only
one available where expatriation is concerned. And that distinction, though
highly protective of citizenship, may fail to anticipate the effect on citizens’
rights of rules crafted in a regime in which allegiance bears no weight. Citizenship, under the Afroyim–Terrazas conception of expatriation, means an
individual became a citizen either by birth or naturalization and wants to
remain a citizen, nothing more. Under the concept of expatriation restored,

516
Voluntariness remains an essential element of expatriation even under the
Afroyim–Terrazas framework as demonstrated by the case of the 400 U.S. citizens of an obscure religious cult called the Original African Hebrew Israelite Nation of Jerusalem who
renounced their U.S. citizenship in Israel at the command of the cult leadership. See Alan G.
James, Cult-Induced Renunciation of United States Citizenship: The Involuntary Expatriation
of Black Hebrews, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645 (1991). Eventually, almost all of the renunciants
had their citizenship restored after pursuing appeals within the State Department to the Board
of Appellate Review and seeking reconsideration. Id. at 661–70. The Board of Appellate Review, in reversing an earlier decision in one of these cases, found that renunciation had not
been voluntary because it was “unable to conclude that appellant’s formal renunciation was
wholly without taint of coercion.” Id. at 667. In stark contrast to the OLC opinion, the Board
concluded that “[i]n our opinion, a renunciation procured by pressure, even pressure exerted
on a presumptively strong, resourceful person, cannot stand as a matter of law.” Id.
517
Stumpf, supra note 477, at 139.
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however, citizenship entails something more fundamental: allegiance. Developing a concept of allegiance in the current, global society and defining,
and providing notice of, objective indicia of its renunciation or transfer,
could return expatriation restored and allegiance to the conversation. And
that might ultimately provide a rationale that would prevent the discounting
of citizenship as largely immaterial to the scope of constitutional rights.
V. CONCLUSION
Given the terrorism-related rebirth in legislative, scholarly, and popular
attention to the authority of the government and the rights of a citizen with
respect to citizenship, this Article seeks to reorient the dialogue by restoring
the concept of expatriation. The keywords of this conversation include “loss
of citizenship,” “denationalization,” “revoking” citizenship, and, invariably, “expatriation,” sometimes called “statutory expatriation” or “involuntary expatriation” to make clear that the term is using the state, not the
individual, as its subject. But there should be no need for such clarification.
Expatriation restored is nothing more than an individual’s right to renounce her allegiance to her country and nothing less. As this Article explains, that individual right dates all the way back to, and in many ways
originates in, the founding of our country, appearing in the writings of
Thomas Jefferson, among others, and playing a role in leading the young
United States back into war in 1812. Although the existence of the right was
debated vigorously during the first century of the United States, that debate
was settled in the Expatriation Act of 1868. This Article seeks to undo the
distortion of the term expatriation that has occurred since and to restore expatriation as the individual right to transfer one’s allegiance.
This restoration is vital because the concept of expatriation today, as a
result of the historical precession of the subject of “expatriate,” still includes
the potential for state action. And it has lost all connection to allegiance,
supplanting it with specific intent. As a result, section 349, and the proposed
amendments to it, allow the state to act as subject when it can prove intent
by circumstantial evidence. Expatriation restored does not permit that. Expatriation restored is limited to specific actions, the continuing validity of
which remains to be explored. Without the historical concept of expatriation
restored, courts are no longer able to point to allegiance as a defining characteristic of citizenship, one that differentiates and validates the rights of citizens. Instead, citizenship has become both an accidental formality that
typically bears little weight in the context of individual rights and a right as
waivable as any other fundamental right. Restoring expatriation would restore citizenship: the individual would be the only permissible subject of
“expatriate” and allegiance would be determinative, not derivative.
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